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On the Borderlands of Chevron's Empire: An Essay
on Title VII, Agency Procedures and Priorities, and
the Power of Judicial Review
Barry Sullivan *
"0 body swayed to music, 0 brightening glance,
How can we know the dancer from the dance?" 1
I. INTRODUCTION
In the conventional taxonomy of governmental actors and
functions, administrators are said to "execute" or enforce the law.
Like courts, however, administrators also interpret law. Otherwise,
execution or enforcement of the law would not be possible. In some
cases, the burden of interpretation may be relatively undemanding.
Congress may have given relatively specific instructions as to what
an administrator, applicant for benefits, or regulated industry is
required to do in a set of carefully defined situations, leaving little
room or need for administrative "interpretation." In many cases,
however, the task of interpretation will be more substantial.
Congress's instructions will be less precise, and their proper
application to the class of circumstances at hand will be subject to
contest, requiring recourse to relevant interpretive materials,
analysis, and the exercise of judgment. Administrators will be
required to interpret the law, and will do so in much the same way
that courts do, albeit from a perspective that may be more practical
and informed, as well as more obviously interested. At the far end
of the spectrum, Congress may have legislated in such a way that its
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signals are so sketchy or contradictory as to make interpretation
nearly impossible.
In addition, the work of administrators sometimes includes
"lawmaking" or legislation.2 In some cases, Congress will have given
that responsibility to administrators expressly, as when administrators
are charged by statute with the responsibility for promulgating
"legislative" or substantive rules-rules that are indistinguishable
from statutes, have the force and effect of law, and directly create
enforceable rights or duties. Often the responsibility for crafting
legislative rules will entail the making of choices about policy issues,
large or small. In this class of cases, the proper field of
administrative action, as well as the degree of discretion to be
accorded the administrator's choices and determinations, may be
2. Whether, and to What extent, one may legitimately distinguish between
"interpretation" and "lawmaking" is a matter generally subject to dispute in
contemporary legal scholarship. See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, The Rulemaking
Continuum, 41 Duke L.J. 1463 (1992) (discussing interpretations of agency
legislative rules). On the other hand, it is a distinction that the practice of
administrative law requires us to make. Paul W. Kahn has written:
At the very core of law's rule is the distinction between applying law and
making new law, or between interpreting and creating law. No matter
how many scholars question the distinction, the rule of law as a social
practice is bound to it. We can imagine a policy science that is wholly
unbounded by the past, but it is not law's rule.
Paul W. Kahn, The Cultural Study of Law: Reconstructing Legal Scholarship 44-
45 (1999) (footnote omitted). It is also the case, of course, that agencies may
engage in both "interpretation" and "lawmaking" within the formal frameworks of
agency adjudication and agency rulemaking, or in less formal ways, as provided
by their respective organic statutes and the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
§§ 552-559 (2001).
3. Michael Herz has provided a useful explanation of the distinction between
"legislative" and "interpretive" rules:
A legislative, or substantive, rule has the "force and effect of law." The
rule itself is the "primary source of legal obligation," creating new law,
rights, or duties. An interpretive rule, in contrast, merely states the
agency's view of what the statute already requires. The statute remains
the basis for any legal obligations or the imposition of liability, and the
rule only clarifies or draws attention to the statutory requirements. The
distinction is not crystal clear, and often evaporates in the application;
nevertheless, it is conceptually coherent and doctrinally entrenched.
A second, slightly less common, line is sometimes drawn between
legislative and interpretive rules; only legislative rules are adopted
pursuant to a specific delegation of rulemaking authority. Thus, an
agency rule that fleshes out a statutory term establishing legal obligations,
which is interpretive under the approach outlined above, is legislative if
Congress has specifically instructed the agency to issue such rules, even
though, for example, the agency could bring an enforcement action with
or without promulgating the rule.
Michael Herz, Deference RunningRiot: SeparatingInterpretation andLawmaking
Under Chevron, 6 Admin. L.J. 187, 191-92 (1992) (footnotes omitted).
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broad or narrow, as Congress presumably will (or could) have
determined. In other cases, where Congress has not expressly
delegated lawmaking authority to an administrator, the need for such
administrative action may nonetheless be implicit in the structure and
design of the relevant statutory scheme. In yet another class of cases,
delegation of lawmaking authority will not be implicit in the statutory
scheme, but administrative experience and practical application of the
statute may have demonstrated the need for further elaboration or
application of statutory norms and objectives. In these last two
circumstances, the absence of congressional direction necessarily
leaves unanswered important questions about the permissible scope
and legal effect of administrative action. Among other things, the
extent to which such action will be permitted at all, the permissible
scope of the action, and the proper characterization of the action
within those permeable but necessary categories of lawmaking and
interpretation, may not always be clear. The differences in legal
consequences, however, may be substantial.
Administrators, then, do not simply "enforce" the law; they also
interpret law, make law, and decide on policy initiatives. Different
legal consequences may flow from the characterization of
administrative action as one or the other of these activities, and
attempts to draw bright lines are often unconvincing. With these
three points in mind, one can begin to appreciate the tension and
complexity inherent in the practice of judicial review of
administrative interpretations and applications of law. Which branch
of government is to have the final word with respect to a particular
category of administrative action, and, if that responsibility should
happen to fall to the judicial branch, what degree of respect, if any,
should be accorded to the views of administrators? In some cases,
these questions will implicate basic principles relating to delegations
of legislative power under a republican form of government. In all
cases, the answers will depend on ascertaining various principles of
deference to administrative action and their relationship to politics
and the rule of law.
In 1984, the Supreme Court set forth an apparently simple test for
resolving some of these questions. In Chevron US.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc.,' the Court created a now-familiar
4. 467 U.S. 837, 104 S. Ct. 2778 (1984). Chevron involved the
Environmental Protection Agency's construction and enforcement of the Clean Air
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1970). In 1981, the EPA altered its previous
construction of the statutory term "stationary source" and eased the regulatory
burdens imposed upon industry in states that had not yet achieved national air
quality standards. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840, 104 S. Ct. at 2780. By treating all
pollution-emitting devices within an industrial grouping as though they were
encased in a "bubble," the EPA's new plant-wide or "bubble" regulations allowed
3192002]
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two-step test for determining whether particular administrative
interpretations of law should be upheld. According to Chevron, a
reviewing court, using traditional methods of statutory construction,
must first determine whether Congress has "spoken directly to the
precise question at issue."5 If the court concludes that Congress did
have a specific intention with respect to the precise question at issue,
Congress's intention controls, and the agency's interpretation will
stand only if the court is satisfied that the interpretation reflects
congressional intent. On the other hand, if the reviewing court
determines that Congress did not have a specific intention with
respect to the precise question at issue, the court must proceed to step
two of the analysis. At step two, the court's role is limited to
determining whether the administrator's interpretation of the statute
is "reasonable."6  If the reviewing court determines that the
administrator's interpretation is "a permissible interpretation of the
statute," that interpretation must be given effect, even if the court,
making a de novo determination based on traditional principles of
statutory construction, might have chosen a different interpretation as
being more plausible or efficacious. At least in theory, step two of
the Chevron test creates a default rule favoring strong deference to
agency interpretations of law.7 More generally, Chevron's two-step
companies to install or modify one piece of equipment without meeting otherwise
applicable permit conditions, so long as the alteration did not increase the total
emissions from the plant. Id. at 841, 104 S. Ct. at 2781. The District of Columbia
Circuit set aside the new regulations as contrary to law, but the Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the regulations constituted a reasonable construction of the
statutory term. Id. at 865, 104 S. Ct. 2792.
5. Id. at 842, 104 S. Ct. at 2781.
6. Id. at 844, 104 S. Ct. at 2782.
7. Whether the Chevron analysis is more deferential in fact obviously
depends upon a number of factors, including the level of specificity required of
Congress at the first step. Then-Judge Ginsburg made that point in Central States
Motor Freight Bureau, Inc. v. ICC, 924 F.2d 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1991). She observed
that:
The Supreme Court indicated in Chevron itself that it meant the term
"precise question at issue" to be interpreted tightly.... The Court did not
focus on whether Congress had expressed any intention regarding the
meaning of the general statutory term, 'stationary source.' Rather, it
considered, more pointedly, whether 'Congress ... actually had an intent
regarding the applicability of the bubble concept to the [statutory]
program.' By narrowing the question at issue, the Court reduced the
opportunities for a reviewing court to substitute its own interpretation for
that of the agency. Under 'Chevron Step I,' a court is entitled to supplant
an agency's interpretation only where Congress intended another
interpretation, in the precise circumstances that the agency's action
presents.
Id. at 1104 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). Similarly, Richard Pierce has
noted that:
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approach is thought to have replaced a pragmatic, contextual set of
inquiries with a more systematic and disciplined mode of inquiry, and
to have replaced an approach that made deference a matter of degree
with an approach that makes deference an all-or-nothing matter.8
All this is commonplace. Nonetheless, students of administrative
law soon learn that the apparent simplicity of the Chevron test is
illusory at best, and that its application in practice is sometimes
complex or uncertain. Just as Chevron quickly became one of the
most frequently cited cases in Americanjurisprudence, it also quickly
became a major focus for legal scholarship.9 Both trends continue
In the process of applying Chevron's first step, the court should refrain
from teasing meaning from the statute's ambiguous or conflicting
language and legislative history; it should eschew the process of 'creative'
statutory interpretation that is otherwise essential and appropriate in
judicial decision making. Creative statutory interpretation is not
appropriate in the administrative law context because [it] permits judges
to make policy decisions that should be made instead by agencies.
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Chevron and Its Aftermath: Judicial Review of Agency
Interpretations of Statutory Provisions, 41 Vand. L. Rev. 301, 308 (1988).
Compare with FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 120 S.
Ct. 1291 (2000) (contrary application of Chevron). In some respects, the analytic
problem is similar in form to that presented by the "clearly established law"
requirement in the law of official immunity, that is, the level of generality at which
the law must have been established with clarity. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800, 102 S. Ct. 2727 (1982); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 107
S. Ct. 3034 (1987). See also Larry Yackle, A Primer on the New Habeas Corpus
Statute, 44 Buff. L. Rev. 381 (1996) (explaining that in the administrative law
context the courts accept "reasonable" agency determinations whereas in the
habeas context, Congress is not able to delegate law making authority to state
courts and then instruct the federal courts to accept state court decisions); Linda R.
Meyer, When Reasonable Minds Differ, 71 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1467 (1996) (explaining
the similarities between the administrative deference principles of Chevron and the
doctrine of qualified immunity where public officials are not liable for ordinary
violations of the law that were not "clearly established" at the time they acted).
8. See text accompanying infra notes 71-79.
9. Orin Kerr has usefully divided the scholarly commentary into three parts,
each representing a different intellectual approach:
The scholarly critique of Chevron offers three distinct models of how
courts view agency interpretations of statutory law. The first is a
contextual model, which acknowledges that the two-step test exists on
paper, but posits that in practice judges continue to adhere to the multi-
factored, contextual approach to judicial review that judges are
understood to have followed before the Chevron case was decided.
According to the proponents of the contextual model, the pre-Chevron
"traditional factors" continue to influence judicial decisions to accept or
reject agency interpretations despite the contrary logic of the two-step test.
The second popular critique of the doctrine is a political model, which
views Chevron through the result-oriented lens of politics. Followers of
the political model consider the two-step test to be a justificatory ritual
that legitimates results reached to further judges' political agendas.
3212002]
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today. Some scholars have regarded Chevron as a revolutionary
break with the past; others have thought its impact limited. Some
scholars have criticized Chevron on theoretical and doctrinal grounds;
others have attempted in various ways to measure its impact
empirically or statistically. 10 The doctrinal relationship of the
Chevron test to "arbitrary and capricious" review under the
Administrative Procedure Act" has been an abiding concern, and a
number of commentators have made various suggestions for refining
the Chevron framework or replacing it with another approach."2
The extent to which Chevron may have covered the field, and
thereby rendered the older methods of analysis "an anachronism," as
Justice Scalia has suggested, 3 remains a central and hotly contested
issue within the Court. At present, an overwhelming majority of the
Accordingly, outcomes are best explained in terms of the political
ideologies of individual judges. The third critique of Chevron is an
interpretive model. The interpretive model predicts that deference in
individual cases depends upon a judge's approach to statutory
interpretation-in particular, the likelihood that the text will be considered
ambiguous at Chevron's step one. In contrast to the contextual and
political models, the interpretive model accepts that judges will attempt
to apply the two-step test objectively. Nonetheless, the doctrine is
considered inherently unstable because individual judges will defer more
or less often depending upon how readily they perceive ambiguity in
statutory text.
Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron: An Empirical Study of the Chevron
Doctrine in the US. Courts ofAppeals, 15 Yale J. on Reg. 1, 3-4 (1998) (footnotes
omitted).
10. See, e.g., Thomas Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 10 1
Yale L.J. 969, 1003-12 (1992); Peter Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron
Station: An Empirical Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 Duke L.J. 984(1990); Kerr, supra note 9; Aaron P. Avila, Note, Application of the Chevron
Doctrine in the D.C. Circuit, 8 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 398 (2000).
11. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2001) ("The reviewing court shall ... (2) hold
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be--(A)
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law . . ... "). See, e.g., Herz, supra note 3, at 214; Gary Lawson, Outcome,
Procedure and Process: Agency Duties of Explanation for Legal Conclusions, 48
Rutgers L. Rev. 313, 332 (1996). See also United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S.
218, 313, 121 S. Ct. 2164, 2179 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted)
("There is some question whether Chevron was faithful to the text of the
Administrative Procedure Act, which it did not even bother to cite. But it was in
accord with the origins of federal-court judicial review.").
12. See Merrill, supra note 10, at 1003-12; Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of
Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1253 (1997); Gary
Lawson, Reconceptions of Chevron and Discretion: A Comment on Levin and
Rubin, 72 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1377 (1997); Ernest Gellhom & Paul Verkuil,
Delegation: What Should We Do About It? Controlling Chevron-Based
Delegations, 20 Cardozo L. Rev. 989 (1999).
13. See Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 589, 120 S. Ct. 1655,
1663 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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Court seems committed to the view that the Chevron test is not
exclusive, and that less formal agency interpretations, such as those
contained in opinion letters, policy statements, agency manuals, and
enforcement guidelines should continue to be evaluated under
Skidmore v. Swift & Company, 4 which requires that the courts
evaluate administrative interpretations by considering a number of
factors, including the thoroughness of the agency's consideration and
the strength of its reasoning." Nonetheless, some members of the
Court would apply the Skidmore test so as to find deference more
easily justified, as well as more conclusive or determinative, than
would others. In Justice Scalia's view, of course, the Chevron test is
exclusive. 6 At the most fundamental level, commentators have
disagreed about whether Chevron actually provides an engine of
inquiry or framework for analysis, as opposed simply to a
conventional mode of discourse for explaining conclusions otherwise
reached. 17
14. 323 U.S. 134, 65 S. Ct. 161 (1944).
15. Id. at 140, 65 S. Ct. 164. For example, Justice Stevens observed in
Christensen that an agency interpretation should be accorded Skidmore deference
if it has been "thoroughly considered and consistently observed." Christensen, 529
U.S. at 595, 120 S. Ct. at 1667 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer took issue
directly with Justice Scalia's statement that Skidmore is an "anachronism," but
noted that "[i]f statutes are to serve the human purposes that called them into being,
courts will have to continue to pay particular attention in appropriate cases to the
experience-based views of expert agencies." Id. at 597, 120 S. Ct. at 1668 (Breyer,
J., dissenting). See also Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 128, 121 S. Ct. 2164 (2001)
(according Skidmore deference to letter opinions); Thomas Jefferson Univ. v.
Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 114 S. Ct. 2381 (1994) (upholding Secretary's interpretation
of regulation). Professor Herz has argued that Chevron does not require the courts
to cede to administrative agencies their traditional role in interpreting statutes, and
that the decision is therefore less revolutionary than some commentators have
suggested:
Chevron merely refines longstanding principles most evident in the
distinction between standards for judicial review of interpretive and
legislative rules. An agency's view as to what Congress meant is entitled
to Skidmore deference, but no more. An agency's decision within the
sphere of delegated authority binds the courts. Congress never implicitly
delegates the authority to make binding determinations of what Congress
had in mind; that interpretive task remains for the courts. Congress does
and can delegate the authority to make binding rules when it has not made
them. That legislative task must be left to the agencies.
Herz, supra note 3, at 232.
16. See, e.g., Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 238, 121 S. Ct. 2164,2177 (Scalia,
J., dissenting).17. See generally Merrill, supra note 10, at 1032 (discussing Chevron
deference and the rivalry between the mandatory and discretionary deference
models), Katrine B. MacGregor, Note, Kennecott Utah Copper Corp. v. United
States Department of the Interior: The Validity of Interior's Interpretation of
"Promulgated" Within the Statute of Limitations Provisions of CERCLA, 83
2002]
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The path of the present inquiry is somewhat different. In view of
the existing scholarship, it seemed a worthwhile, and perhaps even a
necessary exercise to take one longstanding, unresolved issue of
statutory interpretation-one that has been disputed since before the
Court's decision in Chevron-and to try and trace the effects, if any,
of the evolving doctrine of judicial review of agency interpretations
and applications of law. With this narrow focus, one might provide
a window for viewing presumed connections between the concerns
of high theory and the work of the courts in practice. Given the
seemingly limitless range of interpretive issues to which Chevron
may be applied, it did not seem possible to find a "typical" issue for
investigation, nor did it seem likely that this method of inquiry would
produce systematically verifiable conclusions, at least without being
repeated many times with respect to a variety of issues. Nonetheless,
even for the limited purposes of this investigation, it seemed that the
background issue should meet several requirements: it should be
accessible in the sense ofbeing relatively straightforward and capable
of explanation; it should be the subject of a relatively substantial, but
not overwhelming, body of case law; and the courts' failure to resolve
the issue definitively should extend over a period of time that is
meaningful relative to the timing of the Chevron decision.
An appropriate subject matter for this investigation recently was
suggested by the District of Columbia Circuit's decision in Martini
v. Federal National Mortgage Association,18 in which the court
invalidated a longstanding rule of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission concerning the issuance of right-to-sue letters. Section
706(f)(1) of Title VII provides, among other things, that "the
Commission ... shall ... notify the person aggrieved," that is, issue
a right-to-sue letter, if, "within one hundred and eighty days," the
Commission has neither (1) entered into a satisfactory conciliation
agreement with respect to an administrative charge of discrimination,
nor (2) commenced a lawsuit.20 It is also clear under Section
706(f)(1) that the Commission may issue a right-to-sue letter prior to
the expiration of the 180-day period when the Commission has
dismissed a charge during that period. The practical justification for
issuing such "early" right-to-sue letters typically has rested on the
need to spare charging parties the delay occasioned by large
Commission backlogs, particularly where the Commission is unlikely
to reach the charge within any reasonable time, and the charging
party, in addition to needing immediate relief under Title VII, may
Cornell L. Rev. 1383 (1998) (arguing that Chevron ambiguities enable courts to
use the Chevron test to reach a predetermined conclusion).
18. 178 F.3d 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1993).
20. Id.
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also have state law claims subject to various limitations periods and
other procedural requirements. However, the import of Section
706(f)(1) has long been disputed in cases in which the Commission
has not dismissed the administrative charge of discrimination, but has
nonetheless issued a right-to-sue letter within the 180-day period.
Based on its reading of Section 706(f)(1), Section 706(b) of Title VII,
and the statute as a whole, the Martini court held that the
Commission generally lacks the power to issue right-to-sue letters
during the 180-day period, and that the regulation was therefore
invalid.2' The practical result of the court's decision in this sexual
harassment and retaliation case was to set aside a $903,500 damage
award (which the district court already had reduced on remittitur of
a jury verdict totaling almost $7million), and to order the case
remanded to the Commission for completion of the 180-day period
and the eventual refiling of the lawsuit in federal district court.2"
The Commission's regulation is perhaps atypical in some respects
and thus defies easy characterization. Title VII does not grant general
legislative rulemaking authority to the Commission, but Section
713(a) of Title VII invests the Commission with the "authority from
time to time to issue ... suitable procedural regulations to carry out
the provisions of [Title VII].'23 In conventional terms, therefore, the
Commission's regulation is not a "legislative" or substantive rule, but
it is, nonetheless, a rule within the agency's special ken and
competence, as recognized by Congress in its organic statute. 4 The
21. Martini, 178 F.3d at 1347. See Section 706(f)(1) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f)(l).
22. The case subsequently was settled after cross-petitions for writs of
certiorari had been filed. See Martini v. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 528 U.S.
1147, 120 S. Ct. 1155 (2000).
23. Section 713(a) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a) (2001). The
Commission does have substantive or legislative rulemaking authority under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act.
See 29 U.S.C. § 628 (2001); 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (2001).
24. In 1989, the Administrative Conference of the United States took the
position that merely "interpretive" rules and other relatively informal agency
interpretations should not be given deference under Chevron. See 54 Fed. Reg.
28970 (July 10, 1989), available at http://www.law.fsu.edu/library/admin/acus/-
305895.html. The Administrative Conference emphasized the importance of
procedural formality as a condition for giving binding effect to interpretations and
recommended that "[i]n developing an interpretation that is intended to be
definitive, an agency should use procedures such as rulemaking, formal
adjudication, or other agency statutory interpretations." Id. Given the broad array
of circumstances in which agencies are required to "interpret" statutes, the
Administrative Conference believed it important that Chevron deference be
accorded only to interpretations provided in formal circumstances. Id. The
rationale for such a position with respect to "interpretive" rules necessarily is
different from that which would condition the granting of deference upon
compliance with procedural formalities. One presumably relates to the legal
2002]
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rule invalidated by the District of Columbia Circuit in Martini was
promulgated by the Commission in 1977, after compliance with
notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures,25 and is based on an
even more longstanding Commission practice. The legitimacy of the
Commission's practice and rule was first challenged in the courts
more than a quarter century ago. The question has produced
conflicting and diverse answers in the district courts, but the
Commission's rule was uniformly upheld in the relatively few
challenges that reached the courts of appeals before the District of
Columbia Circuit's decision in Martini.16 The Supreme Court has not
directly considered the question.
Part II of this essay will briefly consider the general context and
contribution of the Chevron analysis. Part III will describe the
statutory and regulatory background of the "early" right-to-sue letter
problem. Part IV will examine the case law concerning early right-to-
sue letters and compare the approaches taken before and after the
Chevron decision. Part V will attempt to draw some broader
conclusions from the present analysis of the courts' treatment of this
narrow and discrete issue.
Among other things, Part V will explore certain ramifications of
the courts' traditional and habitual role of "say[ing] what the law
is,"27 that is, the extent to which the courts' traditional understanding
of the judicial role may overwhelm doctrinal initiatives that attempt
to place some part of that responsibility in other hands. Not
surprisingly, the traditional institutional orientation of the courts has
proved a powerful, if unacknowledged, force in this area. Thus, the
case law reflects a strong tendency on the part of the courts to frame
character of the product, while the other relates to the degree to which the
interpretation has been subjected to scrutiny by those responsible for the
administration of the law. See also Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman,
Chevron's Domain, 89 Geo. L.J. 833 (2001).
25. See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(a)(2) (2001).
26. It is not entirely clear why so few cases have reached the courts of appeals.
In some cases, however, the district courts have held that the lawsuit was premature
but the time in which the case was pending in the district court should be counted
towards satisfaction of the 180-day period, thus providing a technical victory for
the defendant without having any real practical effect on the plaintiff, particularly
where the total elapsed time exceeds 180 days. In such circumstances, there would
be little incentive to mount an appeal. See, e.g., Eldrege v. Carpenters 46 N. Cal.
Counties Joint Apprenticeship and Training Comm., 440 F. Supp. 506 (N.D. Cal.
1977). In other cases, the time entailed by a remand for completion of the 180-day
period may be shorter than that required to prosecute an appeal in most cases, and
the cost is likely to be considerably less as well, particularly if the Commission is
not in a position to pursue the case actively. See, e.g., Connor v. WTI, 67 F. Supp.
2d 690 (S.D. Tex 1999) (calling defendant's proposed remedy to have plaintiffs
complaint remanded to the EEOC for thirty-four days "nonsensical").
27. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
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the question, not in terms of the degree of deference, if any, to be
accorded an agency's construction or application of the statute, but in
terms of determining the "correct" answer to the "legal" question
presented in the case. In this way, questions of policy may be
reduced to questions of law, and decisions about policy tend to fall
within the authority of the courts. Likewise, courts retain the
flexibility to decide whether to give close scrutiny to administrative
determinations. The District of Columbia Circuit's decision in
Martini v. Federal National Mortgage Association,28 by emphasizing
the need for courts to look at statutes as a whole, well illustrates the
broad practical sweep of the courts' authority in this area, particularly
with respect to the application of statutes that are themselves broad,
sweeping, and informed by conflicting and inconsistent policy goals.
II. AGENCY INTERPRETATIONS OF LAW BEFORE AND AFTER
CHEVRON
Before 1984, when the Supreme Court announced its decision in
Chevron US.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,29
prevailing approaches to the problem ofjudicial deference to agency
interpretations of law seemingly were predicated on the view that
courts are principally responsible for determining the meaning and
proper application of statutory provisions, and that the role of
administrators is necessarily limited and secondary in that regard.
This division of responsibility was based, in turn, on a particular
understanding of constitutional tradition, rooted in Chief Justice
Marshall's famous observation in Marbury v. Madison,30 that "[i]t is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say
what the law is,"31 and, at least to some extent, on a judicial
28. 178 F.3d 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
29. 467 U.S. 837, 104 S. Ct. 2778 (1984).
30. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
31. Id. at 177. In 1983, the year before the Supreme Court decided Chevron,
Henry P. Monaghan strongly challenged the view that this division of responsibility
was mandated by Marbury. See Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the
Administrative State, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1983). Professor Monaghan noted that
Marbury was "among the Court's first encounters with the propiety of judicial
deference to administrative interpretation of statutes " and that the decision
contains "no hint of acquiescence in a reasonable but contrary administrative
interpretation of the relevant congressional legislation." Id. at 2 (footnotes
omitted). Nonetheless, Professor Monaghan observed that "there has never been
a pervasive notion that limited government mandated an all-encompassing judicial
duty to supply all of the relevant meaning of statutes." Id. at 33 (footnotes
omitted). At least in part because of the existence of "alternative methods of
control, both political and administrative in nature," Professor Monaghan argued,
"the judicial duty [in reviewing agency interpretations of law, as opposed to
constitutional questions] is to ensure that the administrative agency stays within the
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understanding and appreciation of law enforcement or administration
that was both formalisitc and narrowly circumscribed, This
minimalist view of administration is well-captured by the opinion in
Humphrey's Executor v. United States,32 in which Justice Sutherland
explained the need for insulating members of the Federal Trade
Commission from every vestige of presidential influence by reference
to the nature of the Commission's characteristics and responsibilities:
"The commission is to be non-partisan; and it must, from the very
nature of its duties, act with entire impartiality. It is charged with the
enforcement of no policy except the policy of the law.""3 Although
zone of discretion committed to it by its organic act." Id. at 33. But see Antonin
Scalia, JudicialDeference to Administrative Interpretations ofLaw, 1989 Duke L.J.
511, 513 ("It is not immediately apparent why a court should ever accept the
judgment of an executive agency on a question of law.... Surely the law, that
immutable product of Congress, is what it is, and its content-ultimately to be
decided by the courts-cannot be altered or affected by what the Executive thinks
about it .... ") (citations omitted).
32. 295 U.S. 602, 55 S. Ct. 869 (1935).
33. Id. at 624, 55 S. Ct. at 872. Justice Sutherland's statement obviously was
intended to describe the work of an expert, independent agency and was
specifically linked to the "quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative" nature of the
Commission's responsibilities. Id. at 624, 55 S. Ct. 872. Presumably, the need for
insulating the Commission from presidential influence arose because the
Commission, unlike the president, was charged with "quasi-judicial"
responsibilities requiring impartiality, while the president, unlike the Commission,
necessarily was charged with the enforcement of a broader range of policies.
However, Justice Sutherland's statement also reflects more general suppositions
that are not necessarily related to independence from the executive branch: an
understanding of law and policy that permits a sharp distinction to be drawn
between the two realms, a belief in the neutrality of expertise, and a confidence in
the ability of the legislative branch to craft legislation in ways that minimize the
need for administrative interpretation or discretion. That style of legislation is
costly, both because each legislative initiative must consider countless
particularities in great detail and because only a limited number of such resource-
intensive initiatives can be undertaken. Presumably, Congress could also narrow
the "policymaking" opportunities of administrators within the executive branch
simply by legislating in very precise and narrow terms, so that they, too, would be
"charged with the enforcement of no policy but the policy of the law." Indeed,
much administrative law traditionally was predicated upon the assumption that the
work of administration simply consists of following directions delivered by
Congress. Conipare with Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865, 104 S. Ct. at 2793 ("an agency
to which Congress has delegated policymaking responsibilities may, within the
limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent administration's views
of wise policy to inform its judgments"). Finally, President Roosevelt's view was
quite different from Justice Sutherland's. President Roosevelt recognized the
practical need for presidential influence over those who made policy decisions for
which the president might well be held accountable. Thus, as William E.
Leuchtenburg has pointed out in his masterly study of the Humphrey dispute:
If his critics were sanctimonious, the President himself was careless about
quieting uneasiness regarding the vast power concentrated in his hands
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uttered within the context of a challenge to the possible insinuation
of presidential influence into the workings of an "independent"
agency, and in the spirit of distinguishing such agencies from the
traditional departments of the executive branch, Justice Sutherland's
words also may have reflected a world view that recognized
lawmaking to be primarily the province of Congress and (at least until
Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins34) of the federal courts, with
administrators, whether officials of the executive branch or of
independent agencies, operating within a narrower compass. In this
view, effectuation of the rule of law meant that the primary
responsibility of administrators was to execute policy choices made
by others.35
Some took a more expansive view of administration, and, not
surprisingly, in the era of Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan36 and A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,3 they were less concerned
with the need to ensure agency independence and insulation from
presidential direction than with the constraining influence that the
courts could exercise with respect to administrative initiatives. Thus,
as Justice Breyer recently observed in FDA v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Co., "[t]hat Congress would grant the FDA such broad
jurisdictional authority should surprise no one. In 193 8, the President
and much of Congress believed that federal administrative agencies
needed broad authority and would exercise that authority wisely-a
view embodied in much Second New Deal legislation."" James M.
and about the threat that was perceived to the civil service and the
capacity of officials to render disinterestedjudgments. Roosevelt's action
in removing Humphrey was not an arbitrary deed but a rational attempt
to enable the President to shape the economic policy for which he would
be held responsible.
William E. Leuchtenburg, The Supreme Court Reborn: The Constitutional
Revolution in the Age of Roosevelt 81 (1995).
34. 304 U.S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817 (1938). For those who see the history of
administrative law in the United States as a struggle for judicial influence over
administration, the case law pertaining to implied private rights of action under
federal regulatory statutes provides an interesting exception to the principle set
forth in Erie. See, e.g., J.I. Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 84 S. Ct. 1555 (1964);
Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 95 S. Ct. 2080 (1975); Cannon v. University of Chicago,
441 U.S. 677, 99 S. Ct. 1946 (1979); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v.
Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 102 S. Ct. 1825 (1982).
35. See also American Textile Mfgs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 543, 101
S. Ct. 2478, 2508 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-
CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607,671, 100 S. Ct. 2844,2878 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
36. 293 U.S. 388, 55 S. Ct. 241 (1935).
37. 295 U.S. 495, 55 S. Ct. 837 (1935).
38. 529 U.S. 120, 120 S. Ct. 1291 (2000).
39. Id. at 161, 120 S. Ct. at 1316 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer
continued by quoting from the Supreme Court's decision in Gray v. Powell, 314
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Landis elaborated an even stronger view of administration when he
suggested that administrators should have the final word on questions
of law:
The interesting problem as to the future of judicial review
over administrative action is the extent to which judges will
withdraw, not from reviewing findings of fact, but
conclusions of law. If the withdrawal [from the review of
findings of fact] is due to the belief that these issues... are
best handled by experts, a similar impulse to withdraw should
become manifest in the field of law.'
While the courts did not take up Dean Landis's suggestion that
they should "withdraw" from the field, neither did they ignore the
work of administrators, to whose views they not infrequently deferred
in practice.4 In doing so, however, the courts invariably "stressed
that the decision regarding deference, and the ultimate responsibility
for interpreting the statute, remained theirs."'4 As Thomas Merrill
U.S. 402,62 S. Ct. 326 (1941), in which the Court noted that Congress "could have
legislated specifically [but decided] to delegate that function to those whose
experience in a particular field gave promise of a better informed, more equitable
[determination]." Id. at 166, 120 S. Ct. at 1318.
40. See James M. Landis, The Administrative Process 144 (1938). For the
sake of completeness, it is important to note that Dean Landis conceived of
administrative agencies as constituting "not... simply an extension of executive
power," but as possessing "an assemblage of rights normally exercisable by
government as a whole." Id. at 15. That is an important point, but one that is not
particularly relevant to the present inquiry. In Dean Landis's view, the courts not
only were ill-suited to do the work of administration, but were antagonistic toward
the administrative process. Thus, "[t]o lodge a great interpretative power in the
judiciary involved the risk that a policy, which initially was given to the
administrative to formulate, might be thwarted at its most significant fulcrum by
judgments antagonistic to its own." Id. at 97. At the very least, Dean Landis
suggested, the scope of judicial review should be extremely deferential, that is,
"something akin to [the scope] of judicial review over the validity of legislation
challenged under the due process clause." Id. at 147. In his view, therefore, the
existence of a "reasonable belief... that such practices tend to promote fraud and
deceit in the securities market" would be sufficient for upholding an agency's rules.
Id. at 147-48.
41. In one sense, as Robert Rabin has suggested, the three decades following
Panama Refining and Schechter Poultry were characterized to a significant extent
by a judicial attitude of deference to administrative action. See Robert Rabin,
Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 1189 (1986). For
various reasons, some of which are more obvious than others, that approach shifted
in the early 1970s. Id. at 1315. See also Herz, supra note 3, at 188 ("For a century
now, the courts have struggled to determine the limits, if any, on what
governmental tasks can be handed over to administrative agencies. The Supreme
Court has rarely held that these limits have been exceeded.").
42. See Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned
Decisionmaking in Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 73 Tex. L. Rev.
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has pointed out, the pre-Chevron case law shows that the courts
regularly accorded deference to agency interpretations of law under
a variety of rules and approaches that were nonetheless characterized
by two significant features: a particularized consideration of multiple
contextual factors, and the grant or withholding of deference, not as
a binary or categorical matter, but by degree.43 The contextual factors
on which the courts looked with favor in deferring to agency
interpretations of law were of various kinds, but may fairly be
viewed, as Professor Merrill has also suggested, "as reflecting deep-
seated judicial intuitions about the kinds of considerations that ought
to bear on the decision to defer. '' 4
Reliance on these contextual factors, which always framed the
inquiry but seldom were seen to yield a certain and unequivocal
answer to the deference inquiry, was justified in various ways. Some
contextual factors were thought to be reliable indicators ofCongress's
intent, either with respect to the degree of deference that Congress
intended the courts to give to the views of administrators in a
particular regulatory context or with respect to the accuracy with
which the substance of a specific administrative interpretation
reflected Congress's regulatory intent. Other factors were somewhat
less obviously connected to congressional intent, but may also have
been thought useful in protecting established reliance interests and,
thus, conducive to efficiency and the maintenance of stability and
continuity in the law.45 If the exigencies of modem times required
some degree ofjudicial deference to the legal interpretations of expert
83, 87-88 (1994). As other commentators have suggested, the pre-Chevron case
law effectively was divided into two lines of authority. One line of cases
emphasized the ultimate responsibility of the courts, while the other emphasized
the various factors that might counsel in favor of according deference to agency
determinations. See, e.g., Avila, supra note 10, at 398-99.
43. Merrill, supra note 10, at 972-75.
44. Id. at 975.
45. Dean Landis noted that the rise of the "independent agency" was based in
part on the hope "that the independent agency would make for more
professionalism than that which characterized the normal executive department,"
and that the predominance of professionalism over politics might make for
"[p]olicies [that were] more permanent and... fashioned with greater foresight
than might attend their shaping under conditions where the dominance of executive
power was pronounced." Landis, supra note 40, at 111. As a practical matter,
Dean Landis did not attribute a great deal of significance to the "independence" of
the so-called independent agencies. See id. at 47-48. As Professor Jaffe has noted,
Dean Landis thought that "[t]heir independence is so tenuous ... that it hardly
stands in the way of any real presidential demand for coordination; and on the other
hand, in the absence of actual pressure from the President himself (which can only
rarely be exercised) the executive agencies will just as effectively resist
coordination." Louis L. Jaffe, James Landis and the Administrative Process, 78
Harv. L. Rev. 319, 327 (1964).
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administrators, the courts could at least provide strong incentives for
administrators to act with deliberation and consistency.46 A main
focus of the courts in determining whether to give deference to
agency interpretations was to evaluate the intellectual and persuasive
power of an agency's reasoning.4v At least from the days of the New
46. See Landis, supra note 40, at 134-35:
The insistence that the administrative process in these phases must be
subject to judicial review is to be explained in part, I believe, by economic
determinism. But the deeper answer lies in our traditional notions of
'law' as being rules administered and developed by courts. We must
remember that until a comparatively short time ago Anglo-American
government was essentially government by judges. The great mass of our
law was developed by the resolution of conflicting claims in courts where
the governing rules were evolved by the judge.
See also Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d. 1, 223-24 (D.C. Cir.) (Leventhal, J.,
concurring), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941, 96 S. Ct. 2663 (1976):
In the case of legislative enactments, the sole responsibility of the courts
is constitutional due process review. In the case of agency
decisionmaking, the courts have an additional responsibility set by
Congress. Congress has been willing to delegate its legislative powers
broadly-and courts have upheld such delegation-because there is court
review to assure that the agency exercises the delegated power within
statutory limits, and that it fleshes out objectives within those limits by an
administration that is not irrational or discriminatory.
Of course, the organization of the federal courts along regional lines,
together with the limited ability of the Supreme Court to review a sufficient
number of cases from the regional courts of appeals to ensure national uniformity
of legal requirements imposed on the administration of federal programs, except
in relatively rare and infrequent circumstances, is itself an impediment to the
accomplishment of consistency. See generally Peter Strauss, One Hundred Fifty
Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court's Limited Resources for
Judicial Review ofAgency Action, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 1093 (1987). See also Paul
D. Carrington, The Obsolescence of the United States Courts of Appeals: Roscoe
Pound's Structural Solution, 15 J.L. & Pol. 515, 516-17 (1999) (critiquing courts
of appeals' view of their role as "that of making national law as applied to their
geographical territories," as opposed to relieving the Supreme Court of the
responsibility of correcting errors of single judges, assuring defeated litigants that
the judicial power brought to bear in their cases was not simply the work of one,
possibly idiosyncratic judge, and correcting the actions of administrative agencies
which might otherwise be "at risk of politically motivated or bureaucratic
mischief'). In recent years, the number of cases decided by the Supreme Court
each Term has declined further. See, e.g., David M. O'Brien, Opinion, Justice;
Supreme Court Can No Longer Duck the Big Issues, Los Angeles Times, Oct. 3,
1999, at M l (explaining that in October Term 1998, the Supreme Court heard oral
arguments in 90 cases out of the more than 8,000 on the docket, a decline of fifty
percent since the early 1980s when about 180 cases were decided each term); Linda
Greenhouse, In Year of Florida Vote, Supreme Court Also Did Much Other Work,
N.Y. Times, July 2, 2001, at A-12 (commenting on the 79 merits cases decided
during October Term 2000).
47. See Skidmore v. Swift& Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140, 65 S. Ct. 161, 164 (1944)
(persuasive power of agency regulations varies according to thoroughness of
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Deal, however, the courts also had given substantial weight to such
other factors as whether the agency's interpretation of the statute was
more or less contemporaneous with the enactment and initial
implementation of the regulatory scheme,48 whether the agency had
played a significant role in framing the legislation on which the
regulation was based,49 whether the agency's interpretation was
recently adopted or longstanding, and whether the agency's
interpretation had been consistently articulated and followed over
time." To some extent, consideration of these factors undoubtedly
interpretation, validity of their reasoning, consistency with earlier and later
announcements, and other factors).
48. See, e.g., Fawcus Mach. Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 375,378,51 S. Ct.
144, 145 (1931) ("contemporaneous construction[s] by those charged with the
administration of the act are... entitled to respectful consideration, and will not
be overruled, except for weighty reasons"); Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v.
United States, 288 U.S. 294, 311-15, 53 S. Ct. 350, 357-59 (1933) (administrative
practice that is consistent and unchallenged will not be overturned except for
cogent reasons, and administrative practice will be given "particular weight when
it involves a contemporaneous construction of a statute by [those] charged with the
responsibility of setting its machinery in motion; of making the parts work
efficiently and smoothly while they are yet untried and new"); United States v.
American Trucking Ass'n, 310 U.S. 534, 549, 60 S. Ct. 1059, 1067 (1940)
(administrative interpretation given great weight, especially when interpretations
are contemporaneous constructions of statute); Black v. Magnolia Liquor Co., 355
U.S. 24, 26, 78 S. Ct. 106, 108 (1957) (consistent course of administrative
interpretation more persuasive than inference to be drawn from fact that agency
requested Congress to amend statute to reflect its interpretation); FHA v.
Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84, 90, 79 S. Ct. 141, 145 (1958) (agency's
contemporaneous construction of statute can "carry the day against doubts that
might exist from a bare reading of the statute"); FTC v. Mandel Bros., Inc., 359
U.S. 385, 391, 78 S. Ct. 818, 823 (1959) ("contemporaneous construction entitled
to great weight even though it was applied in cases settled by consent rather than
in litigation"); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16, 85 S. Ct. 792, 801 (1965) (court
shows great deference to administrative interpretation of statute, especially when
administrative practice involves a contemporaneous construction of the statute by
those responsible for administering it).
49. See, e.g., Miller v. Youakim, 440 U.S. 125, 144, 99 S. Ct. 957,968 (1979)
(administrative interpretations are especially persuasive when the "agency
participated in developing the provision"); Adams v. United States, 319 U.S. 312,
315, 63 S. Ct. 1122, 1123 (1943) (court gives great weight to view of agencies that
co-operated in developing statute); American Trucking Ass 'n, 310 U.S. at 549, 60
S. Ct. at 1067 ("Commission's interpretation gains much persuasiveness from the
fact that it was the Commission which suggested the provision's enactment to
Congress").
50. See, e.g., United States v. Clark, 454 U.S. 555, 565, 102 S. Ct. 805, 811
(1982) (statutory construction of agency "charged with administering statute
entitled to great deference, particularly when interpretation has been followed
consistently over a long period of time"); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 291, 101 S.
Ct. 2766, 2744 (1981) ("consistent administrative construction of... statute must
be followed by courts unless there are compelling indications that it is wrong");
EEOC v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 449 U.S. 590,600 n. 17, 101 S. Ct. 817,823
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could be justified in terms of ascertaining legislative intent, even if that
intent often was constructed from inferences based on acquiesence
rather than positive evidence. But a readier and more realistic
explanation in many cases was the perceived need for certainty and
finality. This was especially so where compliance with regulatory
programs depended on public understanding and reliance or entailed
substantial outlays of private funds. The common law's traditional
respect for longevity doubtless also had a hand in the practice.
By the final quarter of the twentieth century, the value of these
conservative virtues no longer seemed so obvious. Among other
things, the sheer volume of federal legislation had increased
dramatically, and many of the subjects to which Congress was turning
its attention seemed qualitatively different from previous subjects of
legislation, administrative interpretation, and judicial review. These
differences in subject matter, together with qualitative differences in the
nature of the legislative work product occasioned by the increased
amount and broader scope of legislative activity, raised issues for
administration that seemed different in kind from those with which
administrators and the courts previously had dealt."' In addition, claims
to agency authority based on expertise were generally met with a new
sense of skepticism, and the value once attributed to expertise was now
modified by demands for transparency, participation, and consensus.52
To be sure, expert administrators had long been charged with
giving particularized effect to broad statutory terms, especially in the
areas of competition, securities, and common carrier regulation,
n. 17 (1981) (agency's contemporaneous construction of its organic statute deserves
special deference when the construction has remained consistent over a long period
of time); Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443, 450, 98 S. Ct. 2441,
2445 (1978) (agency's interpretation of statute which is consistently and uniformly
maintained entitled to considerable weight); NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416
U.S. 267, 275, 94 S. Ct. 1757, 1762 (1974) (courts accord great weight to a
longstanding agency interpretation of a statute, especially when the statute has been
reenacted without pertinent change).
51. In the real world, of course, there is some connection between the degree
of specificity and precision with which a legislative body is capable of legislating
and the number of laws the body is able to enact. Calls for greater specificity in
legislation may sometimes be understood as calls for less legislation. See, e.g.,
Michael Herz, Textualism and Taboo: Interpretation and Deference for Justice
Scalia, 12 Cardozo L. Rev. 1663 (1991).
52. See Gordon C. Young, JudicialReview and InformalAgency Action on the
Fiftieth Anniversary of the APA: The Alleged Demise andActual Status of Overton
Park's Requirement of Judicial Review "On the Record," 10 Admin. L.J. Am. U.
179, 206 (1996) (explaining that between 1971 and 1978, "the notion of
participation by comments in rulemaking" was expanded to require an agency to
make available for public comment any factual material on which it would
significantly rely in justifying its rule and to respond to any significant comment
which challenged its rationality).
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where Congress often had legislated in terms that required substantial
further amplification, either by agency adjudication, rulemaking, or
some less formal means of administrative interpretation or
application.53 Whether particular categories of business practices
would constitute "insider trading" or "unfair trade practices," for
example, were not questions for which any statute was likely to
provide an immediate and complete answer.54 Nor was the
"reasonableness" of a particular common carrier's rate likely to be
determined directly from the terms of a statute, no matter how
carefully drawn." These were questions that could be answered in
time, however, by an agency steeped both in the policy of the law and
in the customs and practices of the relevant industry, and having
sufficient resources to undertake the necessary investigation,
research, and analysis.56 It might take even an expert agency
considerable time and effort to develop solutions that achieved
53. See Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the
Administrative Process, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 4 (1998) (explaining that agencies
were "[c]reated and empowered by Congress ... to fill the gaps in legislation that,
due to scarcity of congressional time, information or political capital, is vague and
open-ended"). Professor Croley also notes that agency decisions "dwarf those of
the other three branches, certainly by volume and quite possibly by importance as
well." Id. at 3. See also FTC v. Mandel Bros., Inc., 359 U.S. 385, 392, 79 S. Ct.
818, 824 (1959) ("[The Federal Trade Commission] is not limited to prohibiting
'the illegal practice in the precise form' existing in the past. This agency, like
others, may fashion its relief to restrain 'other like or related unlawful acts."')
(citations omitted).
54. See, e.g., Robert A. Katzmann, Regulatory Bureaucracy: The Federal
Trade Commission and Antitrust Policy 70 (1980) (discussing open-textured
quality of key statutory terms to be applied).
55. See, e.g. Louisville and Nashville R.R. Co. v. Garrett, 231 U.S. 298, 34 S.
Ct. 48 (1913) (calling on the Railroad Commission to aid in prescribing reasonable
intrastate rates). See also Gerald C. Henderson, Railway Valuation and the Courts
(parts I & II), 33 Harv. L. Rev. 902, 1031 (1920).
56. James Q. Wilson has argued that the enforcement of broadly defined legal
policy often depends on the professional norms of the various groups employed in
the government's law enforcement efforts. In the Federal Trade Commission, for
example, lawyers and economists often take different views concerning
enforcement priorities and decisions. Similarly, the regulatory approach of the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration is thought to have been deeply
influenced by the high concentration of engineers among its workforce. See James
Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It 59-
65 (1989). A recent study of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's
handling of disability discrimination cases suggests that "local office cultural
factors are what really drive the EEOC handling process." Kathryn Moss & Scott
Burris, Unfunded Mandate: An Empirical Study of the Implementation of the ADA
by EEOC, 50 Kan. L. Rev. 1 (2001). See also Daily Labor Report, EEOC.
Upcoming Study Finds Wide Differences Among EEOC Offices Handling ADA
Charges (Aug. 6, 2001), available at http://www.adaenforcementproject.unc.edu
/Westlaw2.doc.
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acknowledged regulatory objectives without creating unforeseen
negative consequences, but it was assumed that such solutions could
be formulated and subjected to critical analysis, given sufficient
agency expertise and access to relevant information. 7
The "new" areas of regulation-such as highway safety,
occupational safety and health, and environmental
protection-seemed to challenge these assumptions and presented
new problems for legislation and administration. If Congress were to
legislate at all, the dynamic nature of these subject matters required
that Congress act "provisionally," providing administrators with the
ability to act effectively in conditions of complexity, scientific
uncertainty, and rapid change. 8 As in other areas, the challenge for
57. To the extent that legal issues were thought to be raised at the margin,
because of Congress's inability to legislate in any but the broadest terms ex ante,
those issues were often characterized as delegation issues. See, e.g., Yakus v.
United States, 321 U.S. 414, 64 S. Ct. 660 (1944); Amalgamated Meatcutters &
Butcher Workmen v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C. 1971). The
implementation of legislation dealing with wage and price controls presented some
of the same problems of rapid response amidst conditions of uncertainty as would
the design of later legislative schemes pertaining to health, safety, and
environmental quality. Challenges to legislation based on the nondelegation
principle have been singularly unsuccessful, although the specter of a successful
challenge may have some restraining effect on the scope of delegations. See Ira P.
Robbins, The Legal Dimensions of Private Incarceration, 38 Am. U. L. Rev. 531,
546 (1989) ("Although it frequently asserts the nondelegation principle, the
Supreme Court almost always sustains the constitutionality of challenged
delegations. In doing so, the Court has taken various approaches to accommodate
increasingly broad congressional delegation."). See also Whitman v. American
Trucking Ass'n, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 121 S. Ct. 903 (2001) (Scalia, J.) (Section
109(a) of the Clean Air Act does not constitute impermissible delegation of
legislative power because "intelligible principle" prevents delegated authority from
being classified as legislation); id. at 921 (Stevens, J., concurring) (denial that
delegated authority is legislative in nature is disingenuous).
58. Judge Laurence Silberman has addressed this issue from the perspective
of statutory "ambiguity." In his view, there are three explanations for statutory
ambiguity:
Ambiguous legislation, as the ambiguity appears in a given case, typically
suggests that Congress has not concretely resolved the policy issue that
the case presents. That may well be because Congress deliberately chose
statutory language such as "feasible," "reasonable," "likely," or
"probable," language that on its face suggests a broad delegation to an
agency to strike the policy balance. Or it may be that a particular
eventuality or series of events was simply not foreseen-even dimly. Or
it may be that the legislative draftsmen were less than exacting so that
congressional policy decisions were not reflected precisely in the
legislation (or in the legislative history). Although deference may seem
most appropriate when Congress chooses language that implies deference,
in all of these circumstances, to a greater or lesser extent, whoever
interprets the statute will often have room to choose between two or more
plausible interpretations. That sort of choice implicates and sometimes
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administrators in the new areas of regulation often involved
developing information and harnessing available expertise, and the
quality of administrative action necessarily depended upon the
quantity and quality of available administrative resources. In
addition, however, the challenge for administrators in these new areas
also often entailed coping with subtle questions of judgment, the
comparison of incommensurable goods, and decisions to be made at
the borderlands of scientific knowledge. For many of these decisions,
the stakes were very high. The practical effects of such regulations
might include removal from the market of products that industry and
the public had previously deemed essential (or at least the most cost-
effective means of accomplishing particular goals), the enforced
obsolescence of whole industries, the need for massive investments
of new capital, and the restructuring of whole areas of industry and
the economy. The additional challenges posed by these new areas of
regulation necessarily called into question existing assumptions about
the neutrality of scientific and technical knowledge and the wisdom
of relying on expertise in administration.
If administration was properly conceived as "filling in details,"
the scope of the "details" had broadened considerably in the new
areas of regulation, and the nature of the "filling in" seemed to have
been transformed by the character of the inquiries to be undertaken
and the decisions to be made. 9 It was one thing for an expert
administrator to decide whether a particular class of trade practices
squarely involves policy making. The agencies--even the independent
ones-have superior political standing to the life-tenured federal judiciary
in performing that policy-making function.
Laurence H. Silberman, Chevron-The Intersection of Law and Policy, 58 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 821, 823 (1990).
59. In Chevron, Justice Stevens used the expression "filling gaps," and that has
become the dominant metaphor. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc., v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843, 104 S. Ct. 2778, 2782 (1984). As Professor
Herz has pointed out, the linear character of this metaphor is at odds with the
reality of the role that agencies typically play in this area:
A better metaphor would be vertical rather than horizontal and so capture
the role of agencies in adding specificity to the generalized statements of
Congress. One possibility is the scheme of biological classification. In
its broadest enactments, Congress has identified the kingdom and nothing
else. Congress occasionally gets down to the species level, but that task
is generally left for agencies. Under this metaphor, the courts' role is to
ensure that as the agency becomes more specific it remains within the
larger boundaries established by Congress.
Herz, supra note 3, at 230-31. Whether the subject matters of the "new"
regulations were inherently more value-laden, or simply seemed to be so because
the stakes were higher and the effects more widespread, the issues certainly were
perceived to be more properly subject to contest. In addition, the social mores of
the time were more generally open to contest and less conducive to recognizing and
giving deference to expertise.
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should be considered "unfair;" it was something else to require that
she locate the precise threshold at which the concentration of cotton
dust in the ambient air would constitute a "significant" risk of
material harm to the public health and safety.' In the latter case, the
relevant information or "legislative facts" might not merely be hard
to obtain; the necessary factual information might not exist at all. Or,
it might be obtainable, but provisional and highly subject to change.
The information might also be subject to widely divergent expert
interpretations. In other words, the tasks of administration in the
"old" and "new" areas of regulation might formally appear to be the
same, but their reality was somewhat different. In short, the
questions presented in these areas of regulation often seemed
"political," rather than simply "technical." If nothing else, the stakes
seemed higher, both in terms of human life and in terms of economic
consequences. Finally, the legitimacy of administrative
"interpretations" would have to depend upon their "effectiveness" in
accomplishing Congress's sometimes only partially-formulated and
incompletely expressed objectives amidst these conditions of
uncertainty and developing knowledge. In these circumstances, the
idea of deference based on longevity or pedigree therefore seemed
less meaningful.6 Indeed, in a world of uncertainty and change, a
consistent and longstanding agency interpretation might better
evidence administrative sloth or incompetence than adherence to rule
of law values.
A new view as to the appropriate understanding of administrative
interpretation may have had its genesis in the epistemological
challenges presented by some of the new areas of regulation, as well
as the extent to which they implicated serious economic and human
costs, but the reasoning did not stop there.62 If the nature of these
new subject matters required Congress to leave significant policy
choices to administrators, and to give administrators considerable
60. See, e.g., American Textile Mfgs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 101
S. Ct. 2478 (1981). See also Barry Sullivan, When the Environment is Other
People: An Essay on Science, Culture, and the Authoritative Allocation of Values,
69 Notre Dame L. Rev. 597 (1994).
61. Of course, Congress's objectives often were articulated only at the most
general level, and then only in inconsistent and conflicting terms.
62. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 374, 109 S. Ct. 647,
656 (1989) (Blackmun, J.) (asserting, in opinion upholding placement in
Sentencing Commission of broad discretionary authority to formulate mandatory
sentencing guidelines, that the judicial branch's unwillingness to strike downbroad
delegations of legislative power "has been driven by a practical understanding that
in our increasingly complex society, ... Congress simply cannot do its job absent
an ability to delegate power under broad general directives"). But see Wade H.
McCree, Jr., Bureaucratic Justice: An Early Warning, 129 U. Pa. L. Rev. 777
(1981) (detailing costs of incomplete and overly generalized legislation).
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latitude or flexibility in making these choices, it was only natural for
new administrations to think that they should choose for themselves
rather than be saddled with choices made by previous
administrations.63 After all, such choices could have profound effects
on the national economy or other matters of paramount importance
to the goals and success of an incumbent administration, and
administrators saw no reason why their hands should be tied. It
might be the case, of course, that tightening requirements for new
technology could be unfair to segments of regulated industries that
already had invested substantial resources in complying with a former
rule, just as the loosening of restrictions might confer the benefit of
rents on late entrants and on previously recalcitrant or non-
conforming segments of the industry, but those were often thought to
be practical problems that could be worked out.
At all events, the virtue of consistency and durability of
regulatory interpretation came to be challenged in a powerful way,
not only because of widespread recognition of obsolescence, but also
by the strong, competing idea, firmly rooted in political realism, that
regulation is a formidable engine of politics and should above all
reflect the views of the incumbent administration, at least where
Congress has not absolutely foreclosed that possibility. 6' The power
of this idea was fortified by another feature of the intellectual climate
in which it was developing, namely, the sense that less regulation is
generally preferable to more regulation, that the costs and benefits of
various regulatory approaches should be quantified and precisely
evaluated, and that any case for preferring regulation over market
63. Of course, there are still substantial costs to attempting to reverse
regulatory actions. In the final days of the Clinton Administration, the president
took numerous actions through the promulgation of executive orders, such as the
setting aside ofvast areas as national monuments, but the new administration, while
opposed to many of these policies in substance, decided not to set aside the
executive orders. See, e.g., Naftali Bendavid, Bush Reluctant to Undo Clinton
Edicts, Chicago Tribune, Feb. 22, 2001, § I at 1.
64. A distinct but related phenomenon is the contemporaneous move towards
greater centralization and presidential control over administrative policymaking.
See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,044, 3 C.F.R. 152 (1979) (President Carter); Exec.
Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981) (President Reagan); Exec. Order
No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (1993) (President Clinton). See also Hal Bruff,
Presidential Management of Agency Rulemaking, 57 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 533
(1989); Christopher DeMuth & Douglas Ginsburg, White House Review ofAgency
Rulemaking, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1075 (1986); Alan Morrison, OMB Interference with
Agency Rulemaking, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1059 (1986); Morton Rosenberg,
Presidential Control ofAgency Rulemaking: An Analysis of Constitutional Issues
That May Be Raised By Executive Order No. 12,291, 23 Ariz. L. Rev. 1199 (1981);
Morton Rosenberg, Beyond the Limits of Executive Power: Presidential Control
ofAgency Rulemaking Under Executive Order No. 12,291, 80 Mich. L. Rev. 193
(1981).
2002] 339
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
forces must be compellingly made.65 Illustrative both of the new areas
of regulation and of the new approaches they engendered is the
protracted, twisting course of the passive restraints rule, which began
with the enactment of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety
Act of 1966,66 during the administration of Lyndon B. Johnson, and
ended some time after the District of Columbia Circuit's 1986 decision
in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Dole,67 late in the
administration of Ronald Reagan. Along the way, the administrative
process included no fewer than sixty different notices of proposed
rulemaking.68 Finally, if the logic of these arguments appeared most
forcefully in connection with the new areas of regulation, those were
not the only areas to which the arguments were applied. Similar
arguments could also be made with respect to any.area of regulation in
which Congress had left open the making of significant policy choices.
65. In James Landis's somewhat triumphalist view of regulation, the
justification for regulation could easily be found in the seeming inability of
common law courts to solve a particular problem, and a multiplicity of regulatory
agencies was seen as a strength, rather than a weakness, of the regulatory system.
See Landis, supra note 40, at 24. To the extent that that view was widespread
among Dean Landis's contemporaries, it had changed dramatically by the late
1970s and early 1980s. In the area of economic regulation, it was now thought
necessary, as a general matter, to establish the appropriateness of regulation by
demonstrating the existence of a market failure, the possibility of improving the
situation (without undesirable, unforeseen consequences) through regulation, and
the appropriateness and efficacy of a particular regulatory strategy. See, e.g.
Stephen G. Breyer, Regulation and Its Reform 27-28 (1982); Charles Wolf, A
Theory of Non-Market Failures, 55 The Public Interest 114 (1979).
66. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1426 (repealed 1994 and superceded by 49 U.S.C.
§ 30169 (1994)); Motor Vehicle Mfgs. Ass'n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Ins.
Co., 463 U.S. 29, 103 S. Ct. 2856 (1983); Jerry Mashaw & David Harfst,
Regulation and Legal Culture: The Case ofMotor Vehicle Safety, 4 Yale J. on Reg.
258 (1987). The statute directs the Secretary of Transportation or her delegee to
issue motor vehicle standards that "shall be practicable, shall meet the need for
motor vehicle safety, and shall be stated in objective terms." 15 U.S.C. § 1392(a)
(1976). In 1967, the Secretary issued standard 208, which simply required the
installation of seatbelts in all automobiles, but it soon became obvious that the level
of seatbelt use was too low to reduce traffic injuries to an acceptable level. By
1969, the Secretary had proposed a standard which required the installation of
passive restraints, thus commencing a series ofrulemakings and adjudications that
would endure for almost twenty years. See Motor Vehicle Mfgs. Ass 'n, 463 U.S.
at 35, 103 S. Ct. at 2862.
67. 802 F.2d 474 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
68. Motor Vehicle Mfgs. Ass 'n, 463 U.S. at 34, 103 S. Ct. at 2862. See Kurt
B. Chadwell, Automobile Passive Restraint Claims Post-Cipollone: An End to the
Federal Preemption Defense, 46 Baylor L. Rev. 141, 145 (1992) ("The airbag
controversy... outlast[ed] seven presidents, at least eight heads of the Department
of Transportation, and more than eight Administrators of the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration."). See also Gareth G. Cook, The Case for Some
Regulation, Part 2: The Politics ofAuto Safety Regulation, 27 Wash. Monthly 34
(1995) (detailing the political history of passive restraints regulations).
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These developments, and particularly the history of the passive
restraints rule, reflected a more sophisticated view of regulation that
had been building for some time.69 Added impetus for change came
with the 1980 election of Ronald Reagan which brought to power an
administration deeply opposed to many governmental policies that
administrations of both parties had followed routinely, albeit with
varying degrees of enthusiasm, for many years. Much that had been
taken for granted was now put on the table for discussion and debate.
President Reagan understood his election to represent a mandate for
fundamental change in the conduct of American government, and his
administration immediately set about altering government policy,
through legislation where necessary, but also through changes in
administrative interpretations and in governmental litigating
positions.70 Even if not explicitly expressed, the substance of the
Reagan Administration's position with respect to administrative
interpretations of law was straightforward: If a statute gives
administrators broad authority to determine government policy in a
particular area, why should it matter that the agency's interpretation
was first set down in the presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt and has
been followed consistently ever since? If those currently charged
with responsibility for administering a statute should be inclined to
take a different view, whether based on changed circumstances or
different values and policy judgments, why should they be required
to overcome some judicially imposed presumption? In addition, the
classical conception of "unity in the executive"'" was to be given a
69. The courts were not unmindful of these trends and clearly sensed the need
for comparable judicial innovations. Among other things, the cases of the period
reflect a judicial uneasiness with respect to the adequacy of the traditional
"arbitrary and capricious" standard. See, e.g., Automobile Parts & Accessories v.
Boyd, 407 F.2d 330 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (McGowan, J.); Citizens to Protect Overton
Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 91 S. Ct. 814 (1971).
70. For example, the government defended the OSHA standard relating to
occupational exposure to cotton dust in an oral argument before the Supreme Court
on January 21, 1981, the day following the inauguration of President Reagan.
Within a few weeks, the Secretary of Labor had filed a memorandum with the
Court suggesting that the case might be dismissed based on the Secretary's interest
in revisiting the rule administratively. See American Textile Mfgs. Ass'n v.
Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 505 n.25, 101 S. Ct. 2478 n.25 (1981). More important,
the new administration, within a few weeks of taking office, promulgated
Executive Order 12,291, requiring coordination of rulemaking and the use of cost-
benefit analysis in federal regulatory programs. See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46
Fed. Reg. 13,193(1981). In the area of civil rights, the Reagan Administration also
quickly began reorienting the government's litigating positions, often taking
positions in appellate courts directly contrary to the positions the government had
taken in the same case in the lower courts. See, e.g., Washington v. Seattle Sch.
Dist. No. 1,458 U.S. 457, 102 S. Ct. 3187 (1982).
71. See, e.g., The Federalist No. 70 (Alexander Hamilton).
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new and more ambitious construction. Since it was the president who
was elected by the people (albeit indirectly), should not the power to
set policy be centralized more completely in the president, rather than
distributed throughout the government?72 These arguments thus
weighed in favor of greater centralization and presidential control of
administrative action, whether located in the executive branch or in
the so-called "independent" agencies. Ironically, the Reagan
Administration may have rejected the substantive goals which
President Roosevelt sought to achieve, but the view of "unity in the
executive" which they thought essential to freeing the government
from the legacy of the New Deal was similar to that which impelled
President Roosevelt to fight the battle of Humphrey's Executor.73
The Reagan Administration's positions also raised important
questions about the proper allocation of authority between
administrators and courts in interpreting the meaning of statutes
which Congress had charged agencies with administering. The
Reagan Administration may not have raised these issues directly, in
the sense of pressing in court for the articulation of a new standard by
which agency interpretations of law are to be evaluated, but the
aggressiveness with which the Administration pursued its substantive
agenda of regulatory reform, often in the face of long-settled policy
determinations, surely caused thoughtful observers to reconsider the
sources, wisdom, and legitimacy of the old understandings. As the
practical consequences of these new views of administration
increasingly found their way onto the docket of the Supreme Court,
the Justices themselves must have wondered about the adequacy of
the old doctrines to accommodate these new realities.74
In 1984, the Supreme Court offered a now familiar answer to
some of these questions in Chevron. Whether by design or not, the
72. See supra note 33.
73. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
74. Compare Motor Vehicle Mfgs. Ass'n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mutual
Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29, 59, 103 S. Ct. 2856, 2875 (1983) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring and dissenting) ("A change in administration brought about by the
people casting their votes is a perfectly reasonable basis for an executive agency's
reappraisal of the costs and benefits of its programs and regulations.") with FDA
v. Brown and Williamson Tobacco Co., 529 U.S. 120, 188, 120 S. Ct. 1291, 1329
(2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("Finally, administration policy changed. Earlier
administrations may have hesitated to assert jurisdiction for the reasons prior
Commissioners expressed... Commissioners of the current administration simply
took a different regulatory attitude... As for the change of administrations, I agree
with then Justice Rehnquist's statement in [Motor Vehicle Manufacturers
Association of US., Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co.]." See also FDIC v.
Philadelphia Gear Co., 476 U.S. 426,441, 106 S. Ct. 1931, 1939 (1986) (Marshall,
Blackmun, and Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting) ("the inflexibility of the statute as
applied to modem financial transactions is a matter for Congress, not the FDIC or
this Court, to remedy").
342 [Vol. 62
BARRY SULLIVAN
Court articulated the ground rules for deference to agency
interpretations of law in a way that worked an apparently
revolutionary change in legal doctrine.75 In place of the "pragmatic
and contextual"76 approach that the courts previously had employed,
the Supreme Court directed that judicial review of administrative
interpretations of law should now proceed under a new two-step test:
Courts were instructed to determine whether Congress had "spoken
directly to the precise question at issue."77 If that was not the case,
the courts were to determine only whether the agency's interpretation
was "reasonable."78  The test seemed designed to increase the
flexibility of administration and give administrators a more
significant role in determining the meaning and application of the
laws they were charged with enforcing.79
Initially, it was thought that Chevron covered a broad field,
including both express and implicit delegations of interpretive and
lawmaking powers, and that it looked to the character and
consequences of an agency interpretation rather than its form. In later
cases, however, it seemed far from obvious that Chevron had covered
the field, as the courts gave considerable attention and controlling
legal significance to the precise form in which agency action or
interpretation has occurred.
For example, in EEOC v. Commercial Office Products,0 the
Supreme Court adopted the Commission's interpretation of the
75. Numerous commentators have questioned whether the Chevron Court
intended the revolutionary change which others soon perceived in the decision.
Among other things, the Chevron Court was sitting at reduced strength. The Court
consisted of only six justices, and none of the justices expressed the view that
Justice Stevens's opinion for the Court signified any change in existing law. In
addition, the Court continued after Chevron to decide cases without mentioning the
Chevron test, and Justice Stevens himself soon limited the application of the
Chevron test in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 107 S. Ct. 1207 (1987).
See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 10, at 985-86; Cass R. Sunstein, Law and
Administration After Chevron, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 2071 (1990); Lawson, supra note
12, at 1379; Herz, supra note 3, at 222.
76. Merrill, supra note 10, at 972.
77. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S.
837, 842, 104 S. Ct. 2778, 2781 (1984)
78. Id. at 844, 104 S. Ct. at 2782.
79. For Supreme Court cases according "Chevron deference," see INS v.
Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 119 S. Ct. 1439 (1999); United States v. Haggar
Apparel Co., 526 U.S. 380, 119 S. Ct. 1392 (1999); Regions Hosp. v. Shalala, 522
U.S. 448, 118 S. Ct. 905 (1998); Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735, 116 S. Ct. 1730
(1996); National Bank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S.
251, 256-57, 115 S. Ct. 810, 813 (1995); Pauley v. Bethenergy Mines, 501 U.S.
680, 111 S. Ct. 2564 (1991); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 111 S. Ct. 1759
(1991). But see National Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.,
522 U.S. 479, 118 S. Ct. 927 (1998) (no Chevron deference); United States v.
LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751, 117 S. Ct. 1673 (1997).
80. 486 U.S. 107, 108 S. Ct. 1666 (1988).
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statutory provisions relating to the charge-filing time limits of Title
VII, although the Commission's interpretation-that "a state agency
terminates its proceeding when it declares that it will not proceed, if
it does at all, for a specific period oftime"81-was memorialized only
in an amicus curiae brief. The Court apparently was not troubled by
the form in which the agency's interpretation appeared, observing that
"the Commission's interpretation need only be reasonable to be
entitled to deference. 's2 Three years later, however, the Court in
EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Company3 rejected outright the
Commission's proffered interpretation of another provision of the
statute which would have permitted the Commission to regulate the
employment practices of United States employers employing United
States citizens abroad. 4  The Court first determined that the
Commission's interpretation was not legally correct,85 and then
invoked Skidmore to reject the idea that deference should be paid to
the Commission's interpretation of its organic statute. 6
In Christensen v. Harris County, 7 the Court also rejected the
applicability of Chevron and invoked the deference principles laid
down in Skidmore to determine the weight to be given an
interpretation of law contained in an agency opinion letter. In
addition, the Court indicated that Skidmore would be applied to
similar administrative interpretations, such as agency policy
statements, manuals, and enforcement guidelines.8 8 Of the current
members of the Court, only Justice Scalia thought that the Chevron
analysis had categorically supplanted Skidmore, which he called an
"anachronism."8' 9 On the other hand, Justice Stevens, while following
81. Id. at 115, 108 S. Ct. at 1671.
82. Id. An interesting comparison may be made with the Court's decision in
Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of California, 572 U.S. 298, 114 S. Ct.
2268 (1994). In Barclays Bank, the Court held that Congress may "passively
indicate that certain state practices do not 'impair federal uniformity in an area
where federal uniformity is essential' [and] need not convey its intent with the
unmistakable clarity required to permit state regulation that discriminates against
interstate commerce . . . ." Id. at 323, 114 S. Ct. at 2283 (citations omitted). On
the other hand, the Court in Barclays Bank found no basis for deferring to "a series
of [contrary] Executive Branch actions, statements, and amicus filings." Id. at 328,
114 S. Ct. at 2285.
83. 499U.S.244, 111 S.Ct. 1227(1991).
84. Id. at 245-56, 111 S. Ct. at 1229-34.
85. Id., 111 S. Ct. at 1229-34.
86. Id. at 257, 111 S. Ct. at 1235. Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion in
Arabian American Oil Company relied extensively on his earlier opinion in
General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 140-46, 97 S. Ct. 401, 410-13
(1976).
87. 529 U.S. 576, 120 S. Ct. 1655 (2000).
88. Id. at 587, 120 S. Ct. at 1662.
89. Id. at 589, 120 S. Ct. at 1664.
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Skidmore, would have treated the agency's opinion letter with
something like the level of deference applicable at the second step of
Chevron. In Justice Stevens's view, Skidmore deference "clearly"
should be afforded to an agency interpretation that is "thoroughly
considered and consistently observed." '9
Most recently, in United States v. Mead Corporation,91 the
Supreme Court determined that tariff classification "ruling letters,"
some 10,000 of which are issued each year by the forty-six regional
offices of the U.S. Customs Service, are not entitled to deference
under Chevron, but held that the "ruling letters" should be accorded
the degree of deference appropriate to whatever persuasive value they
may have under Skidmore.92 Writing for eight members of the Court,
Justice Souter observed:
We granted certiorari ... to consider the limits of Chevron
deference owed to administrative practice in applying a
statute. We hold that administrative implementation of a
particular statutory provision qualifies for Chevron deference
when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the
agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and
that the agency interpretation claiming deference was
promulgated in the exercise of that authority. Delegation of
such authority may be shown in a variety of ways, as by an
agency's power to engage in adjudication or notice-and-
comment rulemaking, or by some other indication of a
90. Id. at 595, 120 S. Ct. at 1667. One case that follows Justice Stevens's
understanding of Skidmore deference is Olmstead v. L. C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S.
581, 119 S. Ct. 2176 (1999). In Olmstead, two mentally retarded patients brought
suit under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1213 1-
12134 (2001), challenging the state's decision to hold them in custodial institutions
rather than place them in community care residential programs. Id. at 587, 119 S.
Ct. 2181. The Court held that the views of the Department of Justice "warranted
respect" because those views had been put forth consistently in judicial briefs. Id.
at 598 n.9, 119 S. Ct. at 2185, 2186 n.9. The Court decided not to employ Chevron
deference analysis, but instead relied on the principle that "the well-reasoned views
of the agencies implementing a statute 'constitute a body of experience and
informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for
guidance."' Id. at 598, 119 S. Ct. at 2186 (footnotes omitted). See also Local No.
93 Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, AFL-CIO v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 106
S. Ct. 3063 (1986) (according Skidmore deference to EEOC guidelines); Bragdon
v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998) ("body of experience and
informed judgment").
91. 533 U.S. 218, 121 S. Ct. 2164 (2001).
92. Id. at 308, 121 S. Ct. at 2175. The court of appeals had previously
determined that the rulings were not entitled to deference under Chevron. Unlike
the Supreme Court, however, the court of appeals thought that that determination
ended the matter, and it made no inquiry into the subject of Skidmore deference.
See id. at 308, 121 S. Ct. at 2175.
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comparable congressional intent. The Customs ruling at issue
here fails to qualify, although the possibility that it deserves
some deference under Skidmore leads us to vacate and
remand.93
As in Christensen, Justice Scalia again dissented in Mead
Corporation, asserting that the majority's opinion marked an "avulsive
change in judicial review of federal administrative action."'94 Justice
Scalia wrote:
Whereas previously a reasonable agency application of an
ambiguous statutory provision had to be sustained so long as it
represented the agency's authoritative interpretation,
henceforth such an application can be set aside unless "it
appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency
generally to make rules carrying the force of law," as by giving
an agency "power to engage in adjudication or notice-and-
comment rulemaking, or . . . some other [procedure]
indicati[ng] comparable congressional intent," and "the agency
interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the
exercise of that authority."... What was previously a general
presumption of authority in agencies to resolve ambiguity in
the statutes they have been authorized to enforce has been
changed to a presumption of no such authority, which must be
overcome by affirmative legislative intent to the contrary. And
whereas previously, when agency authority to resolve
ambiguity did not exist the court was free to give the statute
what it considered the best interpretation, henceforth the court
must supposedly give the agency view some indeterminate
amount of so-called Skidmore deference. We will be sorting
out the consequences of the Mead doctrine, which has totally
replaced the Chevron doctrine, for years to come.95
Notwithstanding the lopsided vote in Mead, one may wonder
whether the majority opinion truly represents the synthesis and end of
discussion that its rhetoric suggests. The Court's experience in this
area has not been linear, and Mead undoubtedly settles less than it
supposes. In theory, the extent to which the field has been covered by
Chevron, and in what circumstances, remain contested questions. In
practice, the effect of Chevron is even less clear.96
93. Id. at 303, 121 S. Ct. at 2171.
94. Id. at 311, 121 S. Ct. at 2177.
95. Id. at 311-12, 121 S. Ct. 2177-78 (citations and footnotes omitted).
96. Among other things, the Supreme Court has not decided whether Chevron
applies to agency interpretations given in the context of informal adjudications.
See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Reno, 212 F.3d 1338 (11th Cir. 2000); Gonzalez ex rel.
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III. THE PROBLEM OF THE "EARLY" RIGHT-TO-SUE LETTER
The Civil Rights Act of 1964,97 the Voting Rights Act of 1965,9"
and the Fair Housing Act of 196899 are now deeply entrenched in the
landscape of American law and social life, and in the commercial and
industrial practices of the nation. One measure of that entrenchment is
the growth of civil rights litigation, particularly employment
discrimination litigation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, from a statistically insignificant part of the workload of the
federal courts to one of its major components.1" Another measure is
the extent to which the concept of equal opportunity in employment, at
least in the abstract, has become an accepted value of American
society. We may differ at the edges, on issues such as affirmative
action, and we may divide over the existence and need for redressing
present effects of past discrimination, but our formal commitment to
civil rights is unquestioned. That is the conventional wisdom, and
there is a great deal of truth to it. Certainly, the nature of our public
conversation and the terms in which we talk about these matters now
reflect that prevailing wisdom."°'
Gonzalez v. Reno, 215 F.3d 1243 (1 lth Cir. 2000).
97. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1999).
98. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 (1994).
99. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619, 3631 (2001).
100. On average, between 21,000 and 24,000 employment discrimination cases
were filed in the federal courts each year during the period 1996 to 2000. See
Administrative Office of U.S. Courts, U.S. District Courts-Civil Cases
Commenced, By Nature of Suit, During the Twelve-Month Periods Ended
Septembqr 30, 1996 Through 2000, Table C-2A (2000), available at
http://www.uscourt.gov/judbus2000/contents.html (visited June 27,2001). Recent
studies suggest, however, that the increase in the volume of Title VII litigation has
not been accompanied by an increase in recoveries by plaintiffs. Theodore
Eisenberg and Stewart J. Schwab have noted that only 26.8 percent of trials in
employment discrimination cases result in victories for plaintiffs, as opposed to the
44.2 percent win rate for federal plaintiffs generally. See Theodore Eisenberg &
Stewart J. Schwab, Double Standard on Appeal: An Empirical Analysis of
Employment Discrimination Cases in the US. Courts of Appeals, at
http://www.fmdjustice.con/nmr/news/eisenber-schwab/schwab-report.htm (visited
July 27, 2001). Of course, many employment discrimination cases are dismissed
prior to trial. Moreover, as Professors Eisenberg and Schwab have shown, plaintiff
trial victories are reversed on appeal 43.61 percent of the time, whereas defense
victories are reversed on appeal only 5.8 percent of the time. Id. By way of
comparison, the authors observe, "Even prisoner civil rights and habeas plaintiffs
have an easier time holding their trial victories on appeal than do employment
discrimination plaintiffs.... Only the wardens in prisoner habeas corpus petitions
are better able to hold their trial judgments on appeal than an employer in a
discrimination case." Id.
101. Of course, the reality of our performance may be quite different. A
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Our current commitment to equal opportunity in employment and
other areas tends to mask the depth and the extent of the disagreement
and controversy that surrounded the civil rights legislation that
Congress enacted during the 1960s. It is not easy today to appreciate
the extent to which the voices supporting these reforms, albeit true to
one traditional version of the American vision, were thought
profoundly discordant to many of the background values that drove
the public conversation of the times.1 2 Nor is it easy to remember the
very serious opposition, both within Congress and in the country at
large, that had to be overcome before the civil rights bills
(particularly the omnibus legislation that became the Civil Rights Act
of 1964) could be enacted into law. That resistance was quelled in
various ways, 103  but particularly through certain political
compromises that have had lasting effects on the specific provisions
and administration of these laws. As one commentator on Title VII
and the Fair Housing Act observed in 1969, "Both Acts, born in the
House, were transfigured in the Senate by those who wished to save
them from an otherwise certain death. Each is the result of a political
compromise, a product more of the desire for passage than the desire
Chicago Tribune columnist recently wrote about Jesse Jackson's critics, noting that
some "honestly object" to Jackson's "boycott-driven tactics," his "outside-with-a-
bullhorn style," and his "lust for the limelight." David Greising, GoodNews Heard
Despite Jackson's Hype, Chicago Tribune, Aug. 10, 2001, § 3 at 1. According to
the columnist, however, "others dislike Jackson because he fights for blacks" in
what these critics see as a zero-sum game world---one in which any gains by
African-Americans necessarily diminish them. Id. In addition, the columnist noted
that:
Low-grade discrimination is common in the workplace. Overt
racism is hardly rare.
Recent past cases have shown us disgusting banter in the
executive suite at Texaco, denial of opportunity throughout the ranks at
Coca-Cola, nooses in the employee locker room at Southern Company
and Klan-style dress showing up at an R.R. Donnelley plant in Dwight,
Ill.
With racism abounding, it's no wonder Jackson uses boycott
threats, walkouts, or public bullying-whatever it takes.
Id.
102. See, e.g., Taylor Branch, Pillar of Fire: America in the King Years, 1963-
65, at 357 (1998) (detailing Senator Goldwater's characterization of civil rights bill
as "threat to the very essence of our basic system"); id. at 456 (describing Governor
George Wallace's demand that Civil Rights Act be repealed); Barry Sullivan, The
Honest Muse: Judge Wisdom and the Uses of History, 60 Tul. L. Rev. 314, 339
(1985).
103. Among other things, cloture was invoked for only the second time in the
history of the United States Senate. See Francis Vaas, Title VII: Legislative
History, 7 B.C. Indus. & Com. L. Rev. 431 (1966). See also Francis T. Coleman,
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act: Four Years of Procedural Elucidation, 8 Duq. L.
Rev. 1 (1969-70); Comment, Enforcement of Fair Employment Under the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 32 U. Chi. L. Rev. 430 (1965).
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for a rational scheme for uprooting discrimination."'" Nowhere,
perhaps, is the reality of that desire for compromise more evident, or
its current effects more deeply felt, than in the procedural aspects of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.05
A. Section 706 of Title VII
The central purpose of Title VII was to prohibit invidious
discrimination in employment. In Title VII, Congress identified
certain "unlawful employment practices," and prohibited employers,
employment agencies and unions from practicing invidious
discrimination, based on race, color, religion, national origin, and sex,
with respect to a broad class of employment-related decisions and
conditions of employment. Congress also established the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), a commission-
104. Note, Discrimination in Employment and Housing: Private Enforcement
Provisions of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1968, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 834, 835
(1969). See also Miller v. International Paper Co., 408 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969)
(discussing legislative development of Title VII). In 1971, the editors of the
Harvard Law Review discussed some of these tensions:
Although the substantive provisions of the Act appear quite sweeping,
closer analysis reveals a number of tensions inherent in this product of
political compromise. Underlying Title VII is the public interest in
eliminating employment discrimination in order to guarantee to minorities
the economic status necessary to a free society and to insure maximum
utilization of human potential. But the Act also reflects the private
individual's interest in securing equal employment opportunity.
Similarly, there is a tension between the judgment that informal, private,
and local methods of eliminating employment discrimination are
preferable, and the desire for prompt, judicial redress of discrimination
grievances.
Developments in the Law: Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1109, 1195-96 (1971).
105. The Harvard editors noted:
These tensions are apparent in the Act's procedural mechanisms. The Act
provides for three instrumentalities of enforcement: the aggrieved
individual; the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC); and
the Attorney General. The aggrieved party bears the primary
responsibility for enforcing Title VII through the mechanism of a private
action in federal district court. The EEOC, which as the bill was
originally conceived bore the primary enforcement responsibility, lost its
adjudicatory and coercive powers through a series of political
compromises. This shift in responsibility for enforcement of the Act has
been characterized as a basic change in the philosophy of the title ...
[which] implied an appraisal of discrimination in employment as a private
rather than a public wrong, a wrong, to be sure, which entitles the
damaged party to judicial relief, but not one so injurious to the community
as to justify the intervention of the public law enforcement authorities.
Id. at 1196.
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form federal agency consisting of five members appointed for five-
year terms by the president, with the advice and consent of the
Senate, and charged with enforcing the provisions of the Act. 106
Congress was deeply divided, however, with respect to the nature and
extent of the enforcement powers to be entrusted to the Commission.
As Rebecca Hanner White has recently reminded us, "a major source
of disagreement during passage of the Act was the character and level
of regulatory authority to be conferred upon the EEOC. 10 7
The House proponents of employment discrimination legislation
had looked initially to the National Labor Relations Board as a model
for the new commission. However, the Labor Board was endowed
with a broad array of investigatory and adjudicatory powers,
including the authority to enter "cease and desist" orders, subject tojudicial review on "substantial evidence" grounds, as well as full
rulemaking authority. 0 8 In addition, the National Labor Relations
Act did not create any private cause of action for those affected by
unfair labor practices; their claims were to be determined
administratively by the Board, subject, of course, to limited judicial
review. 09 As Professor White has suggested, the Labor Board model
did not recommend itself to many opponents of the civil rights bill,
some of whom undoubtedly would have favored curtailing the powers
of the Board rather than duplicating those broad powers in a new
agency, particularly one concerned with employment
discrimination. 10 The opponents won the day. During the course of
106. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 705,
78 Stat. 253, 258 (1964).
107. Rebecca Hanner White, The EEOC, the Courts, and Employment
Discrimination Policy: Recognizing the Agency's Leading Role in Statutory
Interpretation, 1995 Utah L. Rev. 51, 58 (1995). The thrust of Professor White's
thesis is that "the courts should find an implied delegation to the EEOC of authority
to interpret Title VII." Id. at 57-58. Professor White makes a strong case in
support of that argument, but the argument is not one that is made without
difficulty, as she acknowledges. Id. In a sense, the concern of the present essay
is a narrower one. The regulation at issue here is a procedural regulation, and the
compromise effected by Congress in the adoption of Title VII indisputablyincluded the granting of rulemaking power in that area to the Commission. See
Section 713(a) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a) (2001).
108. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 156, 160 (1988). Of course, the Labor Board has chosen
not to rely heavily on its rulemaking powers. See Mark H. Grunewald, The
NLRB 's First Rulemaking: An Exercise in Pragmatism, 41 Duke L.J. 274 (1991).
109. Orders issued by the Labor Board in unfair labor practice cases normally
are subject to review in the regional courts of appeal. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 160(e), (f)(2000). The Board may also seek injunctive relief in a federal district court. See
29 U.S.C. § 1600) (2000).
110. Thus, "there was considerable resistance to creating a civil rights
enforcement agency that could not only investigate and prosecute but also
determine employer liability." White, supra note 107, at 59.
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the legislative process, Congress deleted the "cease and desist" power
contained in the original bill, deleted the grant of authority to the
Commission to prosecute violations of the statute in the federal
district courts, and reduced the agency's rulemaking authority to
include only the issuance of "suitable procedural rules."'
Congress's rejection of the Labor Board model, together with the
various limitations it imposed on the Commission's activities,
resulted in an enforcement authority unlike that given to any other
federal regulatory body. Persons aggrieved by discrimination were
required to have their administrative claims processed initially by
qualifying state and local authorities; their claims would then be
considered by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or,
in the case of a pattern or practice charge, by the Attorney General. 112
Unless the Commission was able to broker a settlement between the
charging party and the respondent, however, the aggrieved party
generally would be required to bring a private action in federal
district court to secure redress for violations of Title VII.1 3 The role
of the courts was to decide claims of discrimination, not to review
Commission determinations; and the first stage ofjudicial decision-
making was to take place in the district courts, not the court of
appeals." 14  Professor White has well summarized the ultimate
product of the 1964 legislative process in this way:
Created by the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the EEOC "was a
strange hybrid creature." It was responsible for processing all
charges of discrimination under Title VII, and filing a charge
with the EEOC was a jurisdictional prerequisite for suit.
Moreover, the EEOC had authority to investigate charges, to
determine whether there was probable cause to believe Title
VII had been violated, and to conciliate the claims.
Furthermore, employers were given immunity for actions
taken in "good faith... reliance on any written interpretation
or opinion of the Commission." But the EEOC lacked the
authority to issue cease-and-desist orders or to file suit.
111. Id. at 60 (citing 110 Cong. Rec. 2575 (1964)). The provision granting
authority to issue "suitable rules" was altered, without explanation or debate, with
the insertion of the word "procedural" during floor consideration of the bill. See
id. at 60-61.
112. See Coleman, supra note 103, at 9 n.30 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12) which
sets forth the general policy with respect to coordination with state agencies). See
also Section 706(b) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (2001).
113. See Coleman, supra note 103, at 4.
114. The legislative determination that cases should be brought as original
litigation in the district courts, rather than as review actions in the courts of appeals,
has greatly increased the number of judicial decision-makers and has had
significant consequences for the development of legal principle.
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Rather, a charging party, after receiving a right-to-sue letter
from the EEOC, was entitled to bring an enforcement action,
which would be heard de novo by a trial court. Additionally,
the Attorney General, not the EEOC, had authority to bring
actions alleging an employer's pattern and practice of
violating the Act.'15
115. White, supra note 107, at 61 (footnotes omitted). Thus, the Commission
had no authority to litigate claims of discrimination, but was authorized to resolve
claims of discrimination only through efforts at conference, conciliation, and
persuasion. In these circumstances, there was little incentive for employers to
reach agreement, and the Commission's efforts were largely unsuccessful. See,
e.g., Comment, Developments in the Law: Employment Discrimination and Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of1964, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1195, 1245 (1971) [hereinafter
Comment, Developments in the Law]. It should be noted, however, that individual
members of the Commission were authorized to file administrative charges of
discrimination with the Commission if they had reasonable cause to believe that
Title VII had been violated. See Coleman, supra note 103, at 9 (explaining that the
Commissioner's charges are filed and processed in the same manner as individual
complaints). This provision was thought important because it permits the
commencement of the administrative process when the person affected by
discrimination chooses to remain anonymous or is unwilling to verify her charge
because of fear of retaliation. See Comment, Developments in the Law, supra, at
1199.
As originally enacted in 1964, Title VII set forth a number of time periods
for various steps in the administrative process. Under Section 706(d) of Title VII,
as originally enacted, a person aggrieved by an unlawful employment practice was
required to file a charge with the Commission "within ninety days after the alleged
unlawful employment practice occurred." Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 706(d), 78 Stat.
253, 260 (1964). An early commentator noted:
In cases where the alleged unfair labor practice also falls within thejurisdiction of certain state laws of equal employment opportunity, this
statutory limitation period is extended to two hundred and ten days
following the occurrence of the alleged discrimination, or thirty days after
the state or local authority has concluded its action on the matter,
whichever comes first.
Coleman, supra note 103, at 6. The Commission was then required to investigate,
determine reasonable cause, and attempt conciliation. No time limits were placed
on the Commission with respect to these activities, but once the period of thirty
days had elapsed, the Commission was ordinarily required to issue a notice of
right-to-sue upon demand by an aggrieved party. However, if the Commission
determined that further efforts at conciliation were warranted, it could delay issuing
the right-to-sue letter for one additional thirty-day period. Section 706 of Title VII,
Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 706, 78 Stat. 253, 259 (1964). See also Note, Title VII, Civil
Rights Act of 1964: Present Operation and Proposals for Improvement, 5 Colum.
J.L. & Soc. Probs. 1, 6 (1969) [hereinafter Note, Title VII]. Finally, the party
aggrieved by discrimination was required by Section 706(e) of Title VII to bring
suit in federal district court within thirty days after being notified by the
Commission of her right to sue. Section 706(e) of Title VII, Pub. L. No. 88-352,
§ 706(e), 78 Stat. 253, 260 (1964).
In 1972, Congress amended Section 2000e-5(f) as part of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972,
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In 1972, Congress amended Title VII to grant litigating authority
to the Commission for the first time. The amendments authorized the
Commission to bring suits against private employers in the event that
the Commission was unable to conciliate individual claims of
discrimination, and the authority to initiate "pattern and practice"
litigation was transferred from the Attorney General to the
Commission." 6 However, contemporaneous efforts to endow the
Commission with "cease and desist" authority, which would have
permitted judicial review of Commission determinations rather than
leaving claims of discrimination to be determined by trials de novo in
the federal district courts, were unsuccessful. Thus, notwithstanding
the very significant changes in certain aspects of Title VII
enforcement brought about by the 1972 amendments, the basic nature
of the administrative enforcement procedure created by the 1964 Act
remained the same. The administrative enforcement scheme
applicable to Title VII claims is set forth in Section 706 of Title VII,
which outlines a complex series of administrative procedures to be
followed. Many of the procedural requirements set forth in Section
706, both those that are meant to guide the actions of the charging
party and those that are directed to the Commission for guidance in
the discharge of its duties, are accompanied by references to time
periods, which almost invariably provide for the taking of action
"within [so many] days." For example, the statute directs that a
charging party file her civil action "within ninety days after the giving
of... notice [of right to sue]."''  At least in this example, the word
"within" is meant to communicate the maximum time period within
which a lawsuit ordinarily must be filed or the right to do so
abandoned. That meaning seems consistent with common experience
and customary legal practice."' The various procedural provisions
Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 4, 86 Stat. 103, 104 (1972) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(f)(1) (1988)). The 1972 amendments altered these time periods, as explained
below. The new provision extended the time for filing an administrative charge of
discrimination from ninety to one-hundred-eighty days. It also retained the
individual's right to file a private civil action and extended the time periods for
bringing an EEOC action from thirty to one-hundred-eighty days, for issuing a
right-to-sue letter to a private party from thirty to one-hundred-eighty days, and for
bringing a private civil action from thirty to ninety days. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)
(1993).
116. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(e) (1988).
117. 42 U.S.C. § 706(0(1) (1993).
118. It is natural, of course, to assume that words will be used in the same sense
throughout a particular statutory provision, but that is not invariably held to be the
case. See Atlantic Cleaners & Dryers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433, 52
S. Ct. 607, 608-09 (1932). See also William N. Eskridge et al., Legislation and
Statutory Interpretation 264, 376 (2000). See also Seybert v. West Chester Univ.,
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and their respective requirements as to timing warrant some
discussion here.
Under Section 706(f)(1), a "person aggrieved" by "an unlawful
employment practice," who wishes to avail herself of the substantive
protections afforded by Title VII, is required to file a "charge" with
the Commission
within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful
employment practice occurred..., except that in a case [in
which] ... the person aggrieved has initially instituted
proceedings with a State or local agency with authority to
grant or seek relief from such practice... such charge shall
be filed ...within three hundred days after the alleged
unlawful employment practice occurred, or within thirty days
after receiving notice that the State or local agency has
terminated the proceedings under the State or local law,
whichever is earlier .... 119
Within ten days of the filing of such a charge of discrimination,
according to Section 706(b), "the Commission shall serve a notice of
the charge ... [on the party or parties alleged to have committed the
unlawful employment practice], and shall make an investigation
thereof."' 2 Section 706(b) also provides that:
If the Commission determines after such investigation that
there is not reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true,
it shall dismiss the charge and promptly notify the person
claiming to be aggrieved and the respondent of its action...
If the Commission determines after such investigation that
there is reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true, the
Commission shall endeavor to eliminate any such alleged
unlawful employment practice by informal methods of
conference, conciliation, and persuasion .... The Commission
shall make its determination on reasonable cause as promptly
as possible and, so far as practicable, not later than one
hundred and twenty days from the filing of the charge .... "2
Additional procedural provisions and requirements are also
outlined in Section 706(f)(1). Among other things, these provisions
83 F. Supp. 2d 547,551 n. 10 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (considering the meaning of the word
"if' in § 2000e-5(f)(1): "Does it preclude private suits unless one of the two
conditions occurs-or, used in connection with "shall," does it suggest the
contrary?"). Compare Spencer v. Banco Real, 87 F.R.D. 739,743 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
with Figueira v. Black Entm't Television, 944 F. Supp. 299, 305 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
119. Section 706(e)(1) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (1993).
120. Section 706(b) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1993).
121. Id.
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permit the Commission, absent the negotiation of a satisfactory
conciliation agreement, to bring suit within thirty days of the filing of
a charge. They also authorize the Commission to notify a charging
party of his right to bring suit if the charge has been dismissed by the
Commission, or if, within 180 days, the Commission has not entered
into a satisfactory conciliation agreement or commenced a lawsuit.
In terms, the statute provides that:
If within thirty days after a charge is filed with the
Commission... the Commission has been unable to secure
... a conciliation agreement acceptable to the Commission,
the Commission may bring a civil action... The person or
persons aggrieved shall have the right to intervene in a civil
action brought by the Commission... If a charge filed with
the Commission pursuant to subsection (b) of this section is
dismissed by the Commission, or if within one hundred and
eighty days from the filing of such charge . . . the
Commission has not filed a civil action ... or. .. has not
entered into a conciliation agreement to which the person
aggrieved is a party, the Commission... shall so notify the
person aggrieved and within ninety days after the giving of
such notice a civil action may be brought against the
respondent named in the charge (A) by the person claiming to
be aggrieved or (B) if such charge was filed by a member of
the Commission, by any person whom the charge alleged was
aggrieved by the alleged unlawful employment practice.
Upon application by the complainant and in such
circumstances as the court may deem just, the court may
appoint an attorney for such complainant and may authorize
the commencement of the action without the payment of fees,
costs, or security. Upon timely application, the court may, in
its discretion, permit the Commission... to intervene in such
civil action upon certification that the case is of general public
importance. Upon request, the court may, in its discretion,
stay further proceedings for not more than sixty days pending
... further efforts of the Commission to obtain voluntary
compliance.'22
The language of Section 706 may seem impenetrable at first
reading, especially with respect to the various time limits that attach
to one aspect or another of the administrative process, but several
122. Section 706(f)(1) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1993). For the
sake of simplicity, the provisions relating to cases in which the respondent is "a
government, governmental agency, or political subdivision," in which case certain
actions are to be taken by the Attorney General, rather than by the Commission,
have been omitted.
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points are relatively clear nonetheless. Among other things, these
provisions spell out two discrete alternatives for commencing a Title
VI action in federal district court. First, the Commission may initiate
a civil action "[i]f within thirty days after a charge is filed with the
Commission... [it] has been unable to secure from the respondent a
conciliation agreement acceptable to the Commission."' 3 On its face,
this language would seem to suggest that the Commission need not
wait until the expiration of any otherwise relevant time period to
commence a civil action in federal district court, but may file such an
action even within the first thirty days after a charge has been filed, so
long as a conciliation agreement satisfactory to the Commission has not
yet been reached-in which case the Commission would not be entitled
to bring suit, and, presumably, would have no reason to do so.' 24 More
important, this provision does not impose on the Commission any
particular requirements as to what the Commission must do before
determining that litigation is the best route to follow; nor does it make
proof of any particular course of administrative conduct, or compliance
with any particular set of requirements, a condition precedent to the
filing of such a lawsuit. The Commission is not required to detail for
the court any efforts that it may or may not have undertaken to secure
a satisfactory conciliation agreement, nor is the court authorized to
evaluate the efficacy or good faith of any such efforts. In short, the
decision whether to file a lawsuit apparently is a decision committed to
agency discretion. 125
Second, this provision also contemplates the possibility that a
private lawsuit will be filed by the "charging party," and it lays out
the requirements for that. Here, two different scenarios are
123. Id. Presumably, the Commission's legal authority to initiate a civil action
would not expire at the conclusion of thirty days because the Commission could
not normally be expected to decide whether to commence litigation within that time
period. Here, as elsewhere, Congress seems to have included a reference to a
specific time for the purpose of expressing an opinion as to an optimal time period,
rather than attempting to create a hard and fast limitation.
124. Although this understanding of the statute seems correct, the Commission
appears not to have asserted its authority to begin an action within the 30-day
period unless it is also seeking preliminary or temporary relief under Section
706(f)(2) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(2) (1993). See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.27
(2000). This fact is not surprising. Absent the need for preliminary or temporary
relief, the Commission ordinarily would have no reason to file its own action
within the 30-day period.
125. The significance of these omissions may be demonstrated by a comparison
with the rulemaking provisions of Section 553(b) of the Administrative Procedure
Act. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1993). Those provisions allow an agency to depart
from notice-and-comment rulemaking when, among other things, "the agency for
good cause finds (and incorporates the finding and a brief statement of reasons
therefor in the rules issued) that notice and public procedure thereon are
impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest." Id.
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contemplated. First, "[i]f a charge filed with the Commission... is
dismissed by the Commission, . . . [it] shall so notify the person
aggrieved and within ninety days after the giving of such notice a
civil action may be brought . . . by the person claiming to be
aggrieved .... , 26 In other words, once the Commission determines
that the charge should be dismissed, presumably because the
Commission believes that there is "not reasonable cause to believe
that the charge is true," the Commission is required to notify the
charging party, who may then bring a civil action within ninety days.
Again, there is no requirement that the Commission await any
specified period of time before dismissing the charge. Nor is there
any requirement that the Commission give any explanation or
justification for its determination.
The statute provides that the Commission's determination to
dismiss the charge be made "after... investigation," but the statute
does not prescribe any particular requirements for this investigation.
Nor does the statute make the dismissal determination subject to
judicial review, let alone require that any particular showing be made
to any court for the purpose of establishing the adequacy of the
Commission's investigation. Of course, the effect of the
Commission's determination is limited. The determination has no
preclusive effect, and the charging party is entitled to press her claim
on a clean slate in federal district court.' On the other hand, the
determination has the important practical effect of terminating the
administrative proceeding and transferring resolution of the conflict
from the administrative realm to the courts, assuming, that is, that the
person aggrieved has access to the financial and professional
resources necessary to sustain federal court litigation. In this sense,
the determination is significant: it deprives both the charging party
and the respondent of the good offices of the Commission in helping
to resolve their dispute without litigation; it limits the charging
party's enforcement options, so that she can pursue her grievance, if
at all, only through litigation; and it may require the respondent to
make her defense in federal district court, with the attendant expense
that requirement entails. 2  Thus, the Commission's dismissal of a
126. Section 706(f)(1) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1993).
127. Although the Commission's determination has no resjudicata effect, some
courts have recently held that the Commission's dismissal of a charge for failure
to cooperate with its administrative processes should preclude the subsequent filing
of a Title VII action in federal court. See, e.g., Pack v. Marsh, 986 F.2d 1155,
1158-59 (7th Cir. 1.993); McLaughlin v. State Sys. of Higher Ed., No. 97-CV- 1144,
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4325 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 1999).
128. Of course, a charging party may also avail herself of remedies provided by
available alternative dispute resolution processes. See Section 118 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) ("[w]here appropriate
and to the extent authorized by law, the use of alternative means of dispute
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charge may not finally and irrevocably determine the parties' substantive
legal rights, but it may well alter their respective positions in not
insignificant practical ways. Most important, and notwithstanding these
effects, the legitimacy of the dismissal does not depend in any way upon
the lapse of any particular time period from the filing of the charge or
with compliance with any other time limits.
A private lawsuit may come about in a second way. Section
706(0(1) further provides that:
[I]f within one hundred eighty days from the filing of such
charge... , the Commission has not filed a civil action under
this section... , or the Commission has not entered into a
conciliation agreement to which the person aggrieved is a party,
the Commission... shall so notify the person aggrieved and
within ninety days after the giving of such notice a civil action
may be brought. 29
On its face, and consistent with other uses of the word "within" in
Section 706, this provision also would seem not to require that some
particular period of time be required to elapse arbitrarily, without regard
to what the Commission may or may not have attempted or achieved
with respect to the charge. In other words, a plausible reading of this
provision (made even more likely by the context in which it appears) is
that the Commission, when it has not filed a lawsuit or entered into a
conciliation agreement to which the person aggrieved is a party, may
issue a right-to-sue letter to the person aggrieved at any time within 180
days after the charge of discrimination has been filed. According to this
reading, the Commission could make the determination to issue a right-
to-sue letter at any time during the 180-day period, which would make
sense in many situations, as, for example, when an employer or other
respondent categorically refuses to participate in conciliation. After the
expiration of that period, the Commission presumably has no discretion
to withhold issuance of a right-to-sue letter, but must then issue one, at
resolution, including settlement negotiations, conciliation, facilitation, mediation,
factfmding, minitrials, and arbitration is encouraged to resolve disputes arising
under the Acts or provisions of Federal law amended by this title [including
sections 2000e, 2000e-1, 2000e-2, 2000e-4, 2000e-5, and 2000e-16]."); 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 note (1999). See also R. Gaull Silberman et al., Alternative Dispute
Resolution of Employment Discrimination Claims, 54 La. L. Rev. 1533 (1994).
129. Section 706()(1) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). This second
possibility actually encompasses two different scenarios: (a) where a civil action
is not commenced by the Commission within 180 days, and (b) where the
Commission has not entered into a conciliation agreement within 180 days. Id. In
the latter scenario, conciliation presumably will have been attempted without
success, while the former scenario need not have included any effort at
conciliation. The result is the same, however, in that a right-to-sue letter may issue
in either case.
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least when requested by the charging party."3 That is not to say, of
course, that the Commission necessarily must terminate its investigation
at that point; the Commission could choose to continue its investigation
of the charge even after the 180-day period has expired and a right-to-sue
letter has been issued-a scenario that is most likely to occur in
circumstances where the Commission perceives the possibility of
building a pattern and practice case on factual circumstances uncovered
in its investigation of one or more charges of discrimination, including
that with respect to which the right-to-sue letter has been requested.13'
Further support for this reading may be found in the legislative
history of the 1972 amendments, which, among other things, granted
litigating authority to the Commission for the first time.132 The section-
by-section analysis of those amendments shows that Congress
considered abolishing the private right of action during the process of
amending Title VII, but decided not to do so. Notwithstanding the grant
of litigating authority to the Commission, Congress thought that
retention of the private right of action was important for two reasons: (a)
to ensure that charging parties would not be denied a remedy solely
because of an adverse agency determination (either dismissal of the
charge or the adoption of a conciliation agreement deemed unsatisfactory
by the charging party), and (b) to ensure that charging parties would be
protected against administrative stonewalling and delay. The section-by-
section analysis articulated these concerns in this way:
The retention of the private right of action, as amended, is
intended to make clear that an individual aggrieved by a
violation of Title VII should not be forced to abandon the claim
130. In some circumstances, a charging party's failure to request a right-to-sue
letter may affect her substantive rights. See, e.g., Churchill v. Star Enters., 183
F.3d 184, 191 (3d Cir. 1999); Heylinger v. State Univ. & Comm. Coll. Sys. Of
Tenn., 126 F.3d 849, 855 n.2 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1117, 118 S.
Ct. 1054 (1998); Cleveland Newspaper Guild, Local 1 v. The Plain Dealer Publ'g
Co., 839 F.2d 1147 (6th Cir. 1988) (en banc); Holden v. Burlington Northern, Inc.,
No. 3-81-994, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15851 (D. Minn. June 15, 1984).
131. Indeed, the section of the EEOC Compliance Manual dealing with the
issuance of "early" right-to-sue letters specifically states that it is the policy of the
Commission to investigate all charges, and that it may be appropriate to continue(or begin) investigations even after the issuance of a right-to-sue letter. See EEOC
Compl. Man. (CCH) No. 915.001, § 6.3 (1987). On the other hand, the Fifth
Circuit has recently held that the Commission has no legal authority to continue its
investigation after the issuance of a right-to-sue letter, although it did reservejudgment as to whether the Commission could bring an enforcement action after
that date. See, e.g., EEOC v. Hearst Corp., 103 F.3d 462, 469-70 (5th Cir. 1997).
132. Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as originally enacted, the Commission
was not authorized to commence litigation. Thus, a charging party's only options,
in the absence of successful conciliation of her claim, were to commence a private
action on her own behalf or abandon her claim.
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merely because ofa decision by the Commission or the Attorney
General as the case may be, that there are insufficient grounds
for the Government to file a complaint. Moreover, it is designed
to make sure that the person aggrieved does not have to endure
lengthy delays if the Commission or Attorney General does not
act with due diligence and speed. Accordingly, the provisions
described above allow the person aggrieved to elect to pursue his
or her own remedy under this title in the courts where there is
agency inaction, dalliance or dismissal of the charge, or
unsatisfactory resolution. 133
B. The Commission's Early Practice and Regulation
1601.28(a)(2)
Virtually from the time of its organization and earliest
operations, 134 the Commission was inundated with a far greater
volume of charges of discrimination than it was able, given its level
of funding and other resources, to process in a timely manner.
Among other things, the extendable thirty-day period after which a
right-to-sue letter must issue at the request of a charging party proved
insufficient, and Congress extended that period to one hundred eighty
days in the 1972 amendments.3 I It soon became clear, however, that
the Commission's caseload often made even the 180-day period an
insufficient amount of time for the Commission to complete its
investigation and processing of a charge, including the making of a
reasonable cause determination, and culminating in either the entry
of a conciliation agreement, the issuance of a right-to-sue letter to the
charging party, or (after 1972) the commencement of a civil action by
the Commission. 136 Indeed, in view of the Commission s
administrative case backlog, the Commission was often unable even
to commence processing a charge within the statutory one hundred
133. 188 Cong. Rec. 7168 (1972).
134. Barbara L. Schlei & Paul Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law 776
(1976) [hereinafter Schlei & Grossman, Employment Discrimination]. The
Commission was disorganized and inadequately staffed during its early months of
operation. The five commissioners were not appointed until May 10, 1965, less
than two months before the Commission was to begin functioning under the statute.
The first year of operation was devoted to organizational problems, and three
Chairmen passed through the agency in the first three years of its existence. The
Commission struggled through the first year of operation with only seven
permanent investigators and did not operate with a full staff until March 1968. See
Note, Title VII, supra note 115, at 13.
135. See supra note 115 (discussing the 1972 Amendments).
136. Schlei & Grossman, Employment Discrimination, supra note 134, at 776.
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eighty-day period. 137 In light of this bureaucratic morass,1 38 the
Commission adopted the practice of sometimes issuing right-to-sue
notices when requested by a charging party before the expiration of
the 180-day period. 139
In 1977, following a major internal study of its organization and
operations, the Commission proposed a series of changes that the
Commission's chair, Eleanor Holmes Norton, called the most
extensive overhaul of the Commission's structure and processes
since its inception in 1965.140 The purpose was to streamline the
agency's procedures, integrate the litigating authority conferred by
the 1972 amendments with the Commission's preexisting
investigative and conciliation functions, and generally improve the
enforcement of Title VII. Among the procedural improvements
adopted by the Commission were the introduction of a rapid case
processing system, a separate backlog case processing system, a
"direct service" consumer-oriented structure, integration of
investigation, conciliation, and litigation functions, and the
establishment of a program to deal specifically with cases of
systemic discrimination.' As part of this administrative reform
effort, and pursuant to notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures,
the Commission proposed the promulgation of a rule that codified
its longstanding practice of issuing right-to-sue letters, in certain
circumstances, before the expiration of the 180-day period. 4 2 In a
137. Id.
138. In 1977 the Commission's backlog figure numbered nearly 130,000.
Oversight Hearings on Federal Enforcement of Equal Employment Opportunity
Laws, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 11 (1977) (statement of Eleanor H. Norton,
Commissioner, EEOC).
139. Schlei & Grossman, Employment Discrimination, supra note 134, at 776.
140. See OversightHearings on Federal Enforcement of Equal Employment
Opportunity Laws, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., at 6 (1997) (statement of Hon. Eleanor H.
Norton); 42 Fed. Reg. 161 at 42023 (Aug. 19, 1977) (notice of rulemaking).
141. Oversight Hearings on Federal Enforcement of Equal Employment
Opportunity Laws, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., at 23 (1997) (statement of Hon. Eleanor
H. Norton).
142. In the notice of proposed rulemaking that initiated the period of public
comment on these reforms, the Commission stated that the proposed rule was not
technically subject to the requirements of notice-and-comment rulemaking,
inasmuch as the proposed rule was a "procedural regulation" under Section 713(a)
of Title VII, which the Commission was authorized to issue without such
compliance under Section 553(b) of the Administrative Procedure Act. See 42 Fed.
Reg. 152, at 40,023 (1997). However, the Commission thought that following the
procedures for notice-and-comment rulemaking would be appropriate because it
would be "useful to solicit public comment with regard to some of the
contemplated changes." Id. With respect to that part of the rule with which this
article is concerned, the Commission explained that the proposed rule was
grounded in Section 706(f)(1) of Title VII, as interpreted by the courts in various
decisions, including Bauman v. Union Oil Corp., 400 F. Supp. 1021 (N.D. Cal.
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statement accompanying the rule, as finally adopted, the
Commission explained further:
The Commission is willing to issue notices before 180 days
when it is clear that the administrative process cannot be
completed, based on the legal principle that a party is not
required to perform a useless act, i.e., wait for the passage of
one-hundred-eighty days when the passage of such time will
not accomplish any purpose. 143
The regulation authorized the issuance of "early" right-to sue letters,
but only if one of several specifically enumerated Commission
officials had determined that it was unlikely that the Commission
would be able to take final action before the expiration of the 180-day
period. The regulation, which is codified at Section 1601.28(a)(2) of
Title 29, Code of Federal Regulations, provides the following:
When a person claiming to be aggrieved requests, in writing,
that a notice of right-to-sue be issued, and the charge to which
the request relates is filed against a respondent other than a
government, governmental agency or political subdivision,
the Commission may issue such notice as described in §
1601.28(e) with copies to all parties, at any time prior to the
expiration of 180 days from the date of filing the charge with
the Commission; provided, that the District Director, the Area
Director, the Local Director, the Program Director, Office of
Program Operations or upon delegation, the Director of
Systemic Programs, Office of Program Operations or the
Directors, Field Management Programs, Office of Program
Operations has determined that it is probable that the
1973). In other words, the new regulation was meant to confirm the Commission's
existing interpretation of Section 706(f)(1) of Title VII, which it understood as
authorizing the issuance of right-to-sue letters prior to the expiration of the 180-day
period. It should also be noted that the Supreme Court had referred to the 180-day
period as "mandatory" in dicta in OccidentalLife Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355,
361, 97 S. Ct. 2447, 2452 (1977), and the regulation has sometimes been
characterized as the Commission's attempt at counteracting that dicta. See, e.g.,
Seybert v. West Chester Univ., 83 F. Supp. 2d 547, 549 (E.D. Pa. 2000); Johnson
v. Cook Composites and Polymers, Inc., No. 99-4916 (JEI), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
(D. N.J. Mar. 3, 2000). In fact, Occidental definitively construed other procedural
provisions of Title VII, but provided little guidance on this one.
143. 42 Fed. Reg. 47,828,47,831 (Sept. 22, 1977). The Commission made this
statement in response to a public comment that took the position that the
Commission lacked legal authority to promulgate this rule. To the extent that
compliance with the time period was considered to constitute an "exhaustion of
administrative remedies" requirement, the Commission's position was consistent
with the established principle that exhaustion is excused when it would be futile.
See Kenneth C. Davis & Richard C. Pierce Jr., Administrative Law Treatise § 15.3(3d ed. 1994); Kenneth C. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 20.07 (1958).
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Commission will be unable to complete its administrative
processing of the charge within 180 days from the filing of
the charge and has attached a written certificate to that
effect. 144
C. The Question of Consistency
Whether Section 1601.28(a)(2) is a legally permissible agency
interpretation of Title VII is a question of long standing. As will be
discussed further, Title VII respondents have attacked the rule on
various grounds and theories over the past quarter century, and the
courts have not only given conflicting answers to the question, but
have sometimes given significantly different rationales even in
support of the same answers. The district courts have long been
divided on the issue, but the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits, until
recently the only two courts of appeals to have considered the issue
directly, have consistently upheld the regulation. Although the
Supreme Court has not spoken directly to the validity of this
regulation, the Court has had other occasions to consider the nature
of the Commission's rulemaking authority, 145 and it is against the
144. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(a)(2) (2001).
145. The Court's approach to the degree of deference owed to Commission
interpretations of Title VII has not been consistent over time. In a number of early
cases, the Court suggested that strong deference should be paid to the
Commission's views, although that sentiment was neither universal nor uniform in
its application. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34, 91 S.
Ct. 849, 854 (1971) ("The administrative interpretation of the Act by the enforcing
agency is entitled to great deference [where] ... the Act and its legislative history
support the Commission's construction.... ."); Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 411
U.S. 86, 94-95, 98 S. Ct. 1278, 1328 (1973) (Marshall, J.) (citations omitted) ("The
Commission's more recent interpretation of the statute in the guideline relied on
by the District Court is no doubt entitled to great deference, but that deference must
have limits... Courts need not defer to an administrative construction of a statute
where there are 'compelling indications that it is wrong."'); Albemarle Paper Co.
v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,431,95 S. Ct. 2362,2378 (1975) ("The EEOC Guidelines
are not administrative 'regulations' promulgated pursuant to formal procedures
established by the Congress. But they do constitute '[t]he administrative
interpretation of the Act by the enforcing agency,' and consequently they are
'entitled to great deference."'); McDonald v. Santa Fe Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273,
279, 96 S. Ct. 2574, 2578 (1976) (interpretations contained in Commission
decisions entitled to "great deference"); General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125,
140-41, 97 S. Ct. 401,410-11 (1976),(Rehnquist, J.) (Commission Guidelines are
entitled to consideration, but not to the degree of deference accorded rules which
Congress has intended to have the force of law or supply a basis for the imposition
of liability); Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 142 n.4, 98 S. Ct. 347, 351
n.4 (1977) (Rehnquist, J.) (Commission guidelines entitled to weight where not
inconsistent with past Commission interpretations, interpretations of other
responsible enforcement agencies, or legislative history); Oscar Mayer & Co. v.
2002]
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background of Supreme Court precedents more generally concerned
with judicial review of agency interpretations of law that the lower
federal courts have struggled with this problem intermittently over the
years.
The most important development in recent years came with the
District of Columbia Circuit's 1999 decision in Martini v Federal
National Mortgage Association. 46 The Martini case began when
Elizabeth Martini filed an administrative charge of sexual harassment
and retaliation against Federal National Mortgage Association
("Fannie Mae"), her former employer, and several former supervisors
Evans, 441 U.S. 750,761,99 S. Ct. 2066,2074 (1979) (Commission interpretation
entitled to "great deference"); EEOC v. Commercial Office Prods. Co., 486 U.S.
107, 115, 108 S. Ct. 1666, 1671 (1988) (Marshall, J.) ("[T]he EEOC's
interpretation of Title VII, for which it has primary enforcement responsibility,
need not be the best one by grammatical or any other standards. [It] need only be
reasonable to be entitled to deference."); EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S.
244, 256-57, 111 S. Ct. 1227, 1234-35 (1991) (Rehnquist, C.J.) (Commission
policy statement entitled only to Skidmore deference). See also Crosslin v.
Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 400 U.S. 1004, 1005, 91 S. Ct. 562, 563 (1971)
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (citations omitted):
The proper functioning of the various Civil Rights Acts is of critical
importance. This Court has recently reemphasized the importance of
deference to an administrative interpretation by the agency charged
with the initial interpretation of a new law.... The court below
rejected the administrative interpretation of 706(b). In so doing it
requires pursuing a state remedy classified as inadequate by the EEOC.
146. 178 F.3d 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1999). In recent years, the Court has divided on
the extent to which determinations should be made under Chevron, as opposed to
Skidmore, and the effects to be given to legislative rules, as opposed to other forms
of interpretation. See supra pages 344-348. See also Arabian Am. Oil, 499 U.S.
at 259-60, 111 S. Ct. at 1236-37 (Scalia, J., concurring):
In an era when our treatment of agency positions is governed by Chevron,
the "legislative rules vs. other action" dichotomy of Gilbert is an
anachronism; and it is not even a correct description of that anachronism
to say that Gilbert held that the EEOC (as opposed to all agency action
other than legislative rules) is not entitled to deference. [In EEOC v.
Commercial Office Products Co., we said] that "the EEOC's
interpretation of ambiguous language need only be reasonable to be
entitled to deference." I would resolve these cases by assuming, without
deciding, that the EEOC was entitled to deference on the particular point
in question. But deference is not abdication, and it requires us to accept
only those agency interpretations that are reasonable in light of the
principles of construction courts normally employ.
Justice Scalia's comments in Arabian American Oil Co., concerning possible
differences between the theory and practice of deference to administrative
interpretations of law, may profitably be compared to Allentown Mack Sales &
Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 118 S. Ct. 818 (1998), in which his opinion
for the Court substituted his version of the standard of proof applicable to agency
adjudications for that previously and uniformly followed by the National Labor
Relations Board, and also criticized the Board for applying the standard in a way
that did not, in his view, accurately reflect the announced formulation.
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on April 10, 1995, shortly after her discharge.'47 Martini had started
work for Fannie Mae in 1988, when she was hired as a debt
manager. 48 By 1995, she was earning $71,000 a year and held
valuable stock options. 49 In 1994, according to Martini, one of her
co-workers, Forrest Kobayashi, "began harassing her because of her
sex, humiliating her with abusive comments in the presence of
colleagues and subordinates, and excluding her from meetings to
which she should have been invited."' 50 Martini complained to Linda
Knight, her supervisor, about Kobayashi's conduct, but Knight did
not solve the problem. 5 Instead, she recommended Kobayashi for
a promotion and then asked him to reorganize his department, which
he did by eliminating Martini's job..
Pursuant to Martini's request under Section 1601.28(a)(2) of Title
29, Code of Federal Regulations, the Commission issued a right-to-
sue letter to her twenty-one days after she filed her charge. ' Martini
filed her federal court action eighty days later, or 101 days after the
filing of her administrative charge. 14 In addition to her Title VII
claims, Martini also sought relief under the parallel provisions of the
District of Columbia Human Rights Act. 55 Fannie Mae moved for
dismissal prior to trial, on the grounds that Section 2000e-5(f)(1) of
Title VII establishes a 180-day waiting period for the filing of civil
actions, and that Section 1601.28(a)(2) of Title 29, Code of Federal
Regulations, which permits the issuance of right-to-sue letters (and,
thus, the commencement of civil actions) in certain circumstances
prior to that time, is inconsistent with that provision of Title VII.'
5 6
The court denied Fannie Mae's motion, and the case proceeded to
trial.
Following an eleven-day trial, the jury awarded Martini nearly
seven million dollars in damages."' In post-trial motions, Fannie
Mae renewed its motion to dismiss the case based on the "early"
right-to-sue letter and also sought a remittitur. The trial court again
147. Martini, 178 F.3d at 1339.
148. Id. at 1338.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1339.
151. Id.
152. Martini, 178 F.3d at 1339.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Martini, 178 F.3d at 1339. The trial judge tendered a single set of
instructions for both the Title VII and Human Rights Act claims. Id. The jury
awarded Martini $153,500 in back pay, $1,894,000 in front pay and benefits, and
$3,000,000 in punitive damages under Title VII, as well as $615,000 in
compensatory damages and $1,286,000 in punitive damages under the Human
Rights Act. Id.
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denied the motion to dismiss, but granted a remittitur, reducing the
damages award to $903,500.158
On appeal, a panel of the District of Columbia Circuit created a
conflict among the circuits on this issue by holding, under step one of the
Chevron test, that the Commission's regulation was not a permissible
interpretation of Title VII because it was contraryto Congress's intent on the
"precise question at issue."'59 The court reached this conclusion based not
on adetermination that the regulation was inconsistent with anyprovision of
Section 706(f)(l) of Title VII, but on the regulation's alleged inconsistency
with the Commission's duty under Section 706(b) to investigate charges of
discrimination-a ground which Fannie Mae had not urged, and one upon
which no other court had relied in aquartercentury oflitigation. "I Speaking
for the court, Judge Tatel wrote:
Thus, neither section 2000e-5(f)(l)'s language nor the
legislative history cited by Fannie Mae reveals "the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress" on "the precise
158. Id.
159. See id. at 1343.
160. Indeed, the court rejected a number of other arguments before ultimately
deciding in favor of Fannie Mae on this ground. For example, the court rejected the
argument that the Supreme Court already had decided the issue in Occidental
Insurance Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 361, 97 S. Ct. 2447, 2452 (1977). As the
court of appeals noted, the issue was neither raised nor decided in that case, and the
language upon which Fannie Mae relied was purely dicta. Martini, 178 F.3d at
1341-42. The court also rejected Fannie Mae's expressio unius argument, that is,
the argument that Congress, by providing expressly that a right-to-sue letter would
issue after 180 days, necessarily intended that a right-to-sue letter not issue before
that time. Without support from the structure or legislative history of Title VII, the
court thought that maxim "too thin a reed to support the conclusion that Congress
has clearly resolved [the] issue." Id. at 1343 (citation omitted). The court also was
unpersuaded by Fannie Mae's argument that its construction of the statute was
required by the parallel nature of the 180-day period provision and the thirty-day
period for Commission suits contained in the first sentence of Section 706(f)(1).
"On numerous occasions, both the Supreme Court and this court have determined,
after examining statutory structure, context, and legislative history, that identical
words within a single act have different meanings." Id. The court also rejected
Fannie Mae's related argument that "private suits within 180 days would
impermissibly upset Title VII's enforcement scheme in cases where timely EEOC-
negotiation is improbable." Id. at 1344. Finally, the court was unconvinced by
Fannie Mae's argument that Congress,"[b]y choosing a 180-day window for
informal resolution of charges despite knowing that many charges would not be
resolved within one hundred eighty days .... clearly intended the 180-day period
to be the minimum time complainants must wait before going to court, even if
EEOC processing would be futile." Id. at 1345. The legislative history upon
which Fannie Mae relied contained "the same ambiguity as the statutory language
itself: Did Congress simply intend to guarantee the right to sue after 180 days, or
did it further intend toprohibitprivate suits within 180 days?" Id. (emphasis added
by court).
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question at issue" in this case.... If our inquiry were to end
here, we likely would agree with the Ninth and Eleventh
Circuits that the early right-to-sue regulation does not
violate section 2000e-5(f)(1). Under Chevron's first step,
however, we have a duty to conduct an "independent
examination" of the statute in question,.., looking not only
"to the particular statutory language at issue," but also to
"the language and design of the statute as a whole" ....
Section 2000e-5(b) prescribes the EEOC's duties once a
charge is filed. . . . It says that the Commission "shall"
investigate the charge and "shall" make a reasonable cause
determination "as promptly as possible and, so far as
practicable, not later than one hundred and twenty days from
the filing of the charge." . . . Thus, although the statute
allows some flexibility in the timing of reasonable cause
determinations, the Commission's duty to investigate is both
mandatory and unqualified. Yet an early right-to-sue notice
typically terminates EEOC investigation of the charge,...
precisely what happened in this case.... We cannot square
this early termination of the process or the regulation
authorizing it,... with section 2005-5(e)'s express direction
to the Commission that it investigates all charges.
Of course, Fannie Mae does not challenge [the regulation
permitting early termination of the Commission's
investigatory process], but we think that section
1601.28(a)(2) alone violates section 2000e-5(b) of the
statute for the same reason. Even in the absence of a
regulation formally terminating administrative processing,
issuance of an early right-to-sue letter would have the same
effect. We think it implausible that an agency as chronically
overworked as the EEOC would either begin or continue to
investigate charges for which it has authorized an alternative
avenue of relief. In most such cases, the charge will simply
go to the bottom of the pile. Although after 180 days this
result comports with congressional intent,... prior to 180
days it conflicts with section 2000e-5(b)'s unambiguous
command. 61
161. Id. at 1345-46 (citations omitted). Whether the court was entitled to make
assumptions about the way in which the agency was likely to enforce the law, in
view of its case load, is a question addressed in subsequent decisions. See infra
Part IV.E. Significantly, the court also failed to consider the possibility that
Congress's use of the word "shall" was intended to signal something other than a
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Based on this analysis, the Martini court held that Title VII
could not be construed to permit either the issuance of a right-to-sue
letter to a charging party, or the subsequent filing of a federal
lawsuit by the charging party, within a period less than 180 days
after the administrative filing of a charge of discrimination. The
court held that the Commission's regulation was inconsistent with
that understanding of Title VII and therefore invalid.
IV. THE SEVERAL PHASES OF CASE LAW
For purposes of this analysis, it may be useful to divide the case
law into four periods. The first, which contains only a few relevant,
reported cases (none of which directly addresses the question
presented here), is the period from the initial implementation of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 to 1972, the date of the amendments made
by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972. The second
period consists of the interval between the 1972 amendments and
the announcement of the Supreme Court's 1984 decision in
Chevron. The third period consists of the "Chevron era" decisions,
that is, the cases decided from the time of the Chevron decision
until the announcement of the District of Columbia Circuit's
decision in Martini in 1999. The fourth covers the interval between
Martini and December 2000.
categorical, mandatory directive. See, e.g., Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417,
432 n.9, 115 S. Ct. 2227, 2236 (1995) ("Though 'shall' generally means 'must,'
legal writers sometimes use, or misuse, 'shall' to mean 'should,' 'will,' or even
'may.' For example, certain of the Federal Rules use the word 'shall' to authorize,
but not to require, judicial action."); Tonkawa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Richards, 75
F.3d 1039, 1046 (5th Cir. 1996) ("Because the essence of the 1866 Act was to
provide subsistence for the Tribe until such time as the Federal government took
the Tonkawas in charge and provided for them, rather than to set apart particular
real estate, we conclude that the 'shall' language in question was not mandatory.");
Lewis v. Jacksonville Bldg. and Loan Ass'n, 540 S.W.2d 307, 310 (1976)
("Although the word 'shall' is generally construed to be mandatory, it may be and
frequently is held to be directory."); Muskego-Norway Cons. Schs. Joint Sch. Dist.
No. 9 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 32 Wis. 2d 478, 485 (Wis. 1967)
("shall" may be mandatory or directory); Allen County Dep't of Public Welfare v.
Ball Mem'l Hosp. Ass'n, Inc., 252 N.E.2d 424,427 (Ind. 1969) ("The general rule
in this state, and in most other jurisdictions, is that the words 'shall' and 'may' will
sometimes be read interchangeably to prevent defeat of the legislative intent.").
More generally, as Professor Davis has pointed out, "[s]tatutes and ordinances
generally provide that agencies or officers 'shall' take action against violators," but
the reality is that most enforcement is selective and discretionary, rather than
mandatory. See Kenneth Culp Davis, Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry
163 (1971). Of course, the word "shall" sometimes is used to signal a directive that
is categorical and mandatory. See, e.g., Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad
Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 35, 118 S. Ct. 956, 962 (1998) ("the mandatory
'shall' .. .normally creates an obligation impervious to judicial discretion").
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A. Early Cases and Commentary Under the 1964 Act: Exploring
The Power of Technical Defenses
The Commission's practice of issuing "early" right-to-sue letters
apparently was longstanding by the time that the Commission
formulated Section 1601.28(a)(2) in 1977. While it is clear that the
practice antedated the regulation, it is not clear exactly when the
practice developed.162 Before the adoption of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972, charging parties may have sought "early"
right-to-sue letters for the purpose of seeking immediate equitable
relief, but that possibility is not necessarily confirmed by the reported
case law.'63 In the ordinary case, in which interlocutory equitable
relief was not being sought, it might have seemed that the statutory
thirty-day time period for agency investigation and conciliation
efforts (even when extended to sixty days) was sufficiently short to
cause most charging parties to wait out the completion of the agency
process, at least when that occurred within the thirty or sixty-day
period. In addition, the administrative process under Title VII was
said to be designed with lay litigants in mind, and many charging
parties in those days (except for those involved in significant test
cases) would not have been represented by counsel during the
administrative phase. Many charging parties doubtless would have
needed the thirty or sixty days to try and find a lawyer willing to take
their case, while others might have chosen to wait out the statutory
period before asking the court to appoint counsel to represent them. 4
In any event, the earliest set of reported cases does not include cases
involving the validity of "early" right-to-sue letters or their legitimacy
and permissibility.
162. See, e.g., Howard v. Mercantile Commerce Trust Co., 8 Empl. Prac. Dec.
(CCH) P9842 (E.D. Mo. 1974) (finding that the words "within one hundred and
eighty days" connote some measure of flexibility); Gary v. Indus. Indem. Co., 7
Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P9224 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (finding there was no
jurisdictional bar to actions where the Commission issues a right-to-sue notice
despite failure to exhaust the full one hundred eighty day period).
163. Indeed, later case law reflects that some charging parties simply filed their
federal court lawsuits and requests for immediate equitable relief without having
requested or received a right-to-sue letter, thus raising the question whether a later-
received right-to-sue letter should relate back to the date on which the lawsuit was
filed. See, e.g., Drew v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 480 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1973). But
see Collins v. Southwestern Bell Tele. Co., 376 F. Supp. 979, 983 (E.D. Okla.
1974) (arguing that "in view of the comprehensive nature of the legislative scheme
embodied in Title VII.... it was the intention of Congress that only the EEOC had
the right to temporary or preliminary injunctive relief').
164. See, e.g., H. Kessler & Co. v. EEOC, 472 F.2d 1147, 1152 (5th Cir. 1973)
("competent lawyers are not eager to enter the fray in behalf of a person who is
seeking redress under Title VII").
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On the other hand, this set of cases does contain several decisions
in which defendants interposed other technical arguments aimed at
leveraging the Commission's seeming inability to keep current with
its workload into a means of avoiding ajudicial determination on the
merits of the charging party's claim of discrimination.' 65 In these
cases, the defendants sometimes argued that the Title VII claim
should be dismissed on statutory "exhaustion" grounds. According
to this argument, exhaustion did not simply mean that charging
parties were required to show that they had filed a charge and given
the Commission thirty (or sixty) days in which to attempt
conciliation; charging parties also would be required to show that the
Commission actually had made efforts to conciliate the charge during
that period. On this reasoning, lawsuits would be subject to dismissal
for having been filed too early. Defendants also sometimes argued
that the plaintiffs' lawsuits had been filed too late, usually on the
ground that the various time periods under Title VII should be
cumulated or "stacked," so that the separate statutory periods-ninety
days to file a charge with the Commission, sixty days for the
Commission to investigate, conciliate, and issue a right-to-sue letter,
and thirty days for the charging party to file a lawsuit after receiving
a right-to-sue letter-simply became one 180-day period. The
statute, of course, does not require the Commission to complete its
investigation within any set period of time; nor does it require the
charging party to demand a right-to-sue letter at any specific point.
The 180-day period could easily elapse without the Commission
having completed (or even begun) its investigation and without the
charging party having asked for a right-to-sue letter. Thus, given the
Commission's apparent inability to process its caseload on a timely
basis, together with the lack of sophistication of most Title VII
plaintiffs, this conflation of statutory time periods would have
resulted in the dismissal of many Title VII claims.
Two additional general points may be made about these early
cases. First, although the holdings do not turn on the
characterization, it is noteworthy, in light of subsequent
developments, that the cases generally refer to the various statutory
requirements for filing suit as "jurisdictional" requirements. These
references tend to be off-hand, however, and not the product of
sustained analysis. 166 Second, the cases sometimes speak in terms of
165. See Comment, Developments in the Law, supra note 115, at 1202 ("In
efforts to impede Title VII actions, respondents have raised a myriad ofjurisdictional objections ostensibly designed to protect the conciliation process").
166. See, e.g. Jamison v. Olga Coal Co., 335 F. Supp. 454, 458 (S.D. W. Va.
1971) (holding that the thirty-day provision for instituting suit in the district court,
like the ninety-day provision for filing administrative charge, is jurisdictional);
Washington v. T.G.&Y Stores, 324 F. Supp. 849, 854-55 (W.D. La. 1971)
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the deference due to the Commission's construction of the statute, but
the courts' methodology normally bespeaks the practice of de novo
review, with the Commission's interpretation mainly being used by
the court as a check on the correctness of its own construction.
The technical defenses pressed in the early cases are well
illustrated by the Fifth Circuit's 1969 decision in Miller v.
International Paper Co.,67 a race discrimination class action in which
the plaintiffs were represented by lawyers from the NAACP Legal
Defense Fund and in which the Commission participated as an
amicus curiae. The named plaintiffs were five African-American
employees of International Paper Company who purported to sue on
behalf of themselves and certain similarly-situated fellow employees.
The defendants were International Paper Company, four local unions,
and three international unions. The case was filed in the Southern
District of Mississippi, and the trial judge granted summaryjudgment
in favor of the defendants. 168
In Miller, the defendants made the prematurity and lateness
arguments described above, but the court of appeals rejected both
arguments. The Fifth Circuit first considered the "lateness"
(concluding that there are two jurisdictional requirements under Title VII: (1) party
aggrieved by discrimination must file a charge with the EEOC, and (2) party
aggrieved by discrimination must receive the statutory notice from the Commission
that it has been unable to obtain voluntary compliance). Whether any of the Title
VII exhaustion requirements is jurisdictional has remained a controversial point.
See, e.g., Gibson v. West, 201 F.3d 990, 993 (7th Cir. 2000).
167. 408 F.2d 283 (5th Cir.1969). It may be argued, of course, that the
participation of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund and the Commission in this
litigation makes the case exceptional, and that the arguments may have been made
in a more thorough and persuasive way than would normally be the case.
168. The flavor of the litigation is well demonstrated by the fact that Chief
Judge W. Harold Cox also imposed sanctions against the plaintiffs, ostensibly for
their failure to comply with discovery. Costs and attorneys' fees were assessed
against plaintiffs because of their refusal to appear for Saturday depositions, which
defendants insisted they were required to do, based on notices of deposition that
called for the plaintiffs to attend "beginning on Wednesday, July 5, 1967.. , and
continuing thereafter from day to day as the deposition may be adjourned and until
the deposition of each of said Plaintiffs named herein shall have been completed."
Id. at 292. In Chief Judge Cox's view, the plaintiffs were required to comply with
the defendants' unusual construction of this language or seek relief from the court.
The Fifth Circuit disagreed, holding that the district judge had abused his
discretion. Id. at 293 ("If the unions' notice had stated that depositions were to be
taken on the weekend, the burden may well have been upon the appellants to seek
protection. But it is not encumbent upon a party to attempt to obtain an eleventh-
hour order protecting himself against an unreasonable construction of the terms of
the notice."). See also Gerald M. Stem, Judge William Harold Cox ant the Right
to Vote in Clarke County, Mississippi, in Southern Justice 165-86 (Leon Friedman
ed., 1965) (detailing Judge Cox's handling of voting rights cases in Mississippi);
Note, JudicialPerformance in the Fifth Circuit, 73 Yale L.J. 90, 101 n.71, 107 n.87
(1963) (discussing Judge Cox's performance in civil rights cases).
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argument, that is, the argument that the time periods should be
aggregated or considered together, and that compliance with them
should be measured by the overall lapse of time between the filing
of the administrative charge and the filing of the lawsuit. The
district court had accepted this argument, holding that Section
706(e) did not establish a series of independent time limits which
must be met, but a cumulative or "stacked" limitations period, and
thus required that a charging party commence litigation in federal
district court within "sixty days [of] filing his charge with the
EEOC ' 169 regardless, presumably, of the Commission's progress
(or lack of progress) in investigating and conciliating the charge.
If the charging party failed to file within the sixty-day period,
according to the district court, "the action and the right of action
no longer exist, and the defendant is exempt from liability.1' 7 ° In
this case, the plaintiffs had filed their federal court complaint
within thirty days after the Commission had notified them of their
right to sue, but the Commission had taken several months to
process the charge. Thus, the court filing date was some five and
one-half months after the plaintiffs had filed their administrative
charges with the Commission. In these circumstances, the federal
lawsuit would be deemed timely if the charging party were simply
required to file his or her complaint within thirty days after
receiving a right-to-sue letter from the Commission, but the
stacking theory (in effect, attributing the Commission's delay to
the charging party) would have been fatal to the plaintiffs'
claims.11F
The court of appeals rejected the district court's reading of the
statutory time limits on both logical and congressional intent
grounds. The Fifth Circuit found the district court's construction
implausible on logical grounds because, under the district court's
view, an action might be deemed untimely even in cases in which
the Commission had taken no more than sixty days to investigate
and attempt conciliation, and the charging party had filed her
169. Id. at 285 (quoting Miller v. International Paper Co., 290 F. Supp. 401,403
n.1 (S.D. Miss. 1964)).
170. Id.
171. In a footnote, the Fifth Circuit pointed out that the Commission's General
Counsel had taken the position in 1965 that a right-to-sue letter must be sent
"within a reasonable time after the expiration of the statutory period, or after an
earlier disposition of the charge," but the Commission took a different view the
following year when it adopted regulations providing "that notice will not be
served prior to the processing of the charge unless the charging party demands
notice." Id. at 286 n. 12 (citations omitted). The court further noted: "In this same
vein, a number of district court decisions have held that the limitation period on
conciliation is directory rather than mandatory." Id. (citations omitted).
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lawsuit within thirty days of receiving notice of her right to sue.
The court observed:
Since by the explicit terms of section 706(e) the EEOC has
up to sixty days to attempt conciliation, the limitation period
applicable to the complainant could in no event be sixty
days after the filing of charges with the EEOC. By stacking
the thirty-day post-notice period on top of the sixty-day
conciliation period it would not be completely unreasonable
to argue that the applicable limitation period is ninety days
from the filing of charges. But even that construction is
untenable. Suppose, for example, a party files a charge with
the EEOC and the latter, after holding the charge for exactly
sixty days, mails notice of failure to effect voluntary
compliance; the charging party receives the notice two days
after mailing and then on the thirtieth day thereafter files
suit in the district court. Here, every term of the statutory
provision has been complied with and yet, if the aggregated
periods fixed the time within which suit must be filed, the
charging party would be two days too late. The logical
discrepancy is a clear portent that the two time periods
provided in section 706(e) were not intended to apply as an
aggregation. 17
The court of appeals also based its decision on the legislative
history of Title VII, tracing the apparent ambiguity in the final
version of the statutory time limitations to the complicated
evolution of those provisions during the legislative process. The
court noted that the original version of Title VII (H.R. 405) would
have given both investigatory and enforcement powers to the
Commission, but the Commission's power to enforce the statute had
been deleted in a subsequent iteration of the bill (H.R. 7152). 173 At
the same time, the Commission had been invested with the authority
to institute a civil action on behalf of the charging party. Still later
in the legislative process, however, Congress deleted the
Commission's authority to commence civil actions on behalf of
private parties, leaving charging parties solely to their own devices.
As the ongoing legislative process altered positions with respect to
the preferred means of enforcing the statute, there were significant
consequences for the time periods set forth in the draft legislation.
If authority which previously had been given entirely to the
Commission were to be divided between the Commission and
private parties, the time for exercising that authority also would
172. Id. at 285-86 (footnote omitted).
173. Id. at 286-87.
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have to be apportioned. Thus, as the court of appeals pointed out in
Miller:
Section 707(b) of H.R. 7152, as drawn when it reached the
Senate, gave the EEOC ninety days after receiving the
charging party's complaint to file suit.... A serious wrinkle
appeared in the legislative fabric,... when the right to bring
suit was vested exclusively in the charging party. The
drafters of the bill appear simply to have allocated the first
sixty days of the original ninety-day limitation period to the
EEOC's conciliation efforts and the last thirty days to the
grievant's right to file suit, without any consideration of the
relationship between the two separate periods. 174
The court of appeals further noted that "Section 706(e) of the Act
provides that notice of failure to conciliate shall be sent by the EEOC
and 'within thirty days thereafter' the aggrieved person may file
suit."'1 75 Thus, the court concluded that the limitation period
applicable to the charging party does not begin to run "until notice of
the failure to obtain voluntary compliance has been sent and
received.' 76 In a footnote, the court observed that its construction of
Section 706(e) was consistent with that given by the Commission,
and that the Commission's construction was entitled to "considerable
weight" because the Commission was "the administrative body
charged with investigation and negotiation of rights under Title
VII.' 7 7 Because the court also found that the charging party could
not be charged with responsibility for any failure by the Commission
to abide by any time limitations applicable to it, the court concluded
that the suit should not have been dismissed on lateness grounds.17 1
With respect to the second issue, whether the complaint should be
dismissed as premature, the court of appeals rejected the defendants'
argument that compliance with the exhaustion requirement not only
meant giving the Commission the opportunity to investigate and
174. Id. at 287-88. The court relied on the views of John Chipman Gray:
The fact is that the difficulties of so-called interpretation arise when the
legislature has had no meaning at all; when the question which is raised
on the statute never occurred to it; when what the judges have to do is, not
to determine what the legislature did mean on a point which was present
to its mind, but to guess what it would have intended on a point not
present to its mind, if the point had been present.
Id. at 287 (quoting John Chipman Gray, The Nature and Sources of Law § 370, at
165 (1948)).
175. Miller, 408 F.2d at 287.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 287 n.18.
178. The court also pointed out that the Commission could not defeat a charging
party's right to sue simply by refusing to issue the appropriate notice. Id.
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engage in conciliation, but also required proof that the Commission
actually had engaged in conciliation efforts during the relevant thirty
or sixty-day period. The question was significant because the record
"does not indicate what, if anything, the EEOC did toward
conciliating the appellants' grievances""' and the plaintiffs admitted
that they were not aware of any efforts the Commission might have
undertaken to conciliate their charges.' The defendants argued that
their position was supported by the legislative history. However, the
court of appeals was not persuaded by the defendants' recitation of
certain "legislative remarks," which the defendants apparently found
"comforting," but which, in the court's view, only generally
"extoll[ed] the value of conciliation or... ambiguously state[d] the
procedural chronology, i.e., that judicial enforcement follows
conciliation."'' The court did not find these legislative comments to
be particularly helpful or pertinent to the precise question presented
for decision:
Granting that conciliation is important and that it precedes
court action, the question is, what effect should the EEOC's
failure to conciliate have upon the charging party's right to
file suit? The appellees assume a crushing burden when they
attempt to convince this court that the value of conciliation
should supersede the value of enforcement. The means
devised cannot be more important than the end envisioned.
We do not believe that the procedures of Title VII were
intended to serve as a stumbling block to the accomplishment
of the statutory objective. We agree with the view expressed
by Judge Butzner in Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc.:
The plaintiff is not responsible for the acts or
omissions of the Commission. He, and the members
of his class, should not be denied judicial relief
because of circumstances over which they have no
179. Id. at 288. As the court of appeals noted, the right-to-sue letters indicated
that no reasonable cause determination had yet been made, but that the notices were
being issued because of the demand made by counsel for the charging parties based
on the fact that "more than sixty (60) days have elapsed since the filing of your
charge in the above case." Id. at 288 n.2 1. Significantly, the letter also noted that
the administrative process would continue: "The Commission will continue to
process your case. You should be aware, however, that failure to institute suit
within this thirty-day period may cause you to loose your right to seek judicial
relief against the Respondent." Id. Finally, the court noted that "[t]he reason given
by the EEOC for its failure to attempt conciliation is that it was not staffed and
financed sufficiently to cope with the volume of complaints it has received." Id.
at 289 n.22. Citing the Commission's first annual report, published in 1967, the
court observed that "[t]his reason is supported by facts." Id.
180. Id. at 288.
181. Id. at 290 (footnote omitted).
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control. The plaintiff exhausted administrative
remedies and satisfied the requirements of the Act by
filing a complaint with the Commission and awaiting
its advice. He is not required to show that the
Commission has endeavored to conciliate. To insist
that he do so, would require him to pursue an
administrative remedy which may be impossible to
achieve. If the Commission makes no effort to
conciliate, the remedy is ineffective and
inadequate.' 82
Thus, the court held that a charging party was entitled to bring
suit if voluntary compliance had not occurred (presumably without
regard to the reason for failure of voluntary compliance) within
sixty days after filing her charge with the Commission, and the
Commission's action or inaction could not affect the charging
party's substantive rights under the statute. Finally, the court of
appeals reiterated a prior holding of the court: "[A]n effort to
conciliate by the EEOC is not in any sense a condition precedent to
the charging party's right to seek judicial consideration of his
grievance. '
In Miller, the Fifth Circuit reached substantially the same
conclusions that the Seventh Circuit had reached the previous year
in Choate v. Caterpillar Tractor Company. '8  In Choate, the
employer had moved to dismiss a Title VII sex discrimination
action"' on the ground that the federal court complaint did not
recite
that the charge filed with the Commission was "under oath"
as required by [S]ection 706(a) of the Act or that the
plaintiff received from the Commission notice.., that it had
182. Id. (footnotes omitted).
183. Id. at 291. The court in Quarles followed an earlier decision by the Eastern
District of Virginia, in which the court observed: "All [Title VII plaintiffs] have to
do under the Act is to show that voluntary compliance has not been accomplished
within the said sixty-day period. To require more would be to deny a complainant
the right to seek redress in the courts, resulting wholly from circumstances beyond
their control." Evenson v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 268 F. Supp. 29, 31 (E.D. Va.
1967). But see Dent v. St. Louis-S.F. R.R. Co., 265 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Ala. 1967)
(finding that the commission is not required to undertake conciliation of charges
within the sixty day period in order for a civil action based on the charge to be
timely filed thereafter).
184. 402 F.2d 357 (7th Cir. 1968).
185. Choate charged in her complaint that she had been denied work at
Caterpillar, being told that "she would not be given ajob for the reason that as long
as men were available for beginning factory jobs, men would be hired to the
exclusion of women." Id. at 358.
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been "unable to obtain voluntary compliance by Caterpillar,
and that ... the action was barred by reason of the time
limitations contained in the statute."'' 86
The district court granted the motion, holding that "resort to the
remedy of conciliation is a jurisdictional prerequisite to the right to
file a civil action," and that "the filing of a verified charge with the
Commission is necessary to invoke the statutory enforcement
procedures."187
The court of appeals reversed. First, the Seventh Circuit held that
the administrative verification requirement was directory and
technical, rather than mandatory and substantive, that it related only
to the administrative features of the statute, and that noncompliance
could have no bearing on the charging party's ultimate right to file a
lawsuit. 8 The court of appeals concluded:
Given the fact that the administrative remedy alone may be
insufficient to vindicate the rights of aggrieved parties, we
believe that it would be unnecessarily harsh and in derogation
of the interests of those whom the Act was designed to protect
to interpret the statutory language as denying substantive
rights in the district court because of procedural defects
before the Commission. 189
Second, the court of appeals rejected the argument that the complaint
should be dismissed because of the plaintiff's failure to support her
complaint with allegations concerning the Commission's efforts to
effectuate a conciliation of the charge. All that is required, the court
said, is that it be clear that the Commission had the "opportunity to
investigate and conciliate," and the complaint demonstrated on its
186. Id. at 359.
187. Id.
188. Id. Significantly, however, the court did not question the district court's
characterization of the filing requirement as a "jurisdictional prerequisite." Indeed,
the court noted that there were only "two additional jurisdictional prerequisites..
. first, a notification to the aggrieved party by the Commission that it has been
unable to obtain voluntary compliance and, second, the action must be filed within
thirty days after the notification." Id. The Seventh Circuit did not cite any
authority to support this characterization, but simply assumed the proposition to be
true, an assumption which seems regularly to have been indulged by the courts
during this period.
189. Id. at 360. The court further noted that the Commission's treatment of the
merits of an unswom charge should be considered a permissive waiver of that
requirement, a view the court found to be supported by a recently-adopted
Commission regulation which permitted charging parties to amend their charges
to "cure technical defects and omissions, including failure to swear to the charge."
Id.
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face that that was the case. '90 Finally, the Seventh Circuit rejected the
employer's contention that the various time periods should be
cumulated to yield the conclusion that the complaint was filed too
late.'
91
Shortly after the Fifth Circuit decided Miller, the Ninth Circuit
also rejected the notion that the time periods set forth in Title VII
should be "stacked." In Cunningham v. Litton Industries,92 the
district court had dismissed a Title VII sex discrimination complaint
on the ground that it had not been filed within 180 days of the date on
which the act of discrimination allegedly had occurred.'93 The court
of appeals reversed, holding that Section 706 should not be read as
"providing for any gross one hundred eighty day period ... within
which a civil action must be filed," that "Commission action and
issuance of notice within sixty days is not a condition precedent to an
aggrieved person's right to sue" and that "the 30 day period within
which suit may be filed in federal district court begins to run when
the aggrieved party receives notice of failure to effect voluntary
compliance from the EEOC, regardless of the period of time the
Commission has taken to process the charge."' 94 Three years later, in
190. Id. at 361. The Commission had that opportunity between March 14, 1966,
when the charge was filed, and October 5, 1966, when the reasonable cause letter
issued. Id. The court observed:
A complainant may have no knowledge when he receives the required
notification of what conciliation efforts have been exerted by the
Commission. And more importantly, even if no efforts were made at all,
the complainant should not be made the innocent victim of a dereliction
of statutory duty on the part of the Commission.
Id. (footnote omitted). Two years later, in Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 427
F.2d 476, 488 (7th Cir. 1970), the Seventh Circuit noted the "flexible
interpretation" that the conciliation requirement had been given by other courts,
concluding that "[a]ctual conciliation or even an attempt at conciliation by the
EEOC no longer presents a jurisdictional barrier to filing suit in a district court."
The Seventh Circuit emphasized the importance of avoiding "unnecessarily harsh"
requirements under a statutory scheme that depended for its enforcement on actions
by lay people untrained in the law, and noted that "the policy in favor of
conciliation should not be transformed into a technical device used to obstruct the
enforcement of prohibitions against racial discrimination in employment and to
deny relief to those Congress has sought to protect." Id. at 488, 489.
191. Choate, 402 F.2d at 361. "Although certain time limits affirmatively
appear in the Act, ... the time period within which the Commission must notify the
complainant after its attempt to obtain a voluntary compliance is nowhere
prescribed. Consequently, the statute contains no definite overall time limitation
which could bar the instant suit." Id.
192. 413 F.2d 887 (9th Cir. 1969).
193. The administrative charge was filed with the Commission on September
14, 1966. Id. at 889 n.2. The Commission made a reasonable cause determination
on March 30, 1967, and issued a right-to-sue letter on June 7, 1967. Id. at 889.
194. Id. at 890. Among other things, the court found support for its decision in
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Jefferson v. Peerless Pumps Hydrodynamic Division of FMC
Corporation,'" the Ninth Circuit also determined that "an EEOC
investigation, finding of reasonable cause, and attempt at
conciliation [are] not... condition[s] precedent to a grievant's right
to sue in federal court."' 96 The court further stated:
The statute does not condition an individual's right to sue
upon the EEOC's performance of its administrative duties.
The grievant need not wait for the EEOC to complete its
investigation, make its finding, or attempt a conciliation..
.Once the grievant has given the EEOC an opportunity to
make an investigation and attempt a conciliation, and he has
been notified that the EEOC has been 'unable' to do so, he
may bring his cause into federal court. 1
97
In 1971, the editors of the Harvard Law Review summed up the
then-current state of Title VII law and pointed out areas in which
the statutory scheme could be strengthened. With respect to the
procedural requirements set forth in Title VII, the editors noted that
the statutory scheme looks in two quite different directions."19 On
the one hand, the statute reflects Congress's intention to provide
prompt judicial vindication of Title VII rights. On the other hand,
the statute reflects Congress's apparent intention that informal
means of conciliation and persuasion be given a chance to work,
notwithstanding the fact that these processes may lead to delay. In
the editors' view, however, the statutory scheme allowed ample
Regulation 1601.25a which extended the time for investigation and conciliation in
all cases from thirty to sixty days and also provided that:
[T]he Commission shall not issue a notice... prior to a determination
under § 1601.19 or, where reasonable cause has been found, prior to
efforts at conciliation with respondent except that the charging party or
the respondent may upon the expiration of sixty days after the filing of the
charge or at any time thereafter demand in writing that such notice issue
and the Commission shall promptly issue such notice to all parties.
29 C.F.R. § 1601.25a (1968). The same regulation provided that issuance of a
right-to-sue letter "does not terminate the Commission's jurisdiction of the
proceeding, and the case shall continue to be processed." Id.
195. 456 F.2d 1359 (9th Cir. 1972). In granting summary judgment, the district
court had found that it lacked jurisdiction for three reasons: (1) the passage of more
than ninety days between the filing of the administrative charge and the
commencement of the federal court action; (2) the plaintiff's alleged failure to file
with the state agency; and (3) the Commission's failure to "exhaust its powers" by
making a reasonable cause determination and attempting to obtain voluntary
compliance. Id. at 1360.
196. Id. at 1361.
197. Id.
198. Comment, Developments in the Law: EmploymentDiscrimination and Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1109 (1971).
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room for the courts to effectuate a resolution of the tension between
these conflicting policy concerns:
[S]ince at least some of the jurisdictional requirements
formulated in deference to conciliation are not unambiguously
declared in the Act, courts are often free to determine for
themselves whether conciliation is really serving the ends
intended for it, and thus to give the conciliation policy as
much force as experience warrants.199
The editors noted that the conciliation process had several "inherent"
weaknesses, principally the Commission's lack of enforcement
authority, which substantially impaired its credibility in the
conciliation and persuasion process.2 00 According to the editors, these
inherent weaknesses were aggravated by "the fact that the EEOC is
physically unable to perform its conciliatory function within the time
limits afforded by Title VII."' ' Thus, the editors observed:
The EEOC has only sixty days from the date the charge is
filed to investigate for reasonable cause and to seek
conciliation before the charging party may commence his
civil suit. But the EEOC's present backlog is such that there
is a four to five month delay before investigation begins, and
beyond that, the EEOC takes an average of about twenty
months to complete the conciliation process. While this
administrative incapacity suggests that the full potential of the
EEOC-administered conciliation process for eliminating job
discrimination has never been tested, it also militates against
a court's enhancing the importance of conciliation in the
present statutory scheme.20 2
Significantly, the editors suggested that the Commission should
exercise "prosecutorial discretion" in determining which charges to
investigate and attempt to conciliate, an enforcement strategy for
which they found ample authority in the statute:
[G]iven the fact that the EEOC lacks the resources to
conciliate all cases where reasonable cause is found, some
rational way to further reduce the cases subject to conciliation
should be developed. Although the statute provides that the
EEOC "shall endeavor" to conciliate cases wherein
reasonable cause has been found, that language can hardly be
construed to withhold from the Agency prosecutorial
199. Id. at 1200.
200. Id. at 1200-01.
201. Id. at 1201.
202. Id. at 1201-02.
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discretion to decide which cases it will decide to conciliate
first. Rather than get to no charges within a reasonable
period, the EEOC would do well to direct its immediate
conciliatory efforts toward those cases which present a fair
likelihood of successful conciliation and which have a
significant public impact. Cases meeting only the latter
criterion should be immediately referred to the Justice
Department as a candidate for a pattern and practice suit. The
EEOC should send notice to a complainant whose case has
been deferred that while the charge has merit, the
Commission will be unable to attempt conciliation within the
sixty days allotted. He should be informed that at the end of
the period he may bring suit or wait in line for conciliation,
but that those complainants waiting in line are not taken on a
first-come, first-served basis. Ofcourse, complainants whose
charges have no merit would continue to receive no-cause
letters.20 3
The editors' analysis is persuasive in several respects. Certainly,
it makes sense for the Commission to establish priorities in the face
of a demand for its services that greatly exceeds its resources,
particularly if the discretion to do so can be found in its statutory
grant of authority.2°4 Moreover, assuming that the statute does not
preclude the Commission from categorically declining to attempt
conciliation in cases that seem not "to present a fair likelihood of
conciliation and ... have a significant public impact," it would have
made sense for that class of cases to be diverted immediately to the
Department of Justice. On the other hand, if it is clear, because of the
great demands placed on the Commission's limited resources, that
charges not selected for conciliation at the outset will never be
selected, it is not obvious that any statutory purpose would be served
203. Id. at 1206 (footnotes omitted).
204. An analogy could be drawn to the practice of the National Labor Relations
Board, which has long declined to exercise its jurisdiction in certain categories of
cases, based on prudential and resource allocation grounds. See, e.g., NLRB v.
Pease Oil Co., 279 F.2d 135, 137 (2d Cir. 1960):
Early in its history, ... the Board came to the conclusion that if it were to
take cognizance of all complaints within its statutory grant of power it
would be unable to decide any complaint with the thoroughness and
promptitude necessary to achieve the objectives of the Act. Therefore the
Board refused to hear certain complaints which clearly were within its
statutory power to decide.... [A] principal criterion the Board adopted
was the volume of interstate commerce engaged in by the employer.
See also 2 Patrick Hardin et al., The Developing Labor Law: The Board, the
Courts, and the National Labor Relations Act 1639-53 (3d ed. 1992); Thomas
Beetham, 1996-97Annual Survey ofLabor and Employment Law, 39 B.C. L. Rev.
365, 379 (1998).
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by requiring those charging parties to await completion of the sixty-
day period before bringing suit. In this respect, the charging party
with an obviously meritorious claim would be worse off, as the
editors noted, than a charging party whose administrative charge was
found by the Commission (perhaps erroneously) to be without merit,
resulting in the immediate issuance of a right-to-sue letter. An
argument could be made, of course, that this disparity does not
necessarily make sense in terms of the overall policy of the statute,
but that it is required by the language of the statute itself. These
difficulties naturally would be exacerbated by lengthening the
statutory period from sixty to 180 days, particularly if that extension
of the statutory period did not cure the backlog problem. Many of the
cases below follow logically from these considerations.
B. Pre-Regulation Cases Under the 1972 Amendments: Exploring
The Commission's "Duty to Investigate" and The.Purposes of the
180-Day Provision
In 1973, the United States District Court for the Northern District
of California issued what appears to have been the first decision in an
"early" right-to-sue notice case since the 1972 amendments had
extended the statutory period from 60 to 180 days.20 5 Although courts
throughout the country were soon called upon to determine the
205. See Bauman v. Union Oil Co., 400 F. Supp. 1021 (N.D. Cal. 1973). After
the enactment of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, which also
provided for the first time that the Commission could bring a civil action on behalf
of a person aggrieved by discrimination, some courts took the position that the
Commission was required to bring suit, if at all, within 180 days of the filing of an
administrative charge of discrimination. See e.g. EEOC v. Kimberley-Clark Corp.,
380 F. Supp. 1106, 1112 (W.D. Tenn. 1974), rev'd, 511 F.2d 1352 (6th Cir. 1975).
Most courts disagreed. See, e.g., EEOC v. Meyer Bros. Drug Co., 521 F.2d 1364,
1364-65 (8th Cir. 1975); EEOC v. Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal., 535 F.2d 533,
536 (9th Cir. 1976); EEOC v. Duval Corp., 528 F.2d 945, 947 (10th Cir. 1976);
EEOC v. E.I. duPont de Nemours and Co., 516 F.2d 1297, 1298 (3d Cir. 1975);
EEOC v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 505 F.2d 610, 612 (5th Cir. 1974); EEOC
v. Cleveland Mills Co., 502 F.2d 153, 154 (4th Cir. 1974). The Supreme Court
eventually held that neither the language nor the legislative history of Section
706(f)(1) "imposes [any] limitation upon the power of the EEOC to file suit in a
federal court." Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 366, 97
S. Ct. 2447, 2454 (1977). See also EEOC v. Appleton Elec. Co., 487 F. Supp.1207, 1210 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (Commission may continue to investigate a charge of
discrimination after issuing a right-to-sue letter, notwithstanding 29 C.F.R. §
1601.28(c), which "basically provides that issuance of a right-to-sue letter
automatically terminates processing of a charge brought by a complainant"). The
question also was raised as to whether an individual affected by discrimination
could bring an action for preliminary relief during the 180-day period, given the
fact that the amendments expressly granted such authority to the Commission. See,
e.g., Drew v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 480 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1973).
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validity of "early" right-to-sue letters, the Northern District of
California appears to have been the first to speak, and a surprisingly
large number of the most influential cases from this period originated
in that judicial district. Indeed, the debate during this period can be
followed largely through thejurisprudence of the Northern District of
California.
In Bauman v. Union Oil Company,20 6 an employer sought
dismissal of a sex discrimination complaint on several jurisdictional
grounds, including the contention that the court lacked jurisdiction
because the Commission had issued right-to-sue letters in a period
less than 180 days after the filing of the respective administrative
charges. 0 7 The employer argued "that before a valid right to sue
letter may issue, the existence of which is necessary to this Court's
jurisdiction, the Commission must, absent dismissal, hold the charges
in abeyance for a period of 180 days."20 According to the
employer's argument, a right-to-sue letter issued before the expiration
of that period is void and "cannot conferjurisdiction on the Court."20 9
The Bauman court rejected these arguments. According to the
court, the alleged prematurity of the right-to-sue notices was not
material because the disputed notices involved claims that related
back to the plaintiff's original charge, and those claims were therefore
covered by an earlier, concededly proper right-to-sue letter.210 The
court also noted, however, that it would have rejected the employer's
argument in any event:
Even if defendant's contentions were made with respect to an
original charge upon which a right to sue letter was issued
before the expiration of 180 days the Court seriously doubts
206. 400 F. Supp. 1021 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
207. The jurisdictional arguments also involved issues relating to compliance
with the requirement that the Commission defer action pending consideration of a
charge by qualifying state agencies. See id. at 1024-26.
208. Id. at 1027.
209. Id.
210. The Second Circuit carried this reasoning a step further in its 1975 decision
in Weise v. Syracuse University, 522 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1975). In that case, a right-
to-sue letter had issued three days after the filing of the plaintiff's charge.
Although the court thought that compliance with the 180-day rule was a
jurisdictional prerequisite to suit, the court held that "rigid insistence on meticulous
observance of technicalities unrelated to any substantive purpose is inappropriate."
Id. at 412 (citation omitted). Compliance was excused in Weise because another
employee's charge had been pending against the same employer for more than the
required time, and it was clear that no conciliation was likely. Id. at 412. The
court observed: "To require the EEOC to hold the second charge for 180 days
would not have advanced the conciliation purposes of the Act and would only have
served to delay the proceedings, contrary to the Act's policy of handling claims
expeditiously." Id.
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that a jurisdictional problem would be presented. The Court
has found no case which construes the 180 day requirement.
However, several courts have held that the Commission's
failure to observe the sixty day requirement contained in the
former [Section] 2000e-5(e), which is the predecessor to the
present statute, did not render a right-to-sue letter defective...
In Jefferson... the court said:
The statute does not condition an individual's right to
sue upon the EEOC's performance of its administrative
duties. The grievant need not wait for the EEOC to
complete its investigation, make its finding, or attempt
a conciliation. He may demand notification that the
EEOC has been "unable" to effect conciliation within
the lime limit set by [Section] 2000e-5(e).... Once a
grievant has given the EEOC an opportunity to make
an investigation and attempt a conciliation, and he has
been notified that the EEOC has been "unable" to do
so, he may bring his cause into federal court."'
The analysis articulated in Bauman was soon followed by another
judge of the Northern District of California in Gary v. Industrial
211. Bauman, 400 F. Supp. at 1028. The court also found no reason to believe
that Congress had intended to call into question the rationale of these cases when
it enacted the 1972 amendments. "This rationale is particularly applicable in light
of the large backlog of cases which makes it unlikely that the Commission will
reach, much less investigate and conciliate, complaints such as that of plaintiff
within 180 days." Id. at 1028-29. In Black Musicians of Pittsburgh v. Local 60-
471, American Fed'n of Musicians, AFL-CIO, 375 F. Supp. 902 (W.D. Pa. 1974),
a case decided at about the same time, another federal district court dealt with the
inverse problem, that is, a situation in which a lawsuit was filed before a right-to-
sue letter had issued. In that case, the court emphasized that the defendant had not
moved to dismiss the premature civil action until after the Commission had
completed its administrative process, made a reasonable cause finding, attempted
conciliation, and issued a right-to-sue letter. The court observed:
Asserting one's rights too late is quite a different matter from asserting
them too soon. This suit was not proper when it was filed and obviously
would have been dismissed had the union moved to do so. But the
issuance of the right to sue letter, in effect, validated the pending suit
making it unnecessary to file another suit.
Id. at 907 (citation omitted). On the other hand, the court in Troy v. Shell Oil Co.,
378 F. Supp. 1042 (E.D. Mich. 1974), held that an employee could not seek
preliminary injunctive relief in a federal district court action without having
received a right-to-sue letter, notwithstanding the fact that the Commission "had
a large backlog of cases and apparently could not or would not act on plaintiff's[charge] with the necessary dispatch." Id. at 1044. However, the court in Troy also
emphasized that the exhaustion principle "is not indiscriminately applied to every
administrative procedure specified in the statute, nor is it without its limited
exceptions." Id. at 1045. Thus, the Commission's "failure to investigate or attempt
conciliation.., will not preclude court action." Id.
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Indemnity Company,212 a 1973 race discrimination case. In response
to the employer's argument that the court lacked jurisdiction because
of the premature issuance of the right-to-sue letter, the court stated
that it was "not willing to foreclose plaintiff from this forum under
the provisions of a remedial statute on the basis of a technicality. 2 3
The court noted that the statutory period is intended to "give the
parties the opportunity for conciliation," but emphasized that the
charging party had afforded the Commission an opportunity to follow
its administrative procedures.21 4 The Commission was unable to take
advantage of that opportunity because of its own workload and
priorities. Thus, the court emphasized that "the Commission is not
being by-passed; they candidly admitted issuing the right-to-sue letter
before passage of the 180 days."2 "5 The court supported this point by
quoting from the Commission's letter to the charging party:
[B]ecause of the very large backlog of charges pending in this
office, the Commission will not be able to reach the subject
charge for investigation, nor file suit, nor enter into a
conciliation agreement within the 180 day period. We do not
believe Congress intended to delay the right of aggrieved
persons to file suit under such circumstances. Accordingly,
we are honoring your request and hereby issue a notice of
right to sue.216
The Eastern District of Missouri reached the same conclusion in
Howard v. Mercantile Commerce Trust Company.2"7 Approximately
100 days after the filing of Howard's charge, the Commission advised
Howard that its backlog would prevent it from processing the charge
within the 180-day period, issued a right-to-sue letter, and closed its
file.21 ' The employer moved to dismiss Howard's subsequently-filed
lawsuit on the grounds that the Commission had exclusive
jurisdiction during the 180-day period and that a right-to-sue letter
issued during that period was null and void.219 The Howard court
rejected this argument, holding that "the words 'within one hundred
212. 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 193 (N.D. Cal. 1973). In this case, because
of deferral to a state fair employment practices commission, the right-to-sue letter
was received on March 14, 1973, "approximately 210 days after the original
charges were filed with the Commission, but only 150 days after the Commission
officially gained jurisdiction of the charges." Id. at 194. The civil action was filed
sixty days later, on May 18, 1973. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 194-95.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 195.
217. 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P9842 at 6502 (E.D. Mo. 1974).
218. Id. at 6503.
219. Id.
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and eighty days' connote some measure of flexibility [and] could
more easily be construed as a maximum than as a minimum time
period. 22' The court also rejected the employer's exhaustion of
administrative remedies argument, noting that a Title VII plaintiffhas
only two statutory obligations: (1) to file a charge with the
Commission, and (2) to receive and act upon the right-to-sue
notice.22" ' The court further noted, "Both of those requirements have
been met in this case, and it is difficult to see what further
administrative remedies could be pursued and exhausted by plaintiff
when she has been officially notified by the Commission that her file
has been closed. 222 The court also was not persuaded by the
employer's argument that issuance of the right-to-sue letter was
contrary to a then-existing Commission regulation which counseled
against the issuance of such letters.223 "The courts have been very
reluctant," the court observed, "to deny private plaintiffs access to thejudicial process because of some procedural mistake by the
Commission. 224
In Jones v. Pacific Intermountain Express,225 which was decided
in 1975, a judge of the Northern District of California broke ranks
with these decisions by granting summary judgment in favor of the
220. Id.
221. Id. The court based this response on the Supreme Court's decision in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 1822
(1973).
222. Howard, 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) at 6503.
223. See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.25b (1975) (stating that notice shall include (a) a
copy of the charge, (b) a copy of the Commission's determination of reasonable
cause, and (c) advice concerning his right to proceed in court under § 706(f)(1) of
Title VII).
224. Howard, 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) at 6503. Finally, the employer argued
that "if this suit is allowed, the Commission would be able to examine its caseload
and issue 'Right to Sue' notices on the same day that a charge is filed, if it
determined that it would not be able to process the charge in 180 days." Id. at
6504. The court did not analyze the employer's argument, but seemingly
concurred in the employer's assumption as to the undesirability of that outcome.
The court responded to the argument by asserting that the problem presented in the
hypothetical was not present here, where the Commission had the charge under
submission for 90 days, and that the courts were well able, in any event, to deal
with situations in which the Commission abused its discretion or the employer had
been prejudiced by the Commission's action. Id.. It is not clear, of course, why
it would ever be preferable for the Commission to retain jurisdiction over a case for
90 days or more, rather than issue a right-to-sue letter, if it is clear that the
Commission will not be able to devote any substantive attention to it. Moreover,
if the Commission knows on the day on which the charge is filed that it will never
be able to take any substantive action with respect to the charge, there seems no
reason for the Commission to hold the charge for some arbitrary period of delay.
The contrary position has more emotional than intellectual power.
225. 10 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 914 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
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defendants on the ground that the case was premature. According to
the court, the exhaustion requirement of Title VII means that "private
plaintiffs, unlike the EEOC itself, simply may not sue before the
180th day after the filing of the charge with the EEOC."' 26 However,
in a second 1975 case, another judge of the Northern District of
California reached the opposite conclusion. In Lewis v. FMC
Corporation,227 the Title VII plaintiff defended his right to bring suit
based on an early right-to-sue letter by producing an affidavit from
the Commission's District Director. The affidavit stated that "there
is no possibility that the EEOC could investigate plaintiffs far-
reaching charge against FMC within the 180-day period," and that the
Commission's practice in the face of such an impossibility is "to
issue, upon request, a right-to-sue letter within the 180-day period."22
The court found that the Commission's practice was justified:
The 180-day period is a period within which the EEOC has
the power and the duty to conciliate a case. Given the present
state of the agency's lack of resources and backlog of charges,
however, many far-reaching charges cannot be investigated
within the 180-day period. The purpose of the period is to
encourage conciliation and voluntary settlement of disputes
without litigation. In light of the inability of the EEOC to
investigate and the issuance of the right-to-sue letter, it is
difficult to conceive of any reason why this court should
require the plaintiff to wait 180 days before initiating the
lawsuit. In the absence of assistance and participation by the
EEOC, the employer and the grieving employee stand in the
same posture with respect to possible settlement of their
dispute after suit is filed as they do while the charge is
pending before the EEOC without any possibility of agency
action. Deferral of the filing of the suit until the 180-day
period has lapsed would serve only to require four or five
months of additional idleness and further delay in reaching
and ruling on the merits of the dispute.229
In Budreck v. Crocker National Bank,2 30 which was decided in the
year following the Lewis decision, Judge Renfrew of the Northern
District of California rejected the reasoning of Howard and Lewis,
which he found unfaithful to the statutory language, insufficiently
attentive to the legislative history, and contrary to sound policy. Like
226. Id. at 915 (citations omitted).
227. 11 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 31 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
228. Id. at 34.
229. Id. See also Westerlund v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 11 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 744 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (Carter, J.) (adopting reasoning of Lewis).
230. 407 F. Supp. 635 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
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the courts in Howard and Lewis, the Budreck court assumed that the
statutory language should be read as evidencing a general
congressional intent that suits not be filed until the conclusion of the
180-day period. Thus, the question for the court was whether the
state of the Commission's docket could justify a departure from that
general rule. In determining that this was not the case, the Budreck
court placed substantial emphasis on the grammar and syntax that
Congress used in Section 706(0(1):
The wording of the statute is admittedly convoluted, but, in
the Court's view, it is not ambiguous. And, while it is true
that the statute does not state that "No action shall be brought
unless * * *," it is also true that Section 2000e-5(f)(f) is the
only statutory authorization for a private civil action under
Title VII and that is expressly conditional. The statute
appears to authorize private civil actions only where both of
two conditions precedent have been met: (1) 180 days have
passed since the filing of the charge, or it has been sooner
dismissed, and (2) a right-to-sue letter has thereafter been
obtained."'
The court could accept the plaintiff s argument, therefore, only by
"ignor[ing] the conditional 'If * * *' phrasing of the statute. 2132 In
addition, the court noted that the relevant parts of the legislative
history were framed in the same conditional language and thus
provided further support for the "jurisdictional interpretation of the
180-day provision."233 Based on its reading of the legislative history,
the court thought that the Commission's policy was simply the
redrawing of a line that Congress already had drawn and was based
on circumstances that were already known to Congress when it drew
that line:
Because the 1972 amendments were enacted with specific
recognition of the delay in Commission action and of the role
of the private civil action in alleviating that problem, the
conclusion seems inevitable that the 180-day provision
represents a carefully considered Congressional judgment of
the proper accommodation between dual concerns. On the
one hand, Congress was concerned that the vindication of
legitimate claims not be excessively delayed, and, on the
other, it was concerned that the preferred process of
conciliation of disputes have an ample opportunity to work. 3 4
231. Id. at 639 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
232. Id. at 639.
233. Id. at 640.
234. Id. at 641.
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The Budreck court found the argument that prevailed in Howard
and Lewis to be "superficially attractive," but ultimately
unpersuasive.23 That argument failed to account for the fact that
Congress was well aware of the Commission's administrative
problems when it extended the time period from sixty to 180 days
and, indeed, that the extension was in response to those problems.
Moreover, according to the Budreck court, the argument gave
insufficient attention to the purely supporting role that Congress
intended for the federal courts in this area: "Although the federal
courts have been given an important role [in remedying employment
discrimination], it is a secondary role to that of the Commission, and
because federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, the scope of
their role as established by Congress must be accepted. '236 The court
further stated that "[t]he unfortunate effect of the Commission's
policy of immediate issuance of right-to-sue letters is... to make the
federal courts the primary, rather than secondary, forum for Title VII
disputes. '237  Thus, in the court's view, insistence on strict
compliance with the time limits serves the purpose of delaying
adjudication of these claims by the federal courts, thereby furthering
the policy of the statute to afford only a secondary role to the federal
courts in this area. Finally, the court did not see the delay as wholly
unproductive from the viewpoint of conciliation because, "even
without the intervention of the Commission, informal conciliation
may be possible in some cases. '"238
Judge Renfrew revisited the subject of early right-to-sue letters
the following year in Eldredge v. Carpenters 46 Northern California
Counties Joint Apprenticeship and Training Committee.239 The court
235. Id. at 643. The court summarized the argument as follows:
The purpose of the 180-day provision is to allow time for the commission
to attempt to conciliate the underlying dispute. If the backlog of cases
before the Commission is so great that the Commission is willing to
certify that it will be unable to reach a particular claim during the 180-day
period, no statutory purpose would be served by enforcing the provision.
Therefore, the argument concludes, Congress could not have intended to
require such an exercise in futility as a prerequisite to the bringing of a
civil action.
Id. at 642-43.
236. Id. at 643 (citation omitted).
237. Id. On the other hand, the issuance of "early" right-to-sue letters may do
nothing more than cause cases to reach the federal courts somewhat earlier than
they otherwise would, and any reduction in the number of cases that might be filed
in the event that the charging party was required to wait might be an ambiguous
factor at best, with nothing to suggest that it is only non-meritorious cases whose
potential plaintiffs give up as a result of the delay.
238. Id. at 644.
239. 440 F. Supp. 506 (N. D. Cal. 1977). The complaint in this case alleged that
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began its discussion of the exhaustion issue by paraphrasing the
language of Section 706(f)(1). The words used by the court in
paraphrasing the statute were carefully chosen. According to the
court, Section 706(f)(1) "requires that [persons aggrieved by
discrimination] file timely charges with the EEOC, defer filing suit
for 180 days after those charges are filed, and obtain a right-to-sue
letter from the EEOC." 4° As the court noted, "[t]here is a sharp
division in the authorities as to whether this requirement is
jurisdictional. 2 41
In Eldredge, the plaintiffs sought a temporary restraining order
and preliminary injunctive relief based on a right-to-sue letter issued
eighteen days after the Commission had acquired jurisdiction over the
charge. The Eldredge court rejected the plaintiffs' contention that a
request for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunctive
relief "made compliance with the statutory period unnecessary for all
purposes," but held that "in the circumstances of this case . . .
jurisdiction was properly assumed to entertain those motions, and that
the passage of 180 days prior to hearing on a motion to dismiss cured
thejurisdictional defect that would otherwise have required dismissal
of the action for permanent relief. 2 42  The court explained its
reasoning as follows:
The result of [issuing the early right-to sue letter] was to
foreclose any possibility of conciliation-either formal or
informal-prior to the hardening of positions and narrowing
of issues that inevitably follow the assumption of roles as
adversary parties in a judicial proceeding, impairing further
efforts at voluntary settlement. In the ordinary case, such
short-circuiting of the time periods contemplated by the
statute frustrates the intention of Congress to promote
the carpenters' joint apprenticeship and training committee discriminated against
women applicants by denying them equal opportunity for placement on the new
applicant referral lists used to supply names to union dispatchers for referral of
applicants to jobs as beginning apprentices. See id. at 509.
240. Id. at 515 (emphasis added). It is clear, of course, that this section does not
so provide in terms, but that Judge Renfrew's description of the plaintiffs'
purported obligation to "defer filing suit for 180 days" is a gloss on the statute
based on his previous holding in Budreck. The statute itself does not speak in
terms of the plaintiffs' duty to defer for 180 days, but of the Commission's duty
to notify the charging party of her right to sue if, "within one hundred and eighty
days from the filing of such charge .... the Commission has not filed a civil
action ... or ... entered into a conciliation agreement to which the person
aggrieved is a party." Section 706 (f)(1) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)
(1993). As in many of these cases, Eldredge presented a second exhaustion issue,
one involving exhaustion of state remedies under Section 706(c).
241. Eldredge, 440 F. Supp. at 515 (citations omitted).
242. Id.
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conciliation and voluntary settlement. Yet Congress itself
recognized, by enacting a provision authorizing the EEOC to
seek preliminary relief ... that the interest in enforcement
may outweigh the policy favoring nonjudicial settlement
when an aggrieved person is threatened with irreparable
injury that imperils the adequacy of any final relief. Congress
failed to similarly provide for private litigants, however, and
their efforts... have met with mixed results. The conflicting
results derive from the courts' efforts to accommodate two
competing concerns: first, that it would be unfair and
unrealistic to require exhaustion where rights are threatened
with irreparable harm, a failure to act may permanently
foreclose adequate relief, and the EEOC's caseload precludes
it from seeking preliminary relief, and second, that to permit
individuals to bypass the statutory mechanism in cases where
the EEOC does not seek prompt judicial relief would flood
the courts with such requests ....
Although the issue is currently before the United States
Supreme Court [in Richmond Unified School District v.
Berg], the law of this Circuit at the present time is that in a
"limited class of cases" where there exists a high probability
of success on the merits and the threat of irreparable harm, a
court may entertain a suit to maintain the status quo pending
administrative disposition.243
243. Id. at 516-17 (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted). The Eldredge court
relied on the Ninth Circuit's decision in Berg v. Richmond Unified School District,
528 F.2d 1208 (9th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded on other grounds, Richmond
Unified School District v. Berg, 434 U.S. 158, 98 S. Ct. 623 (1977),
notwithstanding three significant differences between the two cases. First, the
motion for preliminary injunctive relief had been withdrawn from the calendar in
Eldredge, so the court was not required to make any findings as to the strength of
the plaintiffs' claim, whereas the court in Berg had based its holding on its factual
finding that "there exists a high probability of success on the merits." Eldredge,
440 F. Supp. at 516. In Eldredge, the court suggested that an analogue could be
found in the Commission's "evaluation of the case as one appropriate for
immediate preliminary injunction [which] would appear to satisfy the threshold test
that there be some substance to the claim." Id. at 517. Second, the plaintiffs in
Berg were employees seeking relief from threatened changes in the employment
relationship and were thus asking for maintenance of the status quo, whereas the
plaintiffs in Eldredge were seeking admission to a program. Third, the Eldredge
plaintiffs "arguably sought more than interim relief pending administrative
disposition, since the EEOC had prematurely issued its final right-to-sue letter, thus
terminating the administrative phase." Id. On the other hand, the Commission had
issued its right-to-sue letter based on a certification that it would be unable to reach
the case within the 180-day period, and no administrative disposition would
therefore be forthcoming. In addition, "the prospects of informal settlement are
unlikely to have been impaired by the initiation of the suit for permanent relief to
any greater extent than they would already have been impaired by the filing of the
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In Milner v. National School of Health Technology,2" Chief
Judge Lord of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania pointedly rejected
the reading of the statutory language that Judge Renfrew had
developed in Budreck and reiterated with his paraphrase of the
statutory language in Eldredge. After quoting the language of
Section 706(f), Judge Lord stated his view that neither the statutory
language itself nor sound policy provides any basis for concluding
that the phrase "within 180 days" must be construed to mean "no
earlier than 180 days."245 But Judge Lord's argument was centered
on his rejection of the legitimacy of the gloss that Judge Renfrew had
put on that phrase:
Defendants argue that [Section 706(f)] requires a minimum of
180 days for conciliation between the assumption of
jurisdiction by the EEOC and the issuance of the right-to-sue
letter.
We cannot agree with this argument. The statute does not
require a minimum of 180 days for conciliation; rather, it
requires issuance of a right-to-sue letter within 180 days. The
purpose of this subsection is to allow the Commission to
attempt conciliation or to file its own civil action before
allowing plaintiff to proceed in court. If the Commission
determines that conciliation is unlikely, it serves no useful
motion for a preliminary injunction." Id. In the court's view, and based on its
responsibility to follow the Ninth Circuit's decision in Berg, the plaintiffs properly
were before the court on their motion for preliminary injunction, but the question
remained as to whether jurisdiction should be assumed over the underlying claim.
At least where the prematurity of the right-to-sue letter was the result of a
Commission backlog that would have prevented administrative disposition in any
event, the court held that no purpose would be served by requiring dismissal of the
lawsuit and refiling with the agency. Id. at 517-18. The Berg decision was vacated
and remanded for further consideration in light of General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,
429 U.S. 125, 97 S. Ct. 401 (1976), and Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136,
98 S. Ct. 347 (1977). See Richmond Unified Sch. Dist. v. Berg, 434 U.S. 158, 98
S. Ct. 623 (1977).
244. 409 F. Supp. 1389 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
245. Id. at 1392. As the court observed:
The purpose of this subsection is to allow the Commission to attempt
conciliation or to file its own civil action before allowing plaintiff to
proceed in court. If the Commission determines that conciliation is
unlikely, it serves no useful purpose to insist on the running of the full
180-day period before issuance of the right-to-sue letter.
Id. (citation omitted). In another case, McGee v. Purolator Courier Corp., 430 F.
Supp. 1285 (N.D. Ala. 1977), the court stated that "[t]he 1972 Amendments have
been correctly interpreted to bar private actions for a period of 180 days after the
EEOC charge [has been] filed," but offered no reasoning to support its assertion
that this was the correct rule, and the plaintiff had not received a right-to-sue letter
in any event. McGee, 430 F. Supp. at 1287-88.
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purpose to insist on the running of the full 180-day period
before issuance of the right-to-sue letter.246
The foregoing decisions are representative of the case law during
this period. The cases largely discuss the issues in terms of
"jurisdiction," but the word does not seem to be used in its most
technical sense. Thus, courts that discuss the issue in "jurisdictional"
terms do not seem to see the jurisdictional barrier as necessarily
insuperable or impenetrable. Those that contend that the Commission
has exclusive jurisdiction for 180 days after the charge is filed
generally base that contention on the plain language of the statute, but
the language is admittedly "convoluted," as Judge Renfrew conceded
in Budreck, and the argument is most effectively made by
paraphrasing the statutory language, as he later did in Eldredge.
There seems to be no connection between a court's approval of the
Commission's practice and the giving of deference to the
Commission's views. Courts on both sides of the issue simply
approach the issue as a matter of statutory interpretation for their
determination, with no discussion of the possibility that any degree
of deference should be accorded to the views or expertise of the
Commission. Those that find the practice impermissible tend to
support their conclusion with the policy argument that Congress
intended the courts to have only a secondary role in the enforcement
of Title VII, whereas the practice of issuing early right-to-sue letters
thrusts them into a primary role. It is ironic, of course, that the courts
should attribute such importance to the primacy of the Commission's
role in administering the statute, in terms of case processing, while
paying so little attention to the Commission's views as to its own
jurisdiction, statutory competency, and responsibility.
C. Gilbert, Zipes, and the Commission's Regulation: Title VII and
Early Right-to-Sue Letters in the Pre-Chevron Period
In a number of early cases, the Supreme Court, albeit without
much discussion or analysis, had held that the Commission's
interpretations of its organic statute were entitled to "great
deference. 2 47 By 1976, however, the Supreme Court was moving
away from that commitment, and this shift in the Court's approach
provides part of the context in which the lower federal courts would
evaluate the Commission's new regulation.
In December 1976, the Supreme Court decided General Electric
Company v. Gilbert.248 In that case, the Court rejected a Title VII sex
246. Id. at 1392 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
247. See supra note 145.
248. 429 U.S. 125, 97 S. Ct. 401 (1976). Congress subsequently enacted
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discrimination challenge to an employee disability benefits plan that
excluded coverage for pregnancy-related disabilities.249 Contrary to
the decisions of both courts below, the Supreme Court held that the
exclusion of pregnancy-related disability benefits did not violate
Title VII because the exclusion did not constitute "discriminat[ion]
.. . because of . . . sex" under § 703(a)(1) of Title VII.250  In
reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court emphasized that
Congress had not defined "discrimination" under Title VII, paid
little attention to the Commission's guideline (let alone to the
possibility that Congress might have intended the Commission to
play a critical role in giving meaning to that statutory term), and
determined that the body of constitutional case law on sex
discrimination provided a "quite relevant [resource] in determining
whether or not the pregnancy exclusion did discriminate on the
basis of sex"25 1 in violation of Title VII. In these circumstances, the
Court said, "we should not readily infer that [Congress] meant
something different from what the concept of discrimination has
traditionally meant. '25 2 Thus, the Court found that its decision in
Geduldig v. Aiello,2" which upheld a similar, pregnancy-related
exclusion from coverage against constitutional attack, was virtually
conclusive with respect to the issue presented in Gilbert2 4 and
legislation to overrule this decision and the decision in Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty,
434 U.S. 136, 98 S. Ct. 347 (1977). See Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-555 (codified at Section 701(k) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(k)).
249. The plan provided "nonoccupational sickness and accident benefits to all
employees... in an amount equal to 60% of an employee's normal straight-time
weekly earnings." General Elec., 429 U.S. at 128, 97 S. Ct. at 404. Benefits were
provided to employees who were totally disabled, and the maximum term of
coverage was twenty-six weeks. Id. at 128, 97 S. Ct. at 404. Only pregnancy-
related disabilities were excluded from coverage. The trial evidence established
that, "with pregnancy-related disabilities excluded, the cost of the Plan to General
Electric per female employee was as high as, if not substantially higher than, the
cost per male employee." Id. at 130, 97 S. Ct. at 405 (footnote omitted).
250. Section 703(a)(1) provides in relevant part that it shall be an unlawful
employment practice "to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." Section 703(a)(1) of
Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1993).
251. General Elec., 429 U.S. at 133, 97 S. Ct. at 407.
252. Id. at 145, 97 S. Ct. at 412.
253. 417 U.S. 484, 94 S. Ct. 2485 (1974).
254. Justice Stevens found this reasoning unpersuasive. In dissent, he observed
that:
The word "discriminate" does not appear in the Equal Protection Clause.
Since the plaintiffs' burden of proving a prima facie violation of that
constitutional provision is significantly heavier than the burden of proving
a prima facie violation of a statutory prohibition against discrimination,
the constitutional holding in Geduldig v. Aiello does not control the
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provided a solid basis for rejecting the Commission's contrary
interpretation.
In earlier cases, the Supreme Court had suggested that
Commission interpretations would be accorded "great deference," but
the Court in Gilbert now stated that those interpretations were only
"entitled to . . . consideration."2" That was true, the Court
emphasized, because Congress had not conferred upon the
Commission "the... authority to promulgate rules or regulations," '256
and "courts properly may accord less weight to ...guidelines
[created in such circumstances] than to administrative regulations
which Congress has declared shall have the force of law, or... which
... may themselves supply the basis for imposition of liability."'257
The Court therefore concluded that the value of the Commission's
interpretation was to be determined under the test established in
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., and, under this test, the Commission's
interpretation was entitled to very little weight, being neither a
"contemporary" nor a "consistent" interpretation of the statute. In
addition, the Commission's interpretation was inconsistent with the
scant legislative history on the subject, as well as with the consistent
and longstanding interpretation of the Wage and Hour
Administrator.258 Most important, perhaps, was the fact that the
Commission's definition of discrimination under the statute did not
accord with the "traditional" view of unconstitutional discrimination
embodied in the Court's more recentjurisprudence. Speaking for the
Court, Justice Rehnquist stated: "In short, while we do not wholly
discount the weight to be given the 1972 guideline, it does not receive
high marks when judged by the standards enunciated in Skidmore.''259
In dissent, Justice Brennan took exception to Justice Rehnquist's
synthesis of the prior case law relating to the degree of deference due
to Commission interpretations. The prior cases had not held that the
Commission's interpretations were "entitled to consideration."
question of statutory interpretation presented by this case. And, of course,
when it enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress could
not possibly have relied on language which this Court was to use a decade
later in the Geduldig opinion.
General Elec., 429 U.S. at 160-61, 97 S. Ct. at 420 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
255. Id. at 141, 97 S. Ct. at410.
256. Id., 97 S. Ct. at 410. In a footnote, the Court acknowledged that the
Commission had been given the authority to promulgate "procedural" rules, but
that rulemaking authority was not relevant to the issue before the Court. Id. at 141
n.20, 97 S. Ct. at 410 n.20.
257. Id. at 141, 97 S. Ct. at 410 (citations omitted). The Court did not discuss
the deference due to agency interpretations of law made in the course of
administrative adjudication.
258. General Elec., 429 U.S. at 144-45, 97 S. Ct. at 412.
259. Id. at 143, 97 S. Ct. at 411.
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According to Justice Brennan, the prior cases had held that the
Commission's interpretations, whether embodied in guidelines or
case decisions, should be given "great deference. ' 260 Moreover, the
question presented in Gilbert substantiated the rationale and need for
this approach:
However one defines the profile of risks protected by General
Electric, the determinative question must be whether the
social policies and aims to be furthered by Title VII and
filtered through the phrase "to discriminate" contained in §
703(a)(1) fairly forbid an ultimate pattern of coverage that
insures all risks except a commonplace one that is applicable
to women but not to men.
As a matter of law and policy, this is a paradigm example
of the type of complex economic and social inquiry that
Congress wisely left to resolution by the EEOC pursuant to
its Title VII mandate. See H.R.Rep.No.92-238, p.8 (1972).
And, accordingly, prior Title VII decisions have consistently
acknowledged the unique persuasiveness of EEOC
interpretations in this area.
Justice Brennan not only disagreed with the Court's statement of
the legal principle governing review of the Commission's guidelines,
but he found little merit in the two principal reasons that the majority
advanced for declining to give deference to the Commission's view.
The interpretation was not contemporaneous with the statute, Justice
Brennan conceded, but that was so only because the Commission,
"charged with a fresh and uncharted mandate, [thought] that further
study was required before the contours of sex discrimination as
proscribed by Congress could be defined. '262 Moreover, it was not
surprising that the General Counsel opinion letters had declined to
impose liability in the interim, while the Commission continued to211
study the problem. Justice Brennan summed up by stating his view
that the Commission's guideline merited "our 'great deference' as
260. Id. at 155-56, 97 S. Ct. at 418 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
261. Id. at 155-56,97 S. Ct. at417-18.
262. Id. at 156, 97 S. Ct. at 418. The circumstances in which the prohibition
against sex discrimination had been inserted into Title VII led to many difficulties
in the interpretation and application of these provisions. See, e.g., Leo Kanowitz,
Sex-Based Discrimination in American Law III: Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act and the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 20 Hastings L.J. 305, 310-12 (1968) (detailing
history of insertion of sex as a protected category into equal employment
opportunity legislation). See also County ofWashington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161,
183, 101 S. Ct. 2242, 2255 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (attempting to draw
inference about statutory coverage based on history of insertion of sex as protected
category).
263. General Elec., 429 U.S. at 157, 97 S. Ct. at 418.
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a "particularly conscientious and reasonable product of EEOC
deliberations;" he further suggested that there was "no basis for
concluding that [it] is out of step with congressional intent." 62"
Whatever the ultimate merits of the debate between Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Brennan, it is clear that the degree of deference
due to Commission interpretations was greatly reduced by Justice
Rehnquist's synthesis and restatement of the case law in Gilbert.
Whereas even Commission case decisions previously had been given
"great deference," now carefully considered and crafted guidelines
were only "entitled to consideration." In effect, the Court was
sending a signal to the lower federal courts that Commission
interpretations should not be afforded any significant degree of
deference, and that the courts should basically look at the subjects of
Commission interpretations on their own.
Shortly thereafter, the Commission promulgated the early right-
to-sue letter regulation, thus formalizing its prior practice.265
Notwithstanding the transformation of practice into rule, the terms of
the debate in the lower federal courts remained essentially unchanged.
The courts continued to divide on the correctness or propriety of the
administrative interpretation, and the question continued to be framed
in jurisdictional terms. Indeed, Title VII defendants increasingly
were raising "jurisdictional" defenses, asking the courts to decide
whether various time limits and other administrative requirements of
Title VII were jurisdictional in a strict and strong sense or subject to
equitable modification.266 In Zipes v. Trans World Airlines,267 which
was decided in 1982, the Supreme Court held that the timely filing of
a charge with the Commission was in the nature of a condition
precedent to suit, rather than a jurisdictional requirement, and thus
subject to equitable modification. The issue and holding in Zipes
were narrowly framed, however, so that the question whether other
provisions of Title VII were jurisdictional was one that required
continued litigation. Thus, the case law concerning the 180-day
period reflects this jurisdictional emphasis throughout this period. 2 68
264. Id. at 157-58, 97 S. Ct. at 419.
265. Some courts have suggested that the Commission promulgated the
regulation to counteract dicta contained in the Supreme Court's then-recent
decision in OccidentaILife Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 361, 97 S. Ct. 2447,
2452 (1977). See supra note 142.
266. See, e.g., Harris v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 616 F.2d 377,379 (8th Cir.
1980) ("That the time limitations appearing in the Act are jurisdictional is clear.");
Rice v. New England College, 676 F.2d. 9, 10 (1st Cir. 1982) (requirements of
Section 706(f)(1) are not "jurisdictional").
267. 455 U.S. 385, 102 S. Ct. 1127 (1982).
268. See Pinkard v. Pullman-Standard, 678 F.2d 1211, 1215 (5th Cir. Unit B
1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1105, 103 S. Ct. 729 (1983) (receipt of right-to-sue
letter not jurisdictional requirement, but condition precedent subject to
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During the period following the promulgation of the regulation,
some courts considered the question anew based on the added
element of an agency regulation to support the prior administrative
practice. Others seem to have simply looked to existing case law
with the tacit understanding that the same result would follow in
either case. In some cases, the regulation was not mentioned at all,
which is not particularly surprising in an area in which the issuing
agency is not normally a party to the litigation and the plaintiffs
counsel may or may not have experience in the area. Nor is it
surprising, in view of the decision in Gilbert, that many courts
continued to frame the issue solely in terms of ascertaining the
"correct" answer to a question of statutory construction without
regard to the degree of deference due, if any, to the views of the
expert agency that Congress has charged with administering the
statute.
In other words, this phase of the case law is largely characterized
by reliance on prior authorities and a relative absence of new, critical
analysis. Typical of this period are cases such as Loney v. Carr-
Lowrey Glass Company,2" in which Judge Miller of the District of
Maryland held that the court "lack[ed] jurisdiction under Title VII.
.. because the EEOC did not retain jurisdiction of plaintiffs' charges
for the 180-day period referred to in [Section 706(f)(1)] and suit was
filed in this court prior to the expiration of said period."2 70 The Loney
court relied on Judge Renfrew's decision in Budreck, and on the
description of the statutory scheme contained in the Supreme Court's
dicta in Occidental Life, to reach the conclusion that the new
regulation was inconsistent with congressional intent. The court did
not discuss the degree of deference that might be due the
Commission's construction of the statute; the prior case law simply
showed that the practice (and the conforming regulation) were
modification); Jackson v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co, 678 F.2d 992, 1000 (11 th
Cir. 1982) (broadly interpreting prior decisions as holding that "the conditions
precedent to filing a Title VII action are not jurisdictional prerequisites"); Fouche
v. Jekyll-Island State Park Auth., 713 F.2d 1518, 1525 (11 th Cir. 1983) ("Jackson
mandates that all Title VII procedural requirements to suit are henceforth to be
viewed as conditions precedent to suit rather than as jurisdictional requirements.");
Moteles v. University of Pennsylvania, 730 F.2d 913 (3d Cir. 1984) (declining, on
current state of record, to decide whether time limit is jurisdictional and
Commission regulation invalid, but emphasizing importance of responsibilities
assigned to Commission and need for Commission to have ample opportunity to
fulfill those responsibilities); Hooks v. RCA Corp., 620 F. Supp. 1, 2 (E.D. Pa.
1984) (early right-to-sue letter not invalid where Commission had unsuccessfully
attempted conciliation, and there was no indication that plaintiff attempted to
bypass agency procedures).
269. 458 F. Supp. 1080 (D. Md. 1978).
270. Id. at 1081.
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"inconsistent with an obvious congressional intent."27' In
Hiduchenko v. Minneapolis Medical and Diagnostic Center, Ltd.,272
the court reached essentially the same conclusion, but it did so
without refering to the regulation. In Grimes v. Pitney Bowes, Inc.,27a
the court reviewed the legislative history and case law before
determining that it lacked jurisdiction, but the court principally
contributed a colorful metaphor by comparing the Commission's
regulation to "a swinging door that shifts the primary jurisdiction
over employment discrimination charges from the EEOC to theCOrt.' 2 7 4
courts .
On the other hand, in Bryant v. California Brewers Association,275
the Ninth Circuit followed an analysis similar to that which Judge
Lord had used in Milner.276 Like Judge Lord, the Ninth Circuit found
no basis in the statutory language for assuming that the phrase
"within 180 days" should be read to mean "no earlier than 180 days."
Specifically, the Ninth Circuit discussed the defendants' contention
that the Commission's "failure to observe the 180-day time period
bars plaintiff's claim on the Title VII charge"2 77 in these terms:
Defendants' contention lacks merit. Section 2000e-5(f)(1)
simply requires the EEOC to issue a notice of right-to-sue if
it has failed to file suit or arrange a conciliation agreement
within 180 days. Nowhere does the statute prohibit the
271. Id. The Loney court noted the absence of any indication in the record that
"the EEOC actually ceased processing of the [administrative charge] when the
Notices of Right to Sue were issued on April 25, 1978." Id. at 1081 n.3. Similarly,
there appears to have been no evidence to show that the Commission had ceased
to investigate on the date on which the federal court complaint was filed, but the
court adopted that date as the date on which the investigation should be deemed to
have terminated. Id. Judge Kaufman of the District of Maryland reached the same
result the following year in Vanguard Justice Society v. Hughes, 471 F. Supp. 670
(D. Md. 1979), holding thatjurisdiction depends upon the issuance of a right-to-sue
letter after the expiration of the 180-day period, but that the defect caused by an
early right-to-sue letter could subsequently be cured. Id. at 681-82. In Everett v.
City of Chicago, No. 78 C 2455, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14408 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 15,
1979), the court held that it lacked jurisdiction over plaintiff's Title VII action.
Everett had made three demands for a right-to-sue letter within the 180-day period,
but no right-to-sue letter had issued, and the lawsuit had been filed one year later.
The court cited no authority for the dismissal, rather it cited authority for a negative
pregnant implication which it drew from certain language in Johnson v. Railway
Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 458, 95 S. Ct. 1716 (1975).
272. 467 F. Supp. 103 (D. Minn. 1979).
273. 480 F. Supp. 1381 (N.D. Ga. 1979).
274. Id. at 1385.
275. 585 F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 1978), vacated and remanded on other grounds,
California Brewers Ass'n v. Bryant, 444 U.S. 598, 100 S. Ct. 814 (1980).
276. 409 F. Supp. 1389 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
277. Bryant, 585 F.2d at 425.
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EEOC from issuing such notice before the expiration of the
180-day period ....
Furthermore, in 1973-1974 the undermanned EEOC staff
faced a huge backlog of Title VII cases and, as a practical
matter, was unable to handle Bryant's charges within the 180-
day period. Given this state of affairs, it would be a travesty
to require the EEOC and Bryant to mark time until 180 days
were counted off.
Title VII "does not condition an individual's right to sue
upon the EEOC's performance of its administrative duties."
In the circumstances of this case, we decline to hold that
Bryant's Title VII claim is barred by any lack of compliance
with the procedural requirements of § 2000e-5(f)(1).171
In two subsequent cases, Saulsbury v. Wismer and Becker, Inc. 279
and Brown v. Puget Sound Electrical Apprenticeship & Training
Trust,280 the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed its holding in Bryant. In each
case, the court again rejected the argument that the Commission was
required to wait 180 days before issuing a right-to-sue letter, but
added nothing new to the analysis.28'
278. Id. In an important decision on the subject of seniority systems, the
Supreme Court disagreed with the Ninth Circuit's holding on the merits. However,
Supreme Court review was not sought with respect to the correctness of the Ninth
Circuit's construction of Section 706(0(1). See Pet. for Cert. No. 78-1548 (filed
April 11, 1979). The Supreme Court did not address that issue, nor did the Court
consider whether the lapse of 180 days between the filing of a charge and the
issuance of a right-to-sue letter was a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit. On two
previous occasions, the Supreme Court had described the private right of action
under Title VII as arising after the expiration of the 180-day period. See Johnson
v. Ry. Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 458, 95 S. Ct. 1716 (1975); Gladstone
Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 104 n.12, 99 S. Ct. 1601, 1610 n.12(1979). In both cases, however, the observation was clearly dicta, and no issue was
raised as to the precise meaning of Section 706(0(1). In a third case, Occidental
Life Insurance Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 361, 97 S. Ct. 2447, 2452 (1977), the
Court stated, "The 180-day limitation provides only that this private right of action
does not arise until 180 days after a charge has been filed." It is difficult to quarrel
with that broad statement, inasmuch as no court has ever held that a charging party
is entitled to compel the issuance of a right-to-sue letter prior to the expiration of
the 180-day period, but it also does not seem to address directly the issue with
which this article is concerned. Whether the Commission may issue a right-to-sue
letter before the expiration of the 180-day period, and thus permit the filing of a
suit earlier than otherwise would be the case, is not a question to which the Court
was required to respond in Occidental.
279. 644 F.2d 1251 (9th Cir. 1980).
280. 732 F.2d 726 (9th Cir. 1984).
281. The Ninth Circuit did emphasize that Congress's intention in establishing
the 180-day period was to protect complainants from undue delay. Id. at 729. In
Rossini v. Ogilvy & Mather, Inc., No. 78 Civ. 1713-CLB, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
12985 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 1979), Judge Brieant of the Southern District of New
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A few cases during this period stand out from the rest. Among
them is Judge Sofaer's opinion in Spencer v. Banco Real.28 2 In
Spencer, Judge Sofaer extensively reviewed the arguments and
authorities on both sides of the question before concluding that the
Commission's regulation was invalid, and that jurisdiction could not
be predicated upon a right-to-sue letter issued during the 180-day
period. With respect to the statutory language, Judge Sofaer closely
followed Judge Renfrew's analysis in Budreck, particularly the
argument based on Congress's inclusion of the word "if' in Section
706 (f)(1). Judge Sofaer stated, "Judge Renfrew found [the] statute's
wording 'convoluted,' but unambiguous: 'In order to accept the
position advanced by plaintiffs, the Court would have.., to ignore
the conditional "If.. ." phrasing of the statute.' 23 In Judge Sofaer's
view, the legislative history of the 1972 amendments underscored that
point:
Descriptions of the 180-day provision in the legislative
history also indicate that the right to bring federal suit is
contingent, not upon the mere issuance of a right-to-sue
notice, but rather upon the occurrence of one of the express
conditions-dismissal or expiration of 180 days without
agency action.28 4
That conclusion was further bolstered, the court said, by the overall
design of the "statutory scheme of Title VII," which "suggests that
exhaustion of the 180-day period was intended to be a jurisdictional
prerequisite. 225 According to Judge Sofaer, the overall statutory
York rejected a challenge to an early right-to-sue letter on the ground that the
"internal discretionary determinations of the EEOC and whether or not it was
appropriate to issue the right to sue notice... may not be attacked collaterally in
this action in which the EEOC is not a party." Judge Brieant cited Weise v.
Syracuse University, 522 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1975), to support his assertion that the
mere issuance of such a notice "is sufficient for jurisdictional purposes." Several
other decisions from this period are also primarily cumulative. See Wells v.
Hutchinson, 499 F. Supp. 174, 189 (E.D. Tex. 1980) (holding that the receipt of a
right-to-sue letter is jurisdictional, but the Commission need not wait 180 days to
issue it), Mills v. Jefferson Bank East, 559 F. Supp. 34, 35 (D. Colo. 1983)
(regulation is inconsistent with the statute); True v. New York State Dep't of
Correctional Servs., 613 F. Supp. 27, 29-30 (W.D.N.Y. 1984) (issuance of notice
of right-to-sue prior to passage of 180 days presents jurisdictional deficiency
requiring remand to agency); People of State of New York v. Holiday Inns, Inc.,
656 F. Supp. 675, 680 (W.D.N.Y. 1984) (180-day period is period of exclusive
agency jurisdiction).
282. 87 F.R.D. 739 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
283. Id. at 743 (quoting Budreck v. Crocker Nat'l Bank, 407 F. Supp. 635, 639
(N.D. Cal. 1976)).
284. Id. at 743.
285. Id.
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design shows that the aim of Title VII was not simply "to permit
investigation and conciliation by the EEOC, but rather to require
such agency action and to place primary responsibility for disposing
of complaints in the administrative process.286 According to Judge
Sofaer, Congress's repeated use of the word "shall" also supports that
reading of Title VII.28
The Banco Real court also found support for its conclusion in the
Supreme Court's language in Occidental Life Insurance Company,
where the Supreme Court held that the 180-day period imposes no
limitation on the Commission's power to file suit after the expiration
of that period. Significantly, Occidental did not involve a private
right of action or the rules that might be appropriate thereto.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court observed in Occidental that:
[A] natural reading of Section 706(0(1) can lead only to the
conclusion that it simply provides that a complainant whose
charge is not dismissed or promptly settled or litigated by the
EEOC may himself bring a lawsuit, but that he must wait 180
days before doing so. After waiting for that period, the
complainant may either file a private action within 90 days
after EEOC notification or continue to leave the ultimate
resolution of his charge to the efforts of the EEOC.288
The court found this dictum persuasive. Further, the court
invoked the expressio unius maxim, arguing that Congress's express
authorization for the Commission to seek judicial relief within the
180-day period should be understood to signify a lack of intent to
grant such authority to private plaintiffs.289 Finally, Judge Sofaer was
not persuaded by the argument from policy, that "a 180-day delay in
filing suit is a 'travesty' or unconscionable when the EEOC certifies
in advance that it will be unable to complete its duties within that
period."29 Relying again on the Supreme Court's research and
analysis in OccidentalLife, the court asserted that Congress was well
aware in 1972 "of the enormous backlog of cases before the EEOC
and the consequent delays of 18 to 24 months encountered by
aggrieved persons awaiting administrative action on their
286. Id. (emphasis added).
287. Banco Real, 87 F.R.D. at 744.
288. Id. at 744 (quoting Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. at 361, 97S. Ct. at 2452). Of course, the question presented in Occidental had to do with the
Commission's litigating authority rather than the rights of private parties to sue;being involved with the Commission's litigating authority, it had nothing to do
with right-to-sue letters; and it had to do with Commission suits brought after the
expiration of the 180-day period, not with right-to-sue letters issued before the end
of that period.
289. Id. at 744.
290. Id.
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complaints"29 ' In addition, certain statements in the legislative
history may be read to demonstrate that Congress not only knew
about these delays, but also recognized that the 1972 amendments
would aggravate, rather than alleviate, them.2 92 From these sources,
Judge Sofaer concluded the following:
Thus, in drafting the 180-day provision, Congress protected
aggrieved individuals only from what it regarded as undue
delay-by definition a period of 180 days without final
agency action, for whatever reason. If such a result is a
"travesty," it is one that Congress intended, for it sought to
compel attempts to determine or settle Title VII disputes at
the agency level before resort to the federal courts.293
Nor was Judge Sofaer persuaded by the additional policy
arguments proffered by the Commission, appearing as amicus curiae.
The Commission argued that it could not serve any useful purpose if
it were relegated to the status of a mere "warehouse, storing the
claims of the victims of discrimination."294 The Commission further
argued that early notice would not prejudice defendants in any event,
if "the EEOC [could not] assist the parties during 180 days due to its
workload."2 95 The court said:
The 180-day period is not purposeless, merely because the
agency claims it seems unlikely to take final action during
that time. If complainants are required to remain before the
agency for 180 days, the primary role of the agency in
handling such claims is emphasized and assured.
Complainants faced with such a rule will naturally press the
agency for action, rather than for early right-to-sue letters.
The agency, in turn, will be spurred by that pressure and work
to improve its efficiency .... Merely commencing agency
action within the 180-day period will in some cases lead to
settlements and avoid litigation. In other cases, the agency
may successfully conclude matters after the 180-day period.
The probable effect of the EEOC's regulation on the federal
courts is another important consideration. Regulation
1601.28(a)(2) in effect permits the agency to expand federal
jurisdiction whenever an aggrieved claimant is impatient...
291. Id. (quoting Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. at 369, 97 S. Ct.
at 2456).
292. Id. at 744-45.
293. Banco Real, 87 F.R.D. at 745.
294. Id. at 746.
295. Id.
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and the agency feels unable to complete its tasks within the
statutory period. Early notices will mean more cases filed in
federal courts than if the parties and-the agency are required
to spend 180 days attempting to resolve the controversy.2 96
During this period, Chief Judge Morton of the Middle District of
Tennessee delivered a similarly thorough analysis reaching the
opposite conclusion. In Cattell v. Bob Frensley Ford, Inc.,29 the
Commission had originally scheduled a fact-finding conference, but
determined when that conference failed to materialize, that it would
be unable to act on the charge within the 180-day period and therefore
issued an "early" right-to-sue letter.2 98 In these circumstances, the
defendant argued, the court lacked "subject matter jurisdiction...
until such time as the complaint has been pending before the EEOC
for a minimum of 180 days."2 99 In response, the court noted the
existence of "substantial disagreement among the lower courts" on
the question whether deferral for the full 180-day period should be
considered a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit, and conceded that
dicta in two Supreme Court cases provided some support for the view
that it should be so considered.3" However, the court found
"[p]articularly instructive" the Ninth Circuit's analysis in Bryant
which "pointed out that the statute ... merely grants the aggrieved
party a right to file suit following 180 days of Commission inaction
or failure to achieve conciliation [and] [n]owhere... prohibit[s] the
EEOC from issuing such notice before the expiration of the 180-day
296. Id. at 746-47. The court also chastised the Commission for "giv[ing] no
thought to how its regulation will be administered." Id. at 746. The court stated:
The regulation creates an important new discretionary power, to be
exercised in favor of some complainants and not others. It not only
permits the agency to ignore part of its workload, but also enables
certain agency officials to determine which part of the workload to
ignore and which to address.
Id.
297. 505 F. Supp. 617 (M.D. Tenn. 1980).
298. Id. at 618. Cattell was discharged from her position on March 8, 1980. On
March 25, she filed a charge with the Commission alleging that the discharge was
the result of discrimination based on religion. A similar charge was filed at about
the same time with the Tennessee Commission for Human Development, but the
Tennessee agency deferred initial consideration of the charge to the Commission
on April 14 based on a "worksharing agreement." On April 17, the Commission
scheduled a fact-finding conference to be held on May 30, but that conference did
not occur as scheduled. The Commission subsequently issued a right-to-sue letter,
and Cattell filed suit in federal district court on July 3, 1980. Id. The defendant
moved to dismiss the complaint, both on the ground that the Commission should
have deferred to the Tennessee agency and on the ground that the Commission
should have waited 180 days before issuing the right-to-sue letter. Id. at 619.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 619-20.
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period."3 1 Moreover, the court observed, the statute "does not on its
face, contain any prohibition of an earlier suit, provided the
Commission has determined that a right-to-sue letter should be
issued. 30 2 In a footnote, the court further observed that '[t]he statute
does, by implication, prohibit resort to the courts prior to the expiration
of the 180-day period in cases where the Commission does not issue a
right-to-sue letter."30 3
Similarly, when the court turned its attention to the Supreme
Court's case law, it found the most compelling evidence of the
Supreme Court's view not in the dicta contained in Gladstone,
Realtors v. Village of Bellwood" and Johnson v. Railway Express
Agency,30 5 but in the action the Supreme Court took in Bryant.
Although the Supreme Court vacated and remanded the Ninth Circuit's
decision in Bryant, it did so on substantive grounds, without any
discussion of the nature of the 180-day period. Thus, the court noted:
While there is no indication the argument was raised, the
conclusion that the Court does not view the requirement as
jurisdictional is inevitable. It is a well-settled proposition that
lack of subject matter jurisdiction may not be waived and will
be raised by the courts sua sponte at any stage in the
proceedings should it appear that there is ajurisdictional defect.
... In Bryant, the Court proceeded to a consideration of the
merits despite clear notice through the argument in the court of
appeals that a jurisdictional question was present. The
conclusion is inescapable that the Court considered itself and
the lower courts in the case as having jurisdiction despite the
fact that the 180-day period had not run prior to the
commencement of the district court action.
30 6
Turning to the portions of legislative history on which Judge
Renfrew had relied in Budreck,07 Chief Judge Morton noted that the
301. Id. at 620 (quoting Bryant v. California Brewers Ass'n, 585 F.2d 421,425
(9th Cir. 1978), vacated and remanded on other grounds, California Brewers Ass'n
v. Bryant, 444 U.S. 598, 100 S. Ct. 814 (1980)).
302. Id.
303. Id. n.2. The court added:
Such a result is clearly the only way in which to effectuate the plain
congressional intent that the EEOC remedy should be pursued first. Inthe
present case, however, plaintiff made no effort to resort to the courts until
the EEOC had informed her that she had a right to sue, and that the
Commission would not be able to act on her complaint before the
expiration of 180 days.
Id.
304. 441 U.S. 91, 104n.12,99S.Ct. 1601, 1610n.12(1979).
305. 421 U.S. 454, 458, 95 S. Ct. 1716, 1719 (1975).
306. Cattell, 505 F. Supp. at 620.
307. Id. at 621 (citing Budreck v. Crocker Nat'l Bank, 407 F. Supp. 635, 640
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context in which the language was imbedded lent itself to quite a
different reading." 8 The excerpt followed a discussion of both the
increasingly heavy backlog of cases faced by the Commission and
the need to amend the enforcement procedures to provide for more
expeditious vindication of the rights created by Title VII. The
legislative history also shows that Congress originally had thought that
enforcement of Title VII would principally be accomplished through
conciliation, rather than litigation, but that "[e]xperience... has shown
this to be an oversimplified expectation incorrect in its conclusions. ,,3o
Given the context, Chief Judge Morton noted, the language that
Judge Renfrew invoked in Budreck takes on a different flavor:
[W]hile Congress thought that administrative remedies
should be pursued before resort to the district courts, it
established a ceiling on the length of time that an aggrieved
person would be required to wait for the EEOC to act. This
reflected an accommodation of conflicting interests. As
previously noted, conciliation of disputes was seen as a
preferable alternative to litigation. Second, administrative
remedies were seen as generally preferable because of the
assumed expertise that an agency would develop through the
processing of many similar claims. In addition, it was
thought that the EEOC would usually process claims more
expeditiously than would the courts, despite the backlog of
cases facing the Commission. On the other hand, it was
recognized that the heavy caseload would in some instances
prolong a particular claim for an unsatisfactory length of
time. "The primary concern must be protection of the
aggrieved person's option to seek a prompt remedy in the
best manner available."
Once the Commission has determined, as it did in this case,
that it will be unable to complete administrative processing
of a complaint within the 180-day period, none of the
asserted objectives of the requirement would be served by
forcing further delay. Clearly, the purpose of conciliation
will not be served if the Commission is too busy to consider
the charge. Likewise, any benefits of agency expertise will
be lost. Neither can it be said that Commission action is the
most expeditious route to dispute resolution in the particular
case. And finally, such a rule would stymie the asserted
(N.D. Cal. 1976)).
308. Id.
309. Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 92-238, at 8 (1972), reprinted in 1972
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 2144).
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primary concern for protecting the option to seek a prompt
remedy.310
D. The Chevron-Commercial Office Products-Arabian American
Oil Era Cases: High Theory and the Law in Action
A number of early right-to-sue cases were decided between the
time of the Supreme Court's 1984 decision in Chevron and the
District of Columbia Circuit's decision in Martini. However, most
of the new cases added nothing new to the terms of the debate, and
many did not even purport to analyze the issues in light of the
Supreme Court's opinion in Chevron. In addition, however, the
Supreme Court decided two cases during this period that directly
address the degree of deference, if any, due to the interpretations of
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
In 1988, the Court decided EEOCv. Commercial Office Products
Company,31' which raised two questions relating to the time limits for
the filing of charges with the Commission. The first question was
whether a state agency's decision to waive its exclusive 60-day period
for initial processing of a charge, pursuant to a state-federal work
sharing agreement, "terminates" the state agency's proceedings
within the meaning of Section 706(e) of Title VII,31 2 so that the
Commission may immediately deem the charge filed.313 The second
question was whether a complainant who has filed a charge that is
untimely under state law is nonetheless entitled to the extended 300-
day filing period provided by Section 706(e). 314 The Court answered
both questions in the affirmative. Writing for the Court, Justice
Marshall adopted the Commission's interpretation, apparently put
forth only in its amicus brief, that "a state agency 'terminates' its
proceedings when it declares that it will not proceed, if it does so at
all, for a specified interval of time."3"5 Justice Marshall further
explained that the word "terminate" may bear other meanings, and,
indeed, that other meanings might be more "natural[]" or "frequent[]"
310. Id. at 621-22 (citations omitted). Finally, the court noted that the
Commission's action was based on a previously adopted regulation, 29 C.F.R. §
1601.28(2), which the court was "unwilling, in light of the language of the statute
and the relevant legislative history[,] to hold.., beyond the scope of the EEOC's
authority to promulgate." Id. at 622. Nor was there any "allegation of bad faith on
the part of the appropriate EEOC officials in making the determination in this
particular case that action would not be taken within the 180-day period." Id.
311. 486U.S. 107, 108 S. Ct. 1666 (1988).
312. Section 706(e) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1994).
313. Commercial Office Prods. Corp., 486 U.S. at 109-10, 108 S. Ct. at 1668.
314. Id. at 110, 108 S. Ct. at 1688.
315. Id. at 115, 108 S. Ct. at 1671.
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in common usage.3 16 Justice Marshall stated: "But it is axiomatic
that the EEOC's interpretation of Title VII, for which it has primary
enforcement responsibility, need not be the best one by grammatical
or any other standards. Rather, the EEOC's interpretation of
ambiguous language, need only be reasonable to be entitled to
deference." '317 In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor stated her
belief that the result in the case was correct "solely due to the
traditional deference accorded the EEOC in interpretation of this
statute," which "is particularly appropriate on this type of technical
issue of agency procedure.""
Three years later, in EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Company,319
a majority of the Court, speaking through Chief Justice Rehnquist,
rejected the Commission's position that it could regulate the
employment practices of United States employers who employ
United States citizens abroad. Without any reference to Commercial
Office Products, and over strong disagreement from Justice Scalia
and Justice Marshall,32 the Chief Justice found that the degree of
deference due to Commission interpretations was governed by
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., and that the Commission's interpretation in
this case was not entitled to deference under that test. Some courts
relied on the decision in Commercial Office Products during this
period, but the conflict in reasoning between the two cases does not
seem to have had much effect on the lower federal courts as they
continued to struggle with the early right-to-sue letter issue.
For example, in Rolark v. University of Chicago Hospitals,32'
which was decided in 1988, Judge Moran of the Northern District of
Illinois noted the settled division of authority among the district
courts in other circuits and the fact that "[t]he only court of appeals
to squarely reach the issue [the Ninth Circuit] decided that the early
issuance of the notice of complainant's right to bring suit is in
accordance with [Section] 706(f)(1)."322 Judge Moran also noted that
316. Id., 108 S. Ct. at 1671.
317. Id., 108 S. Ct. at 1671.
318. Id. at 125-26, 108 S. Ct. at 1676-77.
319. 499 U.S. 244, 111 S. Ct. 1227 (1991).
320. Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment. Id. at259-60, 111 S. Ct. at 1236-
37. Justice Marshall, with whom Justice Blackmun and Justice Stevens joined,
dissented. Id. at 260-78, 111 S. Ct. at 1237-46.
321. 688 F. Supp. 401 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
322. Arguably, the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits had come quite close to
addressing the issue, although indirectly. See Miller v. International Paper Co., 408
F.2d 283, 290 (5th Cir. 1969) (stating substantive rights of victim are not affected
by EEOC inaction or action); Sims v. Trus Joist MacMillan, 22 F.3d 1059, 1060
(11 th Cir. 1994) ("hold[ing] that early issuance of a notice of right to sue based on
the Commission's certification that it will be unable to process the charge within
180 days does not preclude a claimant from filing an action in federal court").
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"[a]pparently no court in this jurisdiction has resolved the conflict."323
In a footnote, Judge Moran observed that the Commission's regulation
was "noted and not criticized by the Supreme Court in Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission v. AssociatedDry Goods Corp.
... and by three justices in Kamberos v. GTE Automatic Electric, Inc.
... (Justices White, Brennan and Marshall, dissenting from a denial of
certiorari), although in neither instance was validity of the regulation
an issue before the court. 324
After briefly reviewing some of the major authorities on both sides
of the question, Judge Moran concluded that the "1 80-day time period
does not operate as an absolute jurisdictional bar. '325 Judge Moran
noted that the rights of plaintiffs should not be made to depend on the
action or inaction of administrative officials, and further observed:
While Congress showed clear preference for conciliatory
efforts at the administrative level prior to suit in federal court,
there is nothing in the Act which prohibits the EEOC from
relinquishing its jurisdiction. Further, defendant's use of
[Section] 706(f)(1) as a shield for employers charged with
discrimination turns the purpose of that section on its head.
The 180-day period was intended to afford victims of
employment discrimination a private cause of action where the
EEOC does not act, or does not act in a timely fashion. The
EEOC's regulation simply recognizes that the caseload will
sometimes be so heavy that it can be determined early on that
no action can be taken within 180 days and the issuance of an
early right-to-sue letter is a reasonable implementation of the
Act. We do not think that Congress has so clearly resolved the
dispute that the EEOC, which has been delegated the authority
to administer Title VII claims, has been proscribed from filling
gaps that the Act has left open. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 81 L.
Ed. 2d 694, 104 S. Ct. 2778 (1984).326
323. Rolark, 688 F. Supp. at 403. In the period between Chevron and Martini,
at least four other judges of the Northern District of Illinois subsequently decided
cases in which they concurred in the analysis offered by Judge Moran in Rolark.
See, e.g., Fischer v. Medical Imaging Corp. of Am., 57 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH)
P41,165 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (Grady, J.); Martinez v. Labelmaster, No. 96C4189, 1996
WL 580893 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 4, 1996) (Plunkett, J.); Baker v. Gardner, Carton &
Douglas, No. 97C2649, 1997 WL 781712 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 12, 1997) (Gettleman, J.);
Advani v. Andrew Corp., No. 96 C 7628, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3526 (N.D. Ill.
Mar. 12, 1999) (Williams, J.). Additional cases were decided after Martini. See
infra notes 355-57.
324. Rolark, 688 F. Supp. at 403 n.2 (citations omitted).
325. Id. at 404.
326. Id.
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At first blush, Judge Moran's reliance on Chevron seems
perfunctory, even an afterthought; there is no extended analysis or
division of the issue into the familiar "step 1" and "step 2" phases of
the inquiry. On the other hand, although Judge Moran's analysis is
largely directed to an evaluation of the pre-Chevron case law relevant
to the precise issue presented, the court's approach and ultimate
determination are consistent with the spirit of Chevron. Clearly, the
court believes that this is a decision concerning agency procedure that
is best left to the agency, absent compelling evidence that Congress
intended to the contrary:
Finally, since the rule comes from the EEOC, not this court,
we disagree with the authorities.., describing the allowance
of an early right-to-sue letter as unwarranted judicial
modification of the Act. It is up to the EEOC to decide how
to efficiently administer the Act, and unless its decisions
contravene congressional intent we must afford them
deference. Given the remedial aims of the Act and the
specific purpose behind [Section] 706(f)(1), we do not think
Congress intended to force victims of discrimination to
undergo further delay when the district director has
determined such delay to be unnecessary.32 7
327. Id. Finally, the Rolark court also concluded that the 180-day challenge was
effectively moot because the time taken up by the briefing and decision of the
motion to dismiss had overtaken the shortfall in the time allotted to the completion
of the administrative process. Id. Accord Rosario v. Copacabana Night Club, Inc.,
77 Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 463 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Lemke v. International Total
Servs., Inc., 56 F. Supp. 2d 472 (D.N.J. 1999). Other courts have taken the
opposite view, finding that it is not the mere lapse of time, but the lapse of time
during which the matter is actually committed to agency jurisdiction that is critical.
See, e.g., Wilk v. Intercontinental Hotel ofN.Y., No. 92 Civ. 2068(TPG), 1993 WL
88230 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 1993); Meredith v. National Bus. Coll., Corp., No. 97-
003 1-R, 1997 U.S. Dist. Lexis 12677 (W.D. Va. July 28, 1997). As in Martini,
those courts have insisted on remand to the Commission for whatever time remains
in the 180-day period, measured from the date on which the right-to-sue letter was
"improperly" issued regardless of the amount of time that has been devoted to the
litigation of the federal court action. See, e.g., Martini v. Fannie Mae, 178 F.3d
1336, 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1999). See also Olszewski v. Bloomberg, L.P., No. 96 Civ.
3393(RRP), 1997 WL 375690 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 1997) (observing that court's prior
practice has been to permit early right-to-sue letter cases to go forward, but that
increased volume of such cases has caused reconsideration of that policy).
Similarly, in White v. Federal Express Corp., 729 F. Supp. 1536 (E.D. Va. 1990),
the court held that receipt of a right-to-sue letter was a jurisdictional prerequisite
to suit, but that a suit filed before the expiration of the 180-day period, and without
the issuance of a right-to-sue letter, would not be dismissed where the letter had
been issued and received, and the 180-day period had already passed. On the other
hand, in Chandler v. Fast Lane, Inc., 868 F. Supp. 1138, 1140-42 (E.D. Ark.
1994), the court appeared not to appreciate the significance of the questions raised
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Judge Merhige of the Eastern District of Virginia reached the
same conclusion in Hicks v. Maruchan Virginia, Inc.328 After
acknowledging the substantial difference of opinion on the issue
among the courts, Judge Merhige noted that the Commission was
specifically authorized by its enabling legislation to issue procedural
regulations, such as Section 1601.28(a)(2), and that such regulations
must be upheld under Commercial Office Products and Chevron, "so
long as [they are] reasonably related to the purposes of Title VII" and
do not "clearly contradict[] the [statutory] language or intent. '3 29
Judge Merhige also found that the "twenty-year split among the
district courts demonstrates that reasonable minds can differ over the
language and intent" of the statutory section, and the Commission's
interpretation of the section therefore "warrants deference in the
absence of a specific statutory prohibition of 'early' right-to-sue
letters."33 He concluded: "It is the opinion of the Court that just as
the timely filing of a charge is not ajurisdictional prerequisite, neither
is the requirement that the right-to-sue notice be issued after the
expiration of 180 days." '331
In Sims v. Trus Joist MacMillan,332 which was decided in 1994,
the Eleventh Circuit joined the Ninth Circuit in upholding a Title VII
plaintiffs right to file a civil action based upon an "early" right-to-
sue letter which had been issued with a "certification that it will be
unable to process the charge within 180 days." '333 In Sims, the
Commission had received the plaintiff's charge on March 20, 1992,
and, pursuant to his request, issued a right-to-sue letter on March 31,
1992, when it "certified that the charge would not be processed within
180 days."334 Sims filed his civil action on June 26, 1992, and the
district court dismissed the complaint for want of subject matter
with respect to the issuance of a right-to-sue letter prior to the expiration of the
180-day period.
328. No. 3:96CV549, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13754 (E.D. Va. Sept. 3, 1996).
329. Id. at *6-7.
330. Id. at *7.
331. Id. at *9. A number of other courts reached the same result during this
period, without shedding much additional light on the subject. See e.g. Hollis v.
Johnston-Tombigbee Furniture Mfg. Co., No. 1:93CV346-D-D, 1994 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 21197 (N.D. Miss. Dec. 21, 1994); Beaver v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am.,
No. 94-4181-DES, 1995 WL 670119 (D. Kan. Oct. 20, 1995); Cortes v.
McDonald's Corp., 955 F. Supp. 531 (E.D.N.C. 1996); Parker v. Noble Roman's,
Inc., No. IP-96-65-C-D/F, 1996 WL 453572 (S.D. Ind. June 26, 1996); Figueira v.
Black Entm't Television, Inc., 944 F. Supp. 299 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Palumbo v.
Lufthansa German Airlines, No. 98 Civ. 5005(HB), 1999 WL 540446 (S.D.N.Y.
July 26, 1999). Many of these cases did not even mention Chevron.
332. 22 F.3d 1059 (1lth Cir. 1994).
333. Id. at 1060.
334. Id.
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jurisdiction, holding that the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction
over charges of discrimination for 180 days.335 The court of appeals
reversed, holding that the 180-day period is not jurisdictional, but a
time period in the nature of a statute of limitations subject to equitable
modification.
Unlike many of the other cases considered above, the Eleventh
Circuit in Sims began its consideration of the issues with a statement of
the standards of review which it believed to be applicable, and thus
ostensibly provided a structure for its analysis.336 The district court's
opinion was subject to de novo review, the court noted, because the
dismissal of a case for want of subject matter jurisdiction presents a
question of law. On the other hand, the court noted that under EEOC
v. Commercial Office Products Co. ," the Commission's interpretation
of Title VII was entitled to deference, so long as it is "reasonable." 338
The court of appeals also made clear the reason for according deference
to the Commission's determinations in these circumstances:
In enacting Title VII, Congress charged the Commission with
the responsibility to enforce the statute and vested it with the
authority "to issue, amend, or rescind suitable procedural
regulations to carry out the provisions of this subchapter."...
A regulation promulgated pursuant to section 713(a) must be
upheld "so long as it is 'reasonably related to the purposes of
the enabling legislation."' Mourning v. Family Publications
Service, Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 369, [93 S. Ct. 1652, 1660-61](1973). See EEOC v. Commercial Office Products Company,
486 U.S. at 115, [108 S. Ct. at 1671] . . . (EEOC's
interpretation of statute "need only be reasonable to be entitled
to deference").
335. Id. ("The district court also held that the running of the 180 days should be
tolled from the date on which the EEOC issued its right-to-sue notice").
336. There are several instances in which the court departs from this structure.
For example, immediately after providing this introduction, the court embarks upon
a discussion of Grimes v. Pitney Bowes, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1381 (N.D. Ga. 1979),
the key district court precedent upon which the lower court relied, and points out
that that decision is entitled to little weight because it was decided before the
Supreme Court's decision in Zipes v. TransworldAirlines, 455 U.S. 385, 393, 102
S. Ct. 1127, 1132 (1982), and the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Fouche v. Jekyll-Island-State ParkA uthority, 713 F.2d 1518, 1524 (11 th Cir. 1983), had established
that compliance with time limits prescribed by Title VII is notjurisdictional. Sims,
22 F.3d at 1061. Thus, almost in an aside, the court of appeals held that the district
court erred in dismissing the complaint on the ground that the issuance of the early
right-to-sue letter had deprived it of subject matter jurisdiction. Id.
337. 486 U.S. 107, 115, 108 S. Ct. 1666, 1671 (1988).
338. Sims, 22 F.3d at 1060-61. The court did not mention the Supreme Court's
intervening decision in EEOC v. Arabian American Oil, 499 U.S. 244, 111 S. Ct.
1227 (1991).
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The regulation codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(a)(2) is such a
procedural regulation and is consistent with congressional
intent. The regulation states that when the Commission is
unable to complete processing of the charge within 180 days,
it may issue right to sue letters to charging parties....
The language and history of the statute reveal that this
regulation is fully consistent with the purpose of section
706(0(1) ....
The language of this section clearly states that if the
Commission dismisses the charge or if 180 days pass without
action by the Commission, the charging party must be so
notified and may then bring suit within 90 days. However, the
statute on its face does not prohibit the Commission from
issuing a right to sue letter before the 180 days have expired.339
Drawing heavily from the analysis contained in such previous
decisions as Rolark and Cattell, the court easily concluded that the
Commission's interpretation was supported both by the statutory
language and by the legislative history relating to the 180-day period.3
While preferring voluntary settlement to litigation, Congress
nonetheless thought that "[tihe primary concern must be protection of
the aggrieved person's option to seek a prompt remedy in the best
manner possible. 3 41  Thus, the court explained: "When the
Commission cannot process a claimant's charge within the prescribed
time period and certifies that it is unable to process such charge, the
avenue for a 'prompt remedy' is through the courts .... [N]o legitimate
purpose is served by forcing delay.' ' 42 Although the court relied on
Commercial Office Products, it made no mention of Chevron in its
opinion.343
The Southern District ofNew York reached the opposite conclusion
in Henschke v. New York Hospital-Cornell Medical Center,3 44 which
339. Id. at 1062 (citations omitted).
340. Id. at 1062-63.
341. Id. at 1063 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 92-238 at 8 (1972), reprinted in 1972
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 2144).
342. Id.
343. The Eleventh Circuit had occasion two years later to explore further the
meaning of equitable modification in this context. In Forehand v. Florida State
Hospital at Chatahoochee, 89 F.3d 1562 (1 1th Cir. 1996), the court held that
compliance with the 180-day requirement would not be excused in the case of a
plaintiffwho refused to cooperate with the Commission's processing of her charge.
Id. at 1570. Her failure to cooperate, the court said, "disentitled her to equitable
modification," and required her to exhaust her claims administratively before being
allowed to sue in federal court. Id.
344. 821 F. Supp. 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
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was decided in 1993, the year before Sims was decided. Like the
courts in Rolark, Hicks, and Sims, the Henschke court recognized
the existence of a significant split in the lower federal courts on this
issue, as well as the fact that the Ninth Circuit (at that time the only
court of appeals to have decided the question directly) had
repeatedly construed Section 706(0(1) to permit the issuance of
right-to-sue letters prior to the expiration of the 180-day period.345
In this instance, however, there was no dearth of district court
authority in the Second Circuit, and the Henshke court seems to
have been most impressed by the fact that "[p]rior district court
decisions within the Second Circuit are in direct conflict with the
Ninth Circuit's [decisions]. 346  According to the court, "the
issuance of an early right-to-sue letter does 'present ajurisdictional
deficiency requiring suspension and a remand ofplaintiff's Title VII
claims to the EEOC. ' 347 The Henschke court also rejected the
plaintiff's suggestion that it should "defer to the power of the EEOC
to interpret Title VII because due weight must be given to the
'contemporaneous construction of a statute by the agency charged
with its administration .... "',348 No such deference was possible,
the court said, when the agency's interpretation was directly
contrary to congressional intent, which was the case here, because
[t]he language of section 2000e-5(f)(1) explicitly requires
that one of two events occur before the issuance of a right-
to-sue letter: either (i) the EEOC must dismiss the complaint[sic]; or (ii) 180 days must have run from the filing of the
charges with the EEOC during which time the EEOC has
taken no action.349
According to the court, there was no need to answer the argument
that requiring a plaintiff to wait 180 days would constitute "an
injustice which contradicts the intent of Title VII. ' '350 The court
concluded:
[G]iven the Congressional mandate that Title VII claims can
only be filed after a dismissal of the charges by the EEOC
or the lapsing of 180 days without action by the EEOC, this
345. Id. at 170.
346. Id.
347. Id. (quoting True v. N.Y. State Dep't of Corrections, 613 F. Supp. 27, 29(W.D.N.Y. 1984)).348. Id. (quoting North Haven Bd. of Ed. v. Hufstedler, 629 F.2d 773 (2d Cir.1980), aff'd sub nom, North Haven Bd. of Ed. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 102 S. Ct.
1912 (1982)).
349. Henschke, 821 F. Supp. at 170.
350. Id. at 171.
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Court has no alternative but to grant the relief sought by the
defendants on the Title VII cause of action.51
Significantly, the court never mentioned Chevron.352
E. The Post-Martini Cases: Innovation and Stasis
During the period from the Martini decision in July 1999 until
December 2000, approximately twenty-five more cases were
reported. With the exception of one appellate case (an officially
unreported Second Circuit decision available on Westlaw353), all of
351. Id.
352. Three additional cases fromthis period deserve some mention. InMontoya
v. Valencia County, 872 F. Supp. 904 (D.N.M. 1994), the District of New Mexico
also held that it lacked jurisdiction over a case in which the Commission had issued
an early right-to-sue letter in accordance with its regulation. Citing Chevron, the
court noted two relevant rules of judicial review. First, the court noted that "the
[c]ourt owes deference to an agency's reasonable interpretation of a statute." Id.
at 905. Second, "where an agency's statutory interpretation is manifestly contrary
to congressional intent, the Court must reject it." Id. According to the Montoya
court, the Commission's regulation was invalid because Section 706(f)(1) clearly
"authorizes suit only after either the EEOC dismisses the charge, or after the EEOC
has not filed a civil action or executed a conciliation agreement within 180 days."
Id. According to the court, this section authorizes early right-to-sue letters only
when a charge has been dismissed, and "makes no allowance for excusing
compliance on grounds of administrative infeasibility." Id. at 906. In reaching this
conclusion, the court relied principally on the Supreme Court's dictum in
Occidental Life, and on its interpretation of Congress's preference for resolving
Title VII claims through voluntary compliance. Id. at 905-06. Finally, the court
expressed sympathy for the difficulties faced by the Commission, but observed that
the Commission "may not excuse itself from carrying out its duties by
administrative fiat." The court further observed that "[t]he Commission must look
to Congress to amend the statute or otherwise ease its regulatory burden." Id. That
may well be correct, but the observation seems somehow ironic in the context of
judicial review of action taken pursuant to an administrative regulation that had
been in effect for almost twenty years. In Robinson v. Red Rose Communications,
Inc., 77 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 379 (E.D. Pa. 1998), Judge McGlynn of the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania also held that a Title VII plaintiff could not file
suit before the expiration of the 180-day period. Finally, in Pearce v. Barry Sable
Diamonds, 912 F. Supp. 149 (E.D. Pa. 1996), Judge Dallzell of the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania indicated that he would have invalidated the regulation if he had
been "writing on a blank slate," although he did not explain why that would have
been the case. Id. at 151. Because the Third Circuit had previously "frowned on
the regulation, albeit in dicta," the district court determined that the issue should
be certified to the court of appeals. Id. (There was also a related proceeding at
US. Metal & Coin & Jewelry Co. v. Jewelers Mut. Ins. Co., No. 96-846, 1996 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 12388 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 26, 1996).).
353. See Arroyo v. WestLB Admin., Inc., 213 F.3d 625 (table), No. 99-7942,
2000 WL 562425 (2d Cir. May 9, 2000). In Arroyo, the Second Circuit rejected
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these decisions came from the district courts. In all but a handful,
the courts rejected the holding in Martini and upheld the
regulation.354 It is clear, nonetheless, that the court in Martini
powerfully redefined the problem and moved the center of doctrinal
debate. It did this by asserting that the regulation was not
inconsistent with Section 706(f)(1), but with Section 706(b).
In several cases representing outcomes on both sides of the issue,
the decision in Martini seems to have provided a strong stimulus for
reconsidering the question; several of these decisions reflect a more
serious effort to come to grips with the central problem. On the other
hand, many of the cases contain little sustained legal analysis,
apparently coming to one result or the other based primarily on the
decisions of other courts.355 In some cases, the writing judge seems
to have been impressed by the decision of anotherjudge, often sitting
plaintiffs appeal from an order granting the defendants' motion for summaryjudgment. Among other things, the plaintiff based his appeal on the argument that
the judgment below was void because the district court lacked jurisdiction over his
complaint, which was based on an early right-to-sue letter. Arroyo made this
argument for the first time on appeal. In its summary order, the court of appeals
noted that it had not previously decided whether a court may entertain a Title VII
action when the Commission has issued a right-to-sue letter prior to the expiration
of the statutory period. The infirmity, if any, was not jurisdictional in nature,however, and the point had not therefore been preserved for appeal. Thus, the
court was not required to answer "this complicated question" in this case. Id. at *4.
354. In an additional case, an employer challenged the Commission's issuance
of a right-to-sue letter some sixty-nine days after the filing of the plaintiffs
administrative charge. See Tesfaye v. Carr Park, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 2d 37 (D.D.C.
2000). Unlike Martini, however, the Commission also dismissed the administrative
charge, finding that "[d]iscrimination based on race or national origin does not
appear to be in evidence." Id. at 38 (alteration in original). The district court
upheld the validity of the right-to-sue letter in these circumstances, but certified the
question for immediate appeal. Id. at 39.
355. In Parker v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority, 97 F. Supp. 2d 437,(S.D.N.Y. 2000), for example, the court briefly summarized the arguments on both
sides of the issue and then stated that:
In view of the well-known fact that the EEOC and state administrative
agencies are so overwhelmed with charges that they could not possibly
investigate more than a small fraction of them within 180 days, I find
the Sims-Saulsbury line of cases to be the more persuasive [and]
therefore decline to grant Defendants' motions on the ground of failure
to exhaust administrative remedies.
Id. at 445. The court adopted a similar approach in Hussein v. Pierre Hotel, No.
99 Civ. 2715(DC), 2000 WL 776920 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2000). Similarly, in West
v. Merillat Industries, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 558 (W.D. Va. 2000), Hammer v. ISS-
International Service System, Inc., No. 99 Civ. 2992, 2000 WL 565115 (S.D.N.Y.
May 8, 2000), and Kahn v. Objective Solutions, Intl., 86 F. Supp. 2d 377, 379(S.D.N.Y. 2000), the courts placed primary reliance on Figueira v. Black
Entertainment Television, Inc., 944 F. Supp. 299 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), without
addressing the new arguments made in Martini three years later.
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in the same district, 356 and many doubtless shared the sentiment
expressed by Judge Sweet of the Southern District of New York,
namely, that "[t]o add unnecessarily to these divergent lines of
authority would simply be an act of hubris. '357 After so many years
of litigation concerning this threshold question, and so many
decisions by so many judges, some judges must have wondered
whether, notwithstanding the wrinkle added by Martini, there was
anything new to be said on the subject.358
To the extent that Martini reframed the terms of the debate about
early right-to-sue letters, the new debate was a narrow one. After all,
356. For example, several post-Martini cases were decided by judges of the
Southern District of New York. See Parker v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 97 F.
Supp. 2d 437 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (McMahon, J.); Kahn v. Objective Solutions, Int'l.,
86 F. Supp. 2d 377 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (Sweet, J.); Nodelman v. Gruner & Jahr USA
Publ'g, No. 98 Civ. 1231,2000 WL 502858 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2000) (McKenna,
J.); Hammer v. ISS-International Serv. Sys., Inc., No. 99 Civ. 2992, 2000 WL
565115 (S.D.N.Y. May 8,2000) (Pauley, J.); Huang v. Gruner & Jahr USA Publ'g,
No. 99 Civ. 5058, 2000 WL 640660 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22,2000) (Cote, J.); Deas v.
Volunteers of America, 98 F. Supp. 2d 464 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (Rakoff, J.); Hussein
v. Pierre Hotel, No. 99 Civ. 2715, 2000 WL 776920 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2000)
(Chin, J.). In all but one of them, the early right-to-sue letter was sustained, and
each cited, as either conclusive or strongly persuasive, the 1996 opinion of Judge
Mukasey in Figueira v. Black Entertainment Television, Inc., 944 F. Supp. 299
(S.D.N.Y. 1996). Only in Deas v. Volunteers of America, 98 F. Supp. 2d 464
(S.D.N.Y. 2000), did the court fail to follow the other decisions of the district. In
Deas, Judge Rakoff held that the validity of the regulation was not at issue in the
case due to the fact that the Commission had not followed it in any event:
While its Notice recited that EEOC Director Spencer Lewis had
"determined that it [was] unlikely that the EEOC [would] be able to
complete its administrative processing within 180 days from the filing of
this charge" and that the EEOC was therefore "terminating its processing
of the charge," the record is clear that Director Lewis never made any
such determination particular to this case and that the EEOC never
processed the charge in any meaningful respect.
Id. at 466. According to the court, "in this case the Notice was a sham." Id.
357. Kahn v. Objective Solutions, Intl., 86 F. Supp. 2d 377, 379 (S.D.N.Y.
2000).
358. Thus, in Thomas v. Bet Sound-Stage Restaurant/Brettco, 61 F. Supp. 2d
448 (D. Md. 1999), the court simply noted the split in the circuits, as well as the
absence of controlling Fourth Circuit precedent, before resolving the issue by
stating that "this [c]ourt finds the reasoning as set forth in the Ninth and Eleventh
Circuits' opinions to be convincing." Id. at 459. Similarly, in Hall v. Flightsafety,
International, 106 F. Supp. 2d 1171 (D. Kan. 2000), the court gave scant
consideration either to Martini or to Shepherd v. UnitedStates Olympic Committee,
94 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1145 (D. Colo. 2000), another district court decision from the
Tenth Circuit following Martini. The court mentioned the decisions but simply
indicated that it found the rationale of the Ninth, Eleventh, and Second Circuits to
be "persuasive." Hall, 106 F. Supp. at 1182. Because of the existence of serial
administrative charges, the court placed particular emphasis on the Second
Circuit's decision in Weise v. Syracuse University, 522 F.2d 397, 412 (2d Cir.
1975).
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the Martini court found that "[n]othing in section 2000e-5(f)(1)'s
language forecloses [the] view that the 180-day provision is
simply a maximum, not minimum, waiting period for
complainants seeking access to federal court." '359 Nor did the court
discover anything in the structure, context, or legislative history
of this section to call that conclusion into question.3 60 Indeed, the
Martini court observed that it probably would have adopted the
view of the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits if, like those courts, it had
terminated its inquiry after reviewing the language and legislative
history of Section 706(f)(1). 3 6' Finally, the Martini court did not
believe that compliance with the 180-day period was ajurisdictional prerequisite to suit. 362
359. Martini v. Federal National Mortgage Ass'n, 178 F.3d 1336, 1344 (D.C.
Cit. 1999). As Judge Ellis noted in Lauricia v. Microstrategy, Inc., 114 F. Supp.
2d 489, 495 (E.D. Va. 2000), Section 706(0(1) is clear as to when a right-to-sue
letter must issue, but not with respect to when the issuance of a right-to-sue letter
is impermissible:
[N]othing in the statutory language addresses or limits whether the EEOC
may issue a right-to-sue letter prior to the expiration of the 180-day
period. Had Congress intended such a result, they could easily have done
so explicitly, by stating that right-to-sue letters will issue only in the
circumstances prescribed, namely dismissal of the administrative
complaint or expiration of the 180-day period.
Id. (emphasis in original).
360. Martini, 178 F.3d at 1344-45.
361. Martini, 178 F.3d at 1345 (citations omitted):
Thus, neither section 2000e-5(f)(1)'s language nor the legislative history
cited by Fannie Mae reveals "the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress" on "the precise question at issue" in this case. If our inquiry
were to end here, we likely would agree with the Ninth and Eleventh
Circuits that the early right-to-sue regulation does not violate section
2000e-5(f)(1). Under Chevron's first step, however, we have a duty to
conduct an 'independent examination" of the statute in question, looking
not only "to the particular statutory language at issue," but also to "the
language and design of the statute as a whole."
In this sense, the Martini court effectively rejected the reasoning of the many
district courts that previously had held that the Commission lacked the power to
issue right-to-sue letters prior to the expiration of the 180-day period. See also
King v. Dunn Mem'l Hosp., 120 F. Supp. 2d 752, 755, 757 (S.D. Ind. 2000):
In a thorough and painstaking opinion .... the [Martini] court actually
rejected most of the employer's arguments against 29 C.F.R. §
1601.28(a)(2) and observed ambiguities in Title VII's language and
legislative history .... This court finds much of the Martini opinion
persuasive... However, the final step in the court's analysis, in which the
court turned away from Section 2000e-5(f)(1) and the effects of an early
right-to-sue letter on the recipient of that letter, and focused exclusively
on Section 2000e-5(b) and on the policy goal of bringing long-term
pressure to bear on the agency and Congress, goes beyond a persuasive
application of Chevron principles.
362. Martini, 178 F.3d at 1348.
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Only when the Martini court examined "the language and design
of the statute as a whole," 6 ' and focused on the language of Section
706(b), providing that "the Commission 'shall' investigate the
charge and 'shall' make a reasonable cause determination 'as
promptly as possible and, so far as practicable, not later than one
hundred and twenty days from the filing of the charge,"' 3a did the
Martini court determine that the Commission's regulation could not
be sustained. The court found that the Commission's duty to
investigate was "both mandatory and unqualified," '65 and incapable
of being "square[d]" with the Commission's practice of "early
termination of the process or the regulation authorizing it." ' The
court concluded that "the EEOC's power to authorize private suits
within 180 days undermines its express statutory duty to investigate
every charge filed, as well as Congress's unambiguous policy of
encouraging informal resolution of charges up to the 180th day. '367
For those courts that accepted the Martini court's reformulation of
the issue, the new question for decision was clear: whether Section
706(b) required a result that was not required by Section 706(f)(1).
In Stetz v. Reeher Enterprises, Inc.,368 Judge McAvoy of the
Northern District of New York, adopted the holding in Martini, and
found that "the issuance of a right-to-sue letter by the EEOC prior
to investigating a plaintiffs claims is inconsistent with the clear
statutory mandate set forth in section 2000e-5(b). ' ' 369 According to
Judge McAvoy,
[T]he issuance of a right-to-sue letter before the EEOC is
permitted to investigate a plaintiff's allegation and attempt
conciliation would result in an emasculation of the clear
statutory language of Title VII and the Congressional policy
underlying Title VII, which is aimed at having the EEOC,
rather than the courts, resolving disputes involving unlawful
employment practices.37 °
363. Id. at 1345 (quoting K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281,291,108
S. Ct. 1811, 1818 (1988)).
364. Id. at 1346 (quoting Section 706(b) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b)
(1993)).
365. Id. at 1346.
366. Id.
367. Id. at 1347.
368. 70 F. Supp. 2d 119 (N.D.N.Y. 1999). Three of the plaintiffs filed their
administrative charges on November 2, 1998, and they received right-to-sue letters
on November 24, 1998. The fourth plaintiff filed her charge on November 18,
1998, and she received her right-to-sue letter on December 2, 1998. Id. at 120.
369. Id. at 123.
370. Id.
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In the case at bar, the court noted, one of the plaintiffs had requested
a right-to-sue letter before filing her administrative charge, and all of
the plaintiffs had received right-to-sue letters within three weeks of
filing their charges.37 Thus, the court felt confident in stating that
"no meaningful investigation ofplaintiffs' claims was conducted, and
no serious attempt to resolve the dispute was undertaken prior to
initiating an action in federal court."3 72 Interpreting the statute so as
to permit "such early private suits is plainly inconsistent with the
express language in Title VII, and works to undermine the purpose
and effectiveness of the statute." '373 Finally, the court concluded that,
"absent dismissal, the 180-day requirement in section 2000e-5(f)(1),
read in conjunction with section 2000e-5(b)'s mandate that an
investigation be conducted, clearly prohibits the issuance of a right-
to-sue letter prior to the expiration of 180 days following the filing of
the administrative complaint." '374 The court's opinion assumes that
Section 706(b) generally requires an investigation of a particular kind
and extent, but the opinion does not elaborate on those requirements
for the simple reason that the statute itself does not. The opinion also
assumes that those requirements were not met here, whatever they
might be.375
Judge Spatt of the Eastern District of New York reached a similar
result in Rodriguez v. Connection Technology Inc. ,376 although he
initially framed the question as jurisdictional, asking "whether the
Court presently has jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claims despite the
fact that the EEOC issued an early right-to-sue letter. 3 77 Judge Spatt
found that the court's analysis in Martini was persuasive and
provided "a fundamental basis to conclude that the EEOC lacks the
authority to issue early right-to-sue notices. 3 7' The court also
371. Id. at 124.
372. Id.
373. Id. at 125.
374. Id.
375. Id. at 123-25.
376. 65 F. Supp. 2d 107 (E.D.N.Y. 1999). In Rodriguez, the plaintiff filed her
charge of discrimination on October 14, 1998, and received a right-to-sue letter on
November 30, 1998. Id. at 109. She apparently was advised by the Commission
that it was "unlikely that the EEOC [will] be able to complete its administrative
processing within 180 days from the filing of [the] charge," and she thereafter
requested and received a right-to-sue letter. Id.
377. Id. at 109.
378. Id. at 110. Although the court noted the many district court decisions that
reached the same conclusion, the court did not note that the reasoning of those
cases was often quite different from the reasoning in Martini. The court also noted
that the Second Circuit's holding in Weise v. Syracuse University, 522 F.2d 397,
412 (2d Cir. 1975), was both limited and inapplicable to the present case.
Rodriguez, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 111-12.
420 [Vol. 62
BARRY SULLIVAN
attempted to bolster its conclusion by relying on Judge Patterson's
opinion in Olszewski v. Bloomberg L.P.379  In that case, Judge
Patterson had observed that the number of cases involving early right-
to-sue letters had increased, thus suggesting that:
[T]he EEOC has become indiscriminate in its issuance of
these early notices, is not attempting to resolve disputes
between the parties, and is ignoring its statutory obligations
to review claims before they get to federal court, in order to
unload its backlog of Title VII cases on the courts ... [and,
thus,] frustrating the concept of a two-tier resolution of such
cases as envisioned by Congress.80
Finally, in Simler v. Harrison County Hospital,3"' Chief Judge
Barker of the Southern District of Indiana accepted, in part, the
reasoning of Martini. Judge Barker did not analyze the issues
independently under Chevron, but started from the analysis contained
in Martini. On that basis, Judge Barker was persuaded that previous
decisions had failed to give appropriate attention to the Commission's
duty to investigate under Section 706(b)." 2 On the other hand, and
unlike the courts in Stetz and Rodriguez, Judge Barker did not believe
that the Commission's duty to investigate and attempt conciliation
necessarily required it to maintain on its docket for at least 180 days
all charges that were neither dismissed nor conciliated. According to
Judge Barker, the proper focus was not "on the passage of time, [but]
on the actions of the EEOC."38 Thus, if the Commission had been
able to complete its investigation in fewer than 180 days, a right-to-
sue letter presumably could have issued. In Judge Barker's view,
379. No. 96 Civ. 3393, 1997 WL 375690 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 1997).
380. Rodriguez, 65 F.Supp.2d at 112 (quoting Olszewski, 1997 WL 375690, at
*4). In two other cases, the courts ruled against the plaintiffs with even less
analysis. In Shepherd v. United States Olympic Committee, 94 F. Supp. 2d 1136
(D. Colo. 2000), the District of Colorado indicated its agreement with the analysis
in Martini, that a right-to-sue letter issued before the expiration of 180 days is
invalid, and the resultant lawsuit untimely, because Section 706(b) mandates the
investigation of every charge. Id. The court further relied on its own prior decision
in Mills v. Jefferson Bank East, 559 F. Supp. 34 (D. Colo. 1983), but also indicated
its belief that the holding in that case, framed in jurisdictional terms, was no longer
technically correct. Significantly, the court described Section 706(b) as
"requir[ing] the EEOC to investigate the charge for at least 180 days before issuing
a right to sue notice." Shepherd, 94 F. Supp. 2d at 1143-44 (footnote omitted).
Finally, in Stafford v. Sealright, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 137 (N.D.N.Y. 2000), Judge
Mordue of the Northern District of New York simply recited the split of authority
and noted his agreement with the holdings in Stetz and Rodriguez. Id. at 138-39.
381. 110 F. Supp. 2d 886 (S.D. Ind. 2000).
382. Nor did he specifically consider what degree of deference, if any, might be
owed to the Commission's contrary interpretation of its statutory responsibilities.
383. Simler, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 888.
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however, an "investigation" required more from the Commission
than simply a determination that the Commission's caseload and
resources would likely prevent the Commission from completing an
investigation within 180 days. In effect, the duty to investigate, as
understood by Judge Barker, required the Commission to make an
actual investigation into the merits of "evey charge filed with it
that does not warrant dismissal on its face."3  Judge Barker did not
explain what type of investigation, let alone how much
investigation, would be sufficient to justify the issuance of a right-
to-sue letter in fewer than 180 days. 33 Notwithstanding the fact that
he had remanded the case to the Commission for the purpose of
conducting such an investigation, Judge Barker felt justified in
leaving "for another day a determination of what type of
investigation will meet statutory requirements. 316
Those who were not persuaded by Martini typically thought that
pointing to the Commission's duty to investigate was not sufficient
to alter the result reached by the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits. For
example, Judge Zagel of the Northern District of Illinois upheld the
Commission's interpretation in Berry v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,387
finding that the regulation was "a reasonable interpretation of an
ambiguous statutory provision. '38 In Berry, the Commission had
issued a right-to-sue letter twenty-six days after the filing of the
administrative charge of discrimination, based on the Commission's
determination "that it would be unable to complete the
administrative processing of the charge in less than 180 days. '389
One of the defendants moved to dismiss on the ground that "Title
VII requires the EEOC to spend a minimum of 180 days
investigating each charge of employment discrimination before
issuing a right-to-sue letter. '390
384. Id. at 891.
385. The court recognized that its holding would "put considerable pressure on
the EEOC to improve the efficiency of its operations," and "more funding or a
change in the duties of the Commission may be in order." Id. The court left "these
matters to others to resolve," confident that its duties had been discharged through
its "analysis and decision that the obligations already imposed by Congress in 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) be complied with." Id. (citations omitted). In Commadori v.
LongIsland University, 89 F. Supp. 2d 353,382-83 (E.D.N.Y. 2000), which upheld
the regulation, the court dismissed such arguments, observing that they ignore the
realities of caseloads and funding levels, and suggested that the Commission
"cannot be cajoled into doing what it does not have the capacity to do." Id. at 382-
83.
386. Simler, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 891.
387. 75 F. Supp. 2d 890 (N.D. IUI. 1999).
388. Id. at 891.
389. Id.
390. Id.
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In the absence of apposite authority from the Seventh Circuit,
Judge Zagel applied the Chevron test.39' Even taking into account the
Commission's statutory duty to investigate, Judge Zagel did not
believe that the language and legislative history of Title VII
"unambiguously express an intent to create a minimum 180-day
investigation period, which is 'the precise question at issue."'392 Judge
Zagel wrote in Berry:
The Congressional intent is not as clear as Martini suggests.
The question is whether Congress unambiguously intended to
set a minimum waiting period of 180 days. As the Martini
court noted, "nothing in section 2000e-5(0(1)'s language
forecloses [the plaintiffs] view that the 180-day provision is
simply a maximum, not minimum, waiting period for
complainants seeking access to federal court." The statute only
says that if the EEOC has not acted in 180 days, it must issue
a right-to-sue letter; it does not expressly make agency inaction
for six months a condition precedent to the issuance ofall right-
to-sue letters. The text of the statute is ambiguous.
Contrary to [the defendant's] suggestion, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(b) does not resolve this ambiguity. That provision
requires the EEOC to "make an investigation" whenever a
charge is filed. In Martini, the court held that this mandatory
duty to investigate is a clear expression of Congressional intent
that cannot be reconciled with an early termination of EEOC
proceedings. While it is clear that the EEOC must investigate,
it is not clear that it must spend 180 days to do so. That is the
question here. Nothing in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) suggests that
Congress wanted to dictate the duration of every investigation
to the EEOC.
The legislative history cited in Martini does not establish a
clear Congressional intent to establish a 180-day minimum
investigation period. Arguments made with rhetorical flair on
the Senate floor suggested that the statute would force
complainants "necessarily to sit around awaiting six months"
and that it was a "180-day private filing restriction." These two
isolated comments are not attributed to the entire Congress.
Other evidence, particularly Congress's decision to use 180
days instead of 150 days, is also ambiguous; this could have
been a decision to increase the maximum, not the minimum,
amount of time allotted for an investigation.3 93
391. Of course, several judges of the Northern District of Illinois had spoken to
the issue before the District of Columbia's decision in Martini. See supra note 232.
392. Berry, 75 F. Supp. 2d at 892 (citation omitted).
393. Id. (citations and footnotes omitted).
2002] 423
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
Proceeding to the second step of the Chevron analysis, Judge
Zagel found that the regulation should be upheld as a "permissible
construction of the statute. 394 Judge Zagel emphasized that the
regulation does not permit the decision to issue an early right-to-sue
letter to be made in an arbitrary or undisciplined way. The decision
requires an official determination that the Commission probably will
not complete the processing of the administrative charge within 180
days, which is equivalent to a "finding that a right-to-sue letter is
likely to issue in any event. ' '39" Consistent with the Commission's
duty to investigate and pursue informal resolution of charges of
discrimination, the regulation "does not allow the wholesale
abandonment of the EEOC's mandate," but "requires the agency's
expert determination that a right-to-sue letter is probable. ' 396 In other
words, "[w]here further investigation or conciliation is unlikely to
prevent a right-to-sue letter from being issued (perhaps because the
EEOC's workload prohibits many investigations from being
completed within 180 days), the regulation allows the Commission
to move on to the next case." '' Taking into account the
Commission's "expertise in administering the statute," the court
thought that the regulation constituted "a permissible interpretation
of its obligations under Title VII. 398
Judge Hamilton of the Southern District of Indiana engaged in a
similar analysis in King v. Dunn Memorial Hospital.399 Like Judge
Zagel, Judge Hamilton noted that the inquiry was governed by
394. Id.
395. Id.
396. Id. at 892-93.
397. Id. at 893. In Simler v. Harrison County Hospital, 110 F. Supp. 2d 886
(S.D. Ind. 2000), Judge Barker agreed with Judge Zagel's conclusion that a right-
to-sue letter was not categorically precluded prior to the expiration of the 180-day
period, but Judge Barker did not believe that the Commission's duty to investigate
could be discharged in the manner suggested by Judge Zagel. Id. at 889-90.
According to Judge Barker, a determination that the Commission probably would
not be able to complete its investigation during the 180-day statutory period "is not
tantamount to an investigation of the charge," but "simply an evaluation that the
EEOC, an agency with an admittedly heavy caseload and comparatively few
resources, prefers not to begin an investigation that it estimates it cannot complete."
Id. at 890.
398. Berry, 75 F. Supp. 2d at 893. In Maple v. Publications International, Ltd.,
No. 99 C 6936, 2000 WL 85951 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 21, 2000), Judge Conlon of the
Northern District of Illinois reached the same result. In Johnson v. Cook
Composites and Polymers, Inc., No. Civ. A 99-4916, 2000 WL 249251 (D.N.J.
Mar. 3, 2000), the District of New Jersey relied extensively on the analysis
contained in Berry, as well as on the decision in Seybert v. West Chester University,
83 F. Supp. 2d 547 (E.D. Pa. 2000). In both cases, the courts considered those
decisions in the context of their Chevron analyses.
399. 120 F. Supp. 2d 752 (S.D. Ind. 2000).
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Chevron, the Seventh Circuit had not spoken to the precise question
at issue, and the case law was divided. In addition to analyzing the
issue under Chevron, Judge Hamilton gave considerable attention to
Martini and to Simler, the latter having been decided by another
judge of the Southern District of Indiana. Judge Hamilton closely
reviewed the opinion in Martini, noting that the court in that case had
"actually rejected most of the employer's arguments against 29
C.F.R. § 1601.28(a)(2) and observed ambiguities in Title VII's
language and legislative history."' ° According to Judge Hamilton,
however,
[T]he final step in the [Martini] court's analysis, in which the
court turned away from Section 2000e-5(f)(1) and the effects
of an early right-to-sue letter on the recipient of that letter and
focused exclusively [on] Section 2000e-5(b) and on the goal
of bringing long-term pressure to bear on the agency and
Congress[,] goes beyond a persuasive application of Chevron
principles. 0
Ultimately, the court concluded that Martini was inconsistent with a
proper application of Chevron:
Under Chevron, the court must ask "[f]irst, always ...
whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question
at issue." There is obviously some tension between Section
2000e-5(f)(1)'s grant of authority to dismiss a charge on the
180th day without regard for the status of the EEOC's
processing of the charge and Section 2000e-5(b)'s mandate
that the EEOC "shall investigate" every charge. This court is
not persuaded that Congress has directly addressed the precise
question at issue-whether an "aggrieved person" under Title
VII can obtain a right-to-sue letter and bring suit before the
EEOC has processed his charge for 180 days. The relevant
legislative history does not resolve the statutory ambiguity.
Congress was aware of the competing concerns when it
passed the statutory provisions in question.
By declaring an ambiguous record of congressional intent
unambiguous, the Martini decision embraced Congress's
policy preference for administrative resolution of complaints,
but it did so at the expense of other congressional policy
choices. Martini reflects an explicit policy choice to try to
bring pressure on the EEOC and Congress to speed up agency
400. Id. at 755.
401. Id. at 757. As the King court pointed out, the parties had not thought that
section 706(b) was relevant to the case, and that section had not been discussed in
the briefs. Id. at 756.
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action. The decision does so through the mechanism of
forcing many complaining parties to spend 180 futile days
waiting for agency action that everyone involved is confident
is not going to occur at all.
In other words, under Martini's reasoning, the way to
improve enforcement in the future is to penalize with futile
delay those who seek a remedy today. This court respectfully
disagrees. The Martini analysis goes beyond statutory
interpretation and instead intrudes into the agency's
responsibility for balancing its limited resources with
expanding responsibilities. This approach strikes at the very
heart of Chevron deference. Where congressional intent on
the precise issue at hand is unclear, as it is here, the court may
not "simply impose its own construction on the statute, as
would be necessary in the absence of an administrative
interpretation." Instead, the court must defer to an agency
regulation if it is reasonable ....
The EEOC regulation .. is a reasonable response to
rapidly growing caseloads that is consistent with the policy
balance struck by Congress in Title VII. If a complaining
party and attorney are prepared to pursue their case without
the assistance of an EEOC investigation (one that can take
many months or longer to complete), an early right-to-sue
letter allows the agency to use those investigative resources
for cases in which complainants do not have as many
resources of their own. 40
2
The King court also was not persuaded by the variation of Martini
that Chief Judge Barker adopted in Simler. Unlike Martini, the
Simler court did not hold that a right-to-sue letter may not issue prior
to the expiration of the 180-day period. Instead, the Simler court held
that the dispositive question was whether the Commission's
investigation had been completed. If the Commission has
"completed" its "investigation" in fewer than 180 days, it may issue
a right-to-sue letter under the holding in Simler. The difficulty with
this rule, apart from the question of its connection to congressional
intent or administrative interpretation under Chevron, is that it raises
more questions than it answers. As Judge Hamilton suggested,
Simler "invites further litigation over just how much investigation"
is sufficient to satisfy the Commission's statutory duty of
investigation and permit the issuance of a right-to-sue letter prior to
the expiration ofthe 180-day period.40 3 If the Commission's statutory
402. Id. at 757-58 (footnotes and citations omitted).
403. Id. at 758-59. In Connor v. WTI, 67 F. Supp. 2d 690 (S.D. Tex. 1999), the
Southern District of Texas thought the view taken by the Ninth and Eleventh
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duty also extends to the seeking of conciliation, as it presumably
does, the same question might be raised in that regard.
Similarly, in Fernandes v. TPD, Inc., 4 Judge DiClerico of the
District of New Hampshire found Martini to be unpersuasive.
Although the District of Columbia Circuit in Martini had thought that
"Congress unambiguously intended for the 180-day period to
function [both] as a deadline for the EEOC to issue a right-to-sue
notice [and] as a minimum waiting period within which the EEOC
cannot issue a notice," the Fernandes court thought "Congress's
intent regarding this matter [to be] far from clear."'0 According to
Judge DiClerico, the statutory language is not revealing, and the
legislative history reflects two separate goals, namely, a preference
for discrimination charges to be resolved informally and an intention
that charges be resolved quickly.4 6 The court therefore observed
that:
Because of the EEOC's inability to promptly investigate
every charge it receives, these two goals are somewhat
contradictory. Congress struck a balance by ensuring that
claimants must wait no more than 180 days after filing a
charge before proceeding to court. The EEOC's early right-
to-sue regulation, allowing claimants to proceed before 180
days have passed, furthers Congress's goal of avoiding
unnecessary delay in resolving disputes. Moreover, the
regulation does not interfere with Congress's mandate that the
EEOC investigate charges any more than the 180-day
deadline does. It merely permits the EEOC to make an earlier
determination that it will not be able to investigate a particular
claim within 180 days. Therefore, the EEOC's early right-to-
sue notice regulation does not appear to contradict
Congressional intent, to the extent Congressional intent can
be discerned.0 7
The Fernandes court concluded that the agency's interpretation
was a permissible construction of its organic statute and, therefore,
valid under Chevron. In particular, the court noted that "[t]he
regulation reasonably allows the EEOC to exercise its expert
Circuits to be preferable to the view taken by the District of Columbia Circuit in
Martini, but also thought Martini distinguishable on the ground that the right-to-sue
letter in Connor had issued more than 120 days after the filing of the administrative
charge, at which time the Commission's mandatory investigation period had
passed. Id. at 697-98.
404. No. 99-33-JD, 2000 WL 1466108 (D.N.H. Jan. 7, 2000).
405. Id. at *3 (citation omitted).
406. Id. (citation omitted).
407. Id. (citations omitted).
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judgment in determining which charges are unlikely to be processed
within 180 days. 40 8
Finally, Judge Ludwig of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
engaged in a similar analysis and reached similar conclusions in
Seybert v. West Chester University.4 9 Analyzing the question under
Chevron, the court first considered the statutory text, which it found
to be "not particularly helpful," and then proceeded to discuss the
legislative history, which it found "not less equivocal. '410 With
respect to the latter, the court pointed out that depictions of the
Commission as the "preferred tribunal for resolving employment
discrimination claims" are offset by assertions that primary concern
must be given to protecting the "aggrieved person's option to seek
a prompt remedy in the best manner available. 41 ' The legislation
was not characterized by a single purpose, but by "multiple
objectives. 412 Thus, the court found it "unsurprising[]" that the
legislative history "does not conclusively point to a single
interpretation. '413 In these circumstances, the court's duty under
Chevron is clear: "The question is not whether the EEOC's view is
correct, or whether another view, such as Martini's, is incorrect, but
given the alternatives, whether the regulation is a plausible
interpretation of Section 2000e-5(f)(1). Under Chevron, that
suffices, and once upheld[,] the regulation is entitled to
deference. 414
On the one hand, the court was clear in upholding the
regulation. On the other hand, Judge Ludwig, like other courts, was
obviously uncomfortable with the degree of discretion that this
construction of the statute gave to the Commission. Thus, the court
attempted to draw a distinction between the "validity" of the
regulation and its "applicability," and purported to reserve for the
courts a significant role in reviewing administrative applications of
the regulation. Notwithstanding the ambiguities and complexity of
the statutory text and legislative history, the court asserted that
"[e]arly right to sue notices should not be issued as of course," that
the Commission "should not be regarded as a minor detour on the
way to court," and that the Commission must act in a way that
"assure[s] that misconception is not given credence. '415 The court
408. Id. at *4 (citation omitted).
409. 83 F. Supp. 2d 547 (E.D. Pa. 2000).
410. Id. at 551.
411. Id. at 551-52 (citation omitted).
412. Id. at 552.
413. Id.
414. Id.
415. Seybert, 83 F. Supp. 2d at 552-53.
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took some consolation from the Commission's professed practice
in issuing right-to-sue letters:
It is the position of the EEOC that right to sue notices are
issued only after careful consideration. Factors reviewed
include: the agency's need to conduct extensive witness
interviews; the respondent's history of cooperation; the time
between the filing of the charge and the request; the pending
caseload. Also, the policy of the Philadelphia office of the
EEOC is to afford a settlement opportunity before an early
notice is issued.416
Without any citation of authority, however, the court reserved to itself
the power to review the Commission's determinations under the
regulation: "If it appeared of record that a charge has received little,
if any, consideration other than the issuance of a right to sue notice,
a court should be able to remand the case for further administrative
processing." 417 Taken seriously, that reservation of authority would
doubtless require the Commission to justify its determination at the
request of every defendant and possibly to be second-guessed by the
courts, under not very clear standards, in virtually every case in which
a right-to-sue letter was issued during the 180-day period.
V. DEFERENCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
The case analysis drawn out in the preceding section
demonstrates, among other things, the difficulty of attempting to
follow a single issue in a dynamic and evolving area of law over the
course of a lengthy period of time in a vast, innovative, and
decentralized jurisdiction. Law is not a laboratory science, and it is
not possible in law to isolate a single variable, preserving an
otherwise controlled environment. One can hope to isolate a
particular issue and follow the course of its development, but every
issue has a logical geography and is situated at various times and in
various places within a complicated web of circumstances, including
other evolving issues, all of which are also characterized by various
degrees of constancy and change.418 Some webs of circumstances are
necessarily more dynamic than others, and some fields and periods of
time are more innovative and dynamic than others. Similarly, the
longer the period of time that is the subject of inquiry, the more
complex the relationships and interactions among variables are likely
416. Id. at 553 n.12.
417. Id. at 553.
418. See Barry Sullivan, Book Review, 4 Const. Commentary 452, 454-55
(1987).
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to seem. One can focus, then, on a particular variable, such as the
developing doctrine relating to judicial review of administrative
interpretations of law, and focus further on how that variable is
playing out with respect to a particular agency's interpretation of a
discrete portion of a single statutory provision. But one can only
attempt to pay close attention to such discrete things; one cannot truly
isolate them or remove them from the dynamic contexts and
circumstances that both affect them and contribute to their definition.
Other factors and other trends constantly intrude on the artificial
tidiness of a project such as this, and it is necessary to try and
appreciate the extent of their influence and significance.
With respect to the subject under discussion, the significance of
some of these background features became clear during the earliest
period we have considered. At the most basic level, both the statute
and its implementation evidence compromise and ambivalence. On
the one hand, the legislation's earliest proponents perceived an acute
need for fundamental change in a central aspect of American life. In
1964, after all, the system of industrial organization in many places
reflected the organization of social life in the broader community.
The system of industrial organization in various parts of the country
was therefore characterized by formal racial segregation in the
workplace, the structural relegation of racial minorities and women
to lower-paid work units and seniority lines, and the representation of
workers by racially-segregated or exclusionary local unions.419 On
the other hand, some congressional proponents of change were more
cautious, saw the need for change as less acute, and thought that the
main danger lay in proceeding either in directions that were
unintended or at speeds that were unwise. Yet another group of
legislators perceived any change to be unwarranted, unnecessary, and
even unconstitutional. It is not surprising, therefore, that both the
statutory text and the legislative history speak to many concerns, and
that they speak to them in ways that are far from consistent. Once
one goes beyond the general purpose of the statute, the statutory
language and the legislative history afford many opportunities for
419. See, e.g., Quarles v. Phillip Morris, 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968)(establishing the "present effects of past discrimination" concept of liability after
a formal system of racial segregation ended, but the company continued a
departmental seniority system in which blacks, wishing to transfer to formerly
white departments, would lose their seniority once they transferred); Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335, 97 S. Ct. 1843, 1854 (1977) (finding a pattern
and practice of discriminatory hiring practices when the company "regularly and
purposefully treated Negroes and Spanish-surnamed Americans less favorably than
white persons [by refusing] to recruit, hire, transfer and promote minority group
members on an equal basis with white people, particularly with respect to line-
driving positions").
430 [Vol. 62
BARRY SULLIVAN
principled disagreement. It is possible to claim that Congress
intended its goals in this area to be best accomplished by affording
victims of employment discrimination expeditious redress in the
forum of their choice. It is equally plausible to assert that Congress
was principally interested in achieving its goals through the
administrative resolution of charges of discrimination and without the
need for judicial intervention. It is also the case, however, that these
two goals are totally at odds in many cases, and in various ways that
Congress, attempting to create novel and untested solutions to long-
festering social problems, only dimly appreciated in 1964 or 1972,
when it enacted and revisted Title VII.
The statute which the Commission was charged with enforcing
was the product of political compromise, poor drafting, and often
unexplained parliamentary maneuvers. The conditions were well-
captured by the late insertion, by an opponent of the bill, of sex
discrimination as a prohibited (but undefined) form of
discrimination.42 The statute was both complex and unclear, and it
appeared to leave open many issues that needed to be settled. At the
same time, the final version of the statute contained no grant of
legislative or substantive rulemaking authority, which further
constricted the Commission's room to maneuver. The Commission
presumably could attempt to settle necessary details only through
procedural rules, to the extent that the open issues were procedural,
or through other avenues, such as the framing of guidelines that
would not have the force of law, but would be costly and time-
consuming to promulgate and implement. The need for further
elaboration was obvious. Yet the wisdom of dedicating scarce
resources to the formulation of guidelines might have seemed
somewhat questionable, particularly in view of their non-binding
character, the inherent complexity of the issues, the lack of guidance
which the statute provided for their resolution, the high costs of
attempting to resolve the issues in an intellectually and politically
satisfactory way, and the Commission's competing need for resources
to deal with its growing case backlog.
The ambivalence evidenced by the statutory language and
legislative history also manifested itself in the substantial delays that
accompanied the Commission's organization and staffing, and in the
levels of funding that Congress provided for the Commission during
its early years. Virtually from its inception, the Commission was
unable to keep current with its caseload, and its underfunded,
understaffed performance did little to inspire confidence.
Not surprisingly, Title VII defendants sought to take advantage
of these circumstances. On the one hand, they attempted to exploit
420. See, e.g., Kanowitz, supra note 262; Branch, supra note 102, at 231-34.
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the Commission's inability to keep current with its caseload by
arguing that the exhaustion doctrine prevented cases from being filed
in federal court unless the plaintiff could show that the Commission
had made real efforts to conciliate the dispute. Given the
Commission's caseload and funding levels, it was unlikely that
conciliation efforts could be undertaken or sustained in a large
number of cases. Absent proof of such efforts, however, the
defendants' theory would have required a case to be remitted to the
Commission for further "action." On the other hand, Title VIIdefendants also argued that the various statutory time limits should
be construed as one overall period of limitations, so that charging
parties might find that their claims were time-barred when the
Commission finally acted on them.
The courts eventually rejected both of these arguments, but two
points of continuing importance can be made about them. First, these
early cases tended to refer to the various statutory time limitations,
albeit mainly in an off-hand way, as "jurisdictional" requirements.
Even if unintended, this characterization proved important becausejurisdictional issues were traditionally thought to rest within the
province of the courts and to be less subject to deference than would
the very same issues framed in non-jurisdictional terms. An
assumption that the issue was jurisdictional was therefore likely to
engender a further assumption that the courts would have principal
responsibility for sorting it out. To the extent that this use ofjurisdictional language continued and hardened in later cases, it was
to have an important effect on the framing and resolution of the 180-
day question.
Second, these early cases contain virtually no discussion of any
role for the Commission to play in ascertaining the meaning and
proper application of this complex, confusing, and, in some respects,
essentially unfinished statute. In one sense, that may be attributable
to the off-hand characterization of these issues as "jurisdictional." Itis also consistent with the fact that the Commission had expressed its
views only in the context of litigation, and agency litigating positions
are not normally given great weight as indicators of statutory
meaning.42 Thus, the courts embarked on the process of construing
these "jurisdictional" requirements without having to focus on what
weight, if any, should be given to the Commission's views.42 At
421. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., et al., Legislation and Statutory Interpretation322 (2000); Lars Noah, 75 Tul. L. Rev. 137, 147-48 (2000). On the other hand, theCourt had no trouble relying on such a litigating position in Martin v. OSHRC, 499U.S. 144, 111 S. Ct. 1171 (1991), and Justice Scalia would have done so inChristensen. See Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 589-92, 120 S. Ct.1655, 1663-66 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).422. In cases in which the issue truly is jurisdictional, the weight to be given to
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about the same time, however, Justice Douglas articulated a different
view, when he dissented from the denial of certiorari in Crosslin v.
Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company4 2a on the ground
that the court of appeals had given insufficient attention to the
424Commission's views.
Although the first set of cases did not deal directly with the
problem of early right-to-sue letters, the second set, decided between
1972 and 1977, involved notices issued under the Commission's pre-
regulation practice of issuing early right-to-sue letters. In the second
set of cases, as in the first, there is much talk about the
"jurisdictional" nature of the time requirements under Title VII, and
the mode of analysis in the cases reflects that characterization. The
threshold question, as the Milner court suggested, is whether Section
706(0(1) simply requires the Commission to issue a right-to-sue
letter at the end of the 180-day period or also prohibits its issuance
before the end of that period. If the statute simply requires that a
right-to-sue letter be issued at the conclusion of the 180-day period,
and does not prohibit the Commission from doing so earlier, then the
Commission may issue an early right-to-sue letter, and there is no
problem. If, on the other hand, the statute is to be read as
affirmatively prohibiting the issuance of a right-to-sue letter before
the end of the 180-day period, it becomes necessary to determine the
precise extent and legal significance of that prohibition. Is there some
reason for characterizing the issue in "jurisdictional" terms? If so,
does it mean that the Commission has "exclusive jurisdiction" for the
180-day period, which it cannot waive or otherwise terminate, and
that the federal courts therefore necessarily lack subject matter
jurisdiction during the same period? Or, is it merely a question of
"primary"jurisdiction, which may be overcome when necessary? If
the prohibition is meant to be jurisdictional, is it absolute, or is there
room for modification? Finally, if the statutory prohibition does not
constitute a jurisdictional barrier to the issuance of an early right-to-
sue letter, how is the prohibition to be understood, and what limits are
to be placed on the Commission and the courts by virtue of the
prohibition?
In several of these cases, the Commission's views do come before
the court, even if only through the explanations that the Commission
has offered in the right-to-sue letters on which the cases are premised.
an agency's construction of its statute remains open. See, e.g., Ernest Gellhorn &
Paul Verkuil, Controlling Chevron-Based Delegations, 20 Cardozo L. Rev. 989
(1999). It appeared that the Court might answer this question in FDA v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Company, 529 U.S. 120, 120 S. Ct. 1291 (2000), but the
Court did not reach the issue.
423. 400 U.S. 1004,91 S. Ct. 562 (1971).
424. Id. at 1005, 91 S. Ct. at 563.
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For the most part, however, there is little opportunity for the
Commission's views to be taken into account in this group of cases,
and the courts apparently see little relevance to those views in any
event. As a general matter, these courts treat the issues presented
as straight questions of law which call for the exercise of judicial
expertise and experience rather than any special knowledge or
expertise that the Commission might have to offer. Moreover, thejudicial approach appears consistent across this group of cases.
Specifically, it does not seem to vary depending on whether the
court ultimately holds that Section 706(f)(1) does or does not
prohibit the issuance of a right-to-sue letter within the 180-day
period, or on whether the court ultimately deems such a prohibition
to be jurisdictional or not. There is little discussion of the issue in
terms of the Commission's authority to construe and implement its
organic act and make decisions about the allocation of its own
resources, let alone the degree of deference the courts might owe to
such administrative determinations.
One additional point may be made about this group of cases,
namely, the apparent lack of engagement with Supreme Court
precedent on the part of the lower courts. As we have seen, there
was a great deal of discussion in the Supreme Court cases during
this period concerning the degree of deference, if any, that might be
owed to the Commission's interpretations of Title VII. In his
dissent in General Electric Company v. Gilbert,425 for example,
Justice Brennan pointed out that the Court's previous cases had
given "great deference" to the Commission's interpretations of Title
VII, even when those interpretations occurred in the context of case
decisions or guidelines technically lacking the force of law.426 In
effect, Justice Brennan suggested that the Court had given special
weight to the Commission's interpretations in part, perhaps, because
of the novelty and difficulty of the subject matter with which they
were concerned. Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist
thought that the Commission's views were entitled to nothing more
than "consideration. '427 In other words, there was a lively debate in
the Supreme Court during this period concerning the proper
treatment of Commission interpretations of Title VII. Indeed, if
Justice Brennan's version is to be credited, there was a time before
Gilbert when the Supreme Court seemed to accord greater weight
than was otherwise customary to the Commission's views, and
without regard to the precise form in which those views were
presented. On the other hand, the cases decided by the lower courts
during this period appear to have been little affected by that debate.
425. 429 U.S. 125, 97 S. Ct. 401 (1976).
426. Id. at 156, 97 S. Ct. at 418 (citations omitted).
427. Id. at 141, 97 S. Ct. at410 (citations omitted).
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In the next set of cases, which spans the period from 1977 to
1984, there are two important factors that warrant mention at the
outset. First, the starting point for this period is marked by the
promulgation of the Commission's regulation. Thus, an important
question is the extent, if any, to which the courts' treatment of the
early right-to-sue letter problem was affected by the fact that the
issuance of such letters now rested, not merely on the Commission's
established practice, but on a procedural regulation of the kind that
Congress expressly authorized the Commission to promulgate.
Second, the courts continued during this period to characterize the
primary question as "jurisdictional." However, some courts began to
doubt the accuracy of this characterization, particularly after 1982,
when the Supreme Court, in Zipes v. Trans World Airlines,428
determined that another one of the time limits provided in Title VII
was not a jurisdictional requirement, but a period of limitations or
condition precedent to filing suit, and therefore subject to equitable
modification.
By and large, the existence of the regulation seems not to have
greatly affected the approach taken by the courts. Although some
courts now perceived the issue to concern the validity of the
regulation, rather than simply the legitimacy of a particular right-to-
sue letter, the legal analysis in most cases proceeded largely as it had
in the past. For most courts, the outlines of the approach already had
been determined, and the task was to apply the template without
giving much additional consideration to the administrative law aspect
of the problem. This attitude may be attributable in part to Justice
Rehnquist's overly-broad assertion in Gilbert, that Congress had not
conferred "rulemaking authority" (as opposed to substantive
rulemaking authority) on the Commission, but it certainly was
connected as well with a judicial disinclination to revisit settled
matters.
Even Judge Sofaer's thoughtful opinion in Spencer v. Banco
Real429 approached the problem as simply a straightforward question
of statutory construction for the courts to decide, without any
discussion of the Commission's possible role in construing the
statute. Notwithstanding the "convoluted" language of the relevant
statutory provision, Judge Sofaer, following Judge Renfrew, was able
to detect a clear congressional intent from the statutory language and
legislative history. Judge Sofaer thought that the overall structure of
the statute reflected the intended primacy of the administrative
process and the jurisdictional quality of the 180-day provision. He
dismissed out-of-hand the contrary policy arguments that the
428. 455 U.S. 385, 102 S. Ct. 1127 (1982).
429. 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1558 (1980).
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Commission raised, as an amicus curiae, based on its practical
experience in administering the statute. Moreover, Judge Sofaer
thought that his legal conclusions would have salutary effects on both
the agency and the courts; the former would have to become more
efficient, while the latter would be spared work that Congress
intended the Commission to perform. Judge Morton reached the
opposite result in Cattell v. Bob Frensley Ford, Inc.,430 as did the
Ninth Circuit in Bryant v. California Brewers Association,43' but the
analyses in those cases followed the same general lines. Those courts
mainly departed from Judge Sofaer in their reading of the statutory
language, which they construed as requiring the issuance of a right-
to-sue letter at the expiration of the 180-day period but not
necessarily prohibiting its earlier issuance. Like Judge Sofaer, those
courts gave little attention to questions of deference.
The period that began with Chevron and ended with Martini is an
interesting and lengthy one. From a theoretical perspective, this
period contains three major mileposts, although their ultimate,
practical significance may be disputed. In 1984, the Supreme Court
created the two-part test in Chevron. In 1988, the Court decided
Commercial Office Products, once more taking an expansive view of
the deference due to Commission interpretations of Title VII. In
1991, the Court decided Arabian American Oil Company. Without
mentioning Commercial Office Products, the Court announced in
Arabian American Oil Company that the Commission's
interpretations were entitled only to the degree of deference due under
Skidmore. In neither of these two Title VII cases did the Court talk
specifically about the Commission's statutory rulemaking authority,
much less the significance to be attributed to that grant of authority.
The practical significance of Commercial Office Products and
Arabian American Oil Company for the resolution of the 180-day
issue was considerably less than might have been expected. In the set
of early right-to-sue cases decided in the interval between Chevron
and Martini, the approach taken by the lower federal courts seems not
to have been greatly influenced by the lack of consistency within the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence. Indeed, the cases in this set
generally reflect an awareness of Chevron, but they do not invariably
refer to Chevron or its two-step analysis. Some cases also reflect a
degree of reliance on Commercial Office Products. In the main,
however, the cases also reflect the strong continued influence of the
themes and modes of analysis that characterized even the earliest
cases. Thus, this set of cases continues to be concerned with whether
430. 505 F. Supp. 617 (M.D. Tenn. 1980).
431. 585 F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 1978), vacated and remanded on other grounds,
California Brewers Ass'n v. Bryant, 444 U.S. 597, 100 S. Ct. 418 (mem.) (1980).
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the language of the 180-day provision of Section 706(f)(1) actually
precludes the issuance of right-to-sue letters prior to the end of the
180-day period, and, if so, whether the 180-day provision has
jurisdictional significance. On the other hand, Zipes and its progeny
seem to have taken some of the wind out of the sails of the
jurisdictional argument by this point, causing the use ofjurisdictional
nomenclature to be examined, rather than assumed. In addition, some
of these cases emphasized the specific statutory authority to
promulgate procedural rules that Congress had given to the
Commission, the procedural nature of the early right-to-sue letter
regulation, and the obligation of the courts to uphold such
regulations, so long as they do not directly contradict statutory
language or intent.432 The courts that struck down the regulation
during this period generally did so either because they construed
Section 706(f)(1) to create a 180-day period of exclusive agency
jurisdiction, which the Commission could not alter, or because they
found that the regulation was not entitled to deference because it
directly contradicted congressional intent.433
Compared to the overall length of the time period covered by this
article, the Martini period (July 1999 to December 2000) is a tiny
fraction, yet this period is also an important one from the perspective
of this project. The importance of the period does not rest on the
number of courts that rushed to follow the holding in Martini (those
were relatively few in number), but on the power and speed with
which the reasoning in Martini began to set the agenda for the
doctrinal debate. Essentially, Judge Tatel's opinion in Martini took
a tack different from that of every court that previously had addressed
the issue. Judge Tatel agreed in part with everyone; he agreed in full
with no one. The result Judge Tatel reached was one that others had
also reached, but the reasons he gave for reaching it were different
from those that others had given. At a time when overworked courts
are relieved to find a case on point, and tend to view their
responsibility as that of deciding whether to accept or reject the
reasoning of prior decisions, the intellectual ambition reflected in
Judge Tatel's opinion is itself noteworthy. In any event, by rejecting
the proposition that the Commission's regulation was invalid because
it was inconsistent with the plain meaning of Section 706(f)(1), the
Martini court essentially disagreed with all of the courts that
432. See, e.g., Rolark v. University of Chicago Hosps., 688 F. Supp. 401 (N.D.
Ill. 1988); Sims v. Trus Joist MacMillan, 22 F.3d 1059 (1 1th Cir. 1994); Hicks v.
Maruchan Virginia, Inc., No. 3:96cv549, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13754 (E.D. Va.
Sept. 3, 1996).
433. See, e.g., Henschke v. New York Hospital-Cornell Med. Ctr., 821 F. Supp.
166 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Montoya v. Valencia County, 872 F. Supp. 904 (D.N.M.
1994).
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previously had struck down the regulation. On the other hand, by
holding that the regulation was nonetheless invalid because it was
inconsistent with the Commission's duty under Section 706(b) to
investigate all charges of discrimination, Judge Tatel implicitly
disagreed with all the courts that had upheld the regulation.
Whether one ultimately agreed with Judge Tatel, the opinion was
a tour deforce. The opinion made a powerful argument to show that
the regulation could not justifiably be struck down, based on its
asserted inconsistency with Section 706(f)(1) of Title VII, under the
first step of the Chevron test. Thus, to invalidate the regulation in the
future under the first step of Chevron, it would be necessary to show
(1) that Judge Tatel had been wrong about the meaning of Section
706(f)(1), or (2) that the regulation was inconsistent with Section
706(b) and the statute as a whole. On the other hand, to uphold the
regulation, one would now be required to demonstrate that Judge
Tatel was incorrect in his understanding that the Commission's
statutory duty to investigate was inconsistent with the notion that
some charges of discrimination could be released from the
administrative process without either being investigated or having the
180-day period elapse. In other words, Martini moved the center of
the debate, and it did so immediately.
Thus, courts that previously might have relied on ajurisdictional
argument under Section 706(f)(1) quickly were won over to the new
analysis. For example, Judge McAvoy of the Northern District of
New York, where several judges had previously invalidated the
regulation based on its incompatibility with Section 706(f)(1), now
adopted the reasoning of Martini and rested his holding in Stetz v.
Reeher Enterprises434 on the duty to investigate under Section 706(b).
In that particular case, the record apparently contained no information
about the nature or extent of any investigation that might have
occurred, but Judge McAvoy was willing to assume, based on the
relative speed with which the right-to-sue letters had been produced,
that no such investigation could have occurred.435 Among other
things, the emphasis on the Commission's absolute and categorical
duty to investigate lent reinforcement to the idea (which some courts
had long found congenial) that disputes of this kind generally should
be settled within the confines of the Commission and should not
routinely be heard in federal court.436  On the other hand, some
434. 70 F. Supp. 2d 119 (N.D.N.Y. 1999).
435. Id. at 124.
436. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Connection Technology, Inc., 65 F. Supp. 2d 107,
112 (E.D.N.Y. 1999). Indeed, some courts had previously gone so far as to state
that a prime concern of those who drafted Title VII was to protect the federal courts
from an excessive caseload. See, e.g., Stetz v. Reeher Enterprises, Inc., 70 F. Supp.
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courts thought that the argument based on Section 706(b) showed less
than its proponents thought. After all, the fact that Section 706(b)
requires the Commission to "make an investigation" does not
necessarily mean that the Commission is required to make an
investigation of any particular kind. Nor, as Judge Zagel of the
Northern District of Illinois pointed out, does it necessarily mean that
the Commission is required to investigate for any particular length of
time, and certainly not necessarily for the 180-day period set forth in
Section 706(0(1). 437 In Judge Zagel's view, therefore, the duty to
investigate contained in Section 706(b) did not make the question of
the regulation's validity any more susceptible to resolution at the first
step of the Chevron analysis than it would have been if only Section
706(0(1) had been involved. Thus, the court was required to proceed
to the second step of the Chevron test, at which point the regulation
was upheld as a "permissible construction of the statute.4 3 ' Finally,
as other courts pointed out, the ultimate result in Martini represented
a construction of congressional intent that was far simpler and more
univocal than the reality. The depiction of the Commission as the
"preferred tribunal for resolving employment discrimination
claims '4 39 was technically correct, but misleading insofar as the
legislation is not dominated by that concern. As one court observed,
the legislation was not characterized by a single purpose, but by
"multiple objectives.""
At all events, the decision in Martini transformed the content or
terms of the debate over the early right-to-sue letter, and it did so in
a spirit that even new decisions by the Supreme Court have not been
able to capture. Martini did not announce any new legal principle,
but simply took a fresh look at materials that had been on the table for
a long time. Other courts did not necessarily agree with the
conclusion in Martini, but they did respond to the way in which
Martini had redefined the question. Most important, the decision in
2d 119, 123 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) (explaining that an early issuance of a right-to-sue
letter would result in an "emasculation of the clear statutory language of Title VII
and the Congressional policy underlying Title VII, which is aimed at having the
EEOC, rather than the courts, resolving disputes involving unlawful employment
practices"). In Olszewski v. Bloomberg L.P., No. 96 Civ. 3393 (RPP), 1997 WL
375690 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 1997), Judge Patterson attributed a perceived increase in
the number of early right-to-sue letters to the Commission's effort "to unload its
backlog of Title VII cases on the courts, [thus] frustrating the concept of a two-tier
resolution of such cases as envisioned by Congress." Id. at *4.
437. Berry v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 890 (N.D. Ill. 1999).
438. Id. at 892.
439. See, e.g., Sebert v. West Chester Univ., 83 F. Supp. 2d 547, 551 (E.D. Pa.
2000); Richardson v. Valley Asphalt, Inc., 109 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1337 (D. Utah
2000).
440. Sebert, 83 F. Supp. 2d at 552.
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Martini reflected no new mode or style of analysis. As in the earliest
cases we have considered, Judge Tatel looked at the regulation from
the perspective that the issue was a question of law to be decided by
the courts. If anything, his decision to look to other sections of this
complex and somewhat contradictory statute took that mode of
analysis to a new level, reinforcing the degree to which the courts
would feel free to "say what the law is." After increasing the number
of variables in this way, the court necessarily expanded the range and
number of resources the courts could use to dominate the
conversation.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the final analysis, this study may have raised more questions
than it has answered. That is not surprising, given the narrow
windows through which we have attempted to view the very large
issues to which we have directed our attention. As suggested at the
outset, the methodology we have chosen necessarily requires
repetition. The longitudinal study of a single issue provides a
powerful focus, but it also is subject to inherent limitations. The
issue and its context may be unique in certain respects, and evolving
doctrine in related areas may influence the study in ways that are
difficult to sort out. It is only through repetition, that is, through
application of this methodology to a number of different issues, that
it would be possible to test in a reliable, definitive, and systematic
way the conclusions that present themselves in such a study.
Hopefully, others will attempt parallel studies with respect to similar
issues and thus provide the framework necessary for evaluating the
broader significance of those conclusions. On the other hand, the
present study provides a strong basis for making some compelling
observations about a number of subjects, including the extent to
which the Supreme Court's decisions have actually influenced the
development of the law in this area, the limitations inherent in
attempting to apply a bright-line test like Chevron to a multi-vocal
statute that is the product of compromise and defies efforts at simple
construction, and the continuing power of the natural, institutionally
self-interested inclinations of the courts in matters of statutory
construction.
First, it seems clear that Chevron and its progeny have had a
tangible and significant effect on the lower federal courts' treatment
of the 180-day issue, although the effect of all of the Supreme Court's
various holdings appears to be more modest than one might have
predicted. For example, the Supreme Court suggested in several pre-
Gilbert decisions that the Commission's interpretations of its organic
statute should be entitled to "great deference," regardless of the
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specific form those interpretations take. But the 180-day cases
decided by the lower federal courts before Gilbert provide scant
evidence of such an approach. On the other hand, the pre-Gilbert
lower court decisions do not necessarily evidence the courts'
adherence to any competing deference principle, such as that laid
down in Skidmore. In many of the relevant Supreme Court cases, of
course, the discussion of deference comes only at the conclusion of
the Court's independent statutory analysis, and its purpose is typically
limited to providing additional justification for the Court's own view
of the statute. If anything, the lower federal courts' pre-Gilbert 180-
day cases take their cue from that practice and attempt to ascertain the
meaning of the statutory provision themselves without the assistance
of (or any particular regard for) the views expressed by the agency.
Similarly, given Justice Rehnquist's pronouncement in Gilbert
-that the Commission's interpretations of Title VII were entitled
only to some "consideration" rather than the "great deference"
suggested in earlier cases--one might have expected a sea change in
the lower court cases. In the main, however, the post-Gilbert 180-day
cases are substantively and methodologically consistent with the
cases that came before. Perhaps because the lower courts in the pre-
Gilbert cases had shown little interest in the on-going theoretical
discussions about deference, Justice Rehnquist's reformulation of the
law in Gilbert also seems to have had little direct or explicit effect on
their thinking. Thus, while one might have expected judicial
consideration of the new procedural regulation to include discussion
of the Commission's statutory authority to issue procedural rules, the
courts apparently had little reason to emphasize the deference
principle in framing the issue prior to Gilbert, and they saw no greater
reason to do so afterwards. Nor was there any occasion for taking
issue with Justice Rehnquist's overly broad assertion that the
Commission lacked "rulemaking authority." In any event, the lower
federal courts in the pre-Chevron period settled into a pattern of
conflict with respect to the validity of early right-to-sue letters, but
that conflict was based on the courts' own disagreements about the
meaning of Title VII; it seems to have been little influenced by
upstream disagreements about the degree of deference to be paid
agency interpretations of law.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court's decision in Chevron
clearly influenced the approach that the lower federal courts took to
the early right-to-sue letter cases. By creating this two-step mode of
inquiry, the Court in Chevron established an approach that courts
would be required to follow, at least formally, in ascertaining the
validity of administrative interpretations of law. Especially at the
beginning, courts seemed indifferent to the test and sometimes failed
to acknowledge it If courts departed from the template, however,
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their lack of adherence to the requirements of precedent would be
obvious. In addition, the influence of Chevron was not simply
formal. The importance of the Chevron regime extended to
substantive outcomes, as well as to the framing of issues. One
might think that the Chevron test was sufficiently open-textured,
and, in some respects, ill-defined as to make the result of its
application in a particular case somewhat open to question. To
some extent, of course, that is true. On the other hand, application
of the test to the early right-to-sue letter problem became quite
regular in at least one respect: The courts that struck down the
regulation typically did so at the first step of the Chevron analysis,
while those that upheld the regulation did so at the second step.
Those that struck down the regulation did so on the ground that the
plain language of Section 706(f)(1) manifested an unambiguous
congressional intent that right-to-sue letters not issue during the
180-day period, except where a charge has been dismissed. Those
that upheld the regulation invariably thought that the language of
Section 706(f)(1) was far from "unambiguous" and found that the
Commission's interpretation was supported on legal and policy
grounds, taking into account the overall purpose and structure of the
statute. In either event, however, the courts also continued to be
concerned with the same types of issues with which they had been
concerned from the outset, and they often continued to frame their
concerns in the same terms as before.
Similarly, one might have thought that the broad language of
Commercial Office Products would have had a strong impact on the
case law in the lower federal courts, both during the period when
Commercial Office Products stood alone as the Court's definitive
statement about the weight to be given the Commission's
interpretation of its organic statute, and in the period after it was
"modified" by Arabian American. While these Supreme Court
decisions obviously figure importantly in the early right-to-sue
letter case law as specific applications of Chevron to the problems
that arise under Title VII, they do not command center stage with
quite the force one would expect. Many Of the later cases, for
example, do not analyze the issue in terms of the procedural
character of the 180-day regulation, the Commission's explicit
authority to promulgate procedural rules, or the meaning to be
derived from a harmonization of Commercial Office Products and
Arabian American. The cases also pay scant attention to the fact
that the rule, although adopted pursuant to rulemaking authority and
according to notice-and-comment procedures, is not, technically
speaking, a "legislative" or "substantive" rule. Again, these cases
evidence a continuing preoccupation with the same themes and
issues that captured the attention of the courts in earlier periods.
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In a sense, perhaps, the decision in Martini has had as strong an
influence on this debate as have the various cases decided by the
Supreme Court. Of course, Martini builds on Chevron and its
progeny, and its importance cannot be divorced from that fact or
those cases. On the other hand, the influence of Martini has been
remarkable. Since Martini is not a Supreme Court decision, its
influence in resetting the terms of the debate is therefore due not to
the formal authority of the court's decision, but to other factors,
including, no doubt, the pre-eminent position and reputation of the
District of Columbia Circuit in administrative law matters, but also,
and perhaps more important, to the ambition and manifest seriousness
of its intellectual purpose. That intellectual ambition and seriousness
is manifest in the emphasis the Martini court placed on the need not
simply to reach the right result, but to reach the right result for the
right reasons-an approach that required the court to undertake an
analysis of the issue along lines that were both new and quite
different from those that had been pursued previously. The
seriousness and thoroughness of the court's approach is both unusual
and compelling in today's World where the press ofjudicial business,
particularly with respect to preliminary issues typically decided at the
pretrial motion stage, often tempts judges to solve problems not by
confronting them directly, but by placing excessive reliance on the
conclusions previously adopted by other courts. In this way, judges
are tempted to search for "plausible" answers to the issues they
confront. As in other areas, many of the early right-to-sue letter
decisions reflect the influence and effects of these constraints. The
early right-to-sue cases also reflect a style of opinion writing that
seems to thrive in our time, namely, one that pays scant attention to
opposing views, exudes certainty, and treats the result the court has
reached as inevitable, self-evident, uncontroversial, and not fairly
subject to question. It is at least ironic that such a rhetorical posture
should be pressed into service on behalf of decisions which, at best,
too often reflect only the firm conviction that the intellectual work of
a previous decision maker is "credible" and that the result is
"plausible." In truth, these issues are not simple or straightforward,
and they cannot be because the statutory and legislative materials on
which they are based are themselves equivocal. This is true whether
the decisions be based on preferring one construction to another on
substantive grounds or by virtue of the degree of deference that may
or may not be due.
The influence of Martini can be explained, at least in part, by the
freshness of the analysis and by the court's manifest willingness to
think through the issues in a new way. The freshness of Judge Tatel's
approach was particularly influential because Martini was decided at
a point when the Chevron analysis of the 180-day provision had
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become exhausted, at least in the terms in which it had been framed.
The problem cried out for a final answer from the Supreme Court, or,
lacking that, for an infusion of new thought-an alternative way of
defining the issue. Martini provided that element by conceding that
the regulation could not be struck down solely under Section
706(f)(1) and by shifting the focus to the duty to investigate under
Section 706(b). To applaud the ambition and power of Judge Tatel's
opinion is not, of course, to agree with its conclusions. Judge Tatel's
reliance on the "plain language" of Section 706(b) is also
problematic, as Judge Zagel and others have ably demonstrated, and
it is doubtful that Judge Tatel's resetting of the terms of the debate
will have a lasting effect. At the end of the day, the reasons for the
intellectual exhaustion of the debate have as much to do with the
ultimately unsatisfactory nature of the legislative materials as with the
courts' efforts at statutory construction. Moreover, Martini has
captured only the terms of the debate; most courts have rejected its
ultimate resolution of the question.
Most important, Martini was able to capture the debate not
because what it had to offer was truly new, but because it was new
only in a limited sense. The court's mode or style of analysis was
actually similar to that of the cases that came before; it was different
only in the sense that the Martini court chose to look at an additional
section of the statute which others had neglected. If anything, by
broadening the focus of the court's inquiry to include more sections
of this complex and sometimes inconsistent statute, the Martini court
reinforced the approach seen in the earlier cases and actually
increased the likelihood that decisions with respect to the meaning
and application of the statute would remain the work of the judges
rather than administrators.
Second, the uncertain results of applying the Chevron test to the
early right-to-sue letter problem may say something about the
efficacy of the test itself. One ostensible purpose of the Chevron test
is to simplify the old method of analysis, taking us' away from the
need to engage in a multi-variable, holistic analysis and bringing this
area under the discipline of bright-line tests. In this general way, the
Chevron approach is thought to reduce the authority of the courts and
enhance the relative power of the popular branches of government,
including the bureaucracies they have created to assist them in their
work. There are, however, at least two problems with this view.
First, as Justice Scalia has pointed out, the articulation of the first
prong of the Chevron test in terms of the "precise question at issue"
indirectly confers a great deal of discretion on the courts. In the
present context, for example, it seems hard to sustain the proposition
that Congress has spoken "unambiguously" on this subject whether
one considers only Section 706(f)(1) or the statute as a whole; yet,
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many courts have struck down the regulation on this basis. In other
contexts, it is undoubtedly the case that courts have found
"ambiguities" only through fly-specking at the Chevron step-one
phase of the inquiry. Second, the Chevron test also has the purpose
of disciplining and directing the legislative process, thus making it
easier for the courts to discharge their reviewing functions. As
Justice Scalia has also suggested, the advantage of an ostensibly
bright-line test like Chevron over a holistic approach is that the
former makes it easier for Congress to know and conform to the rules
that the courts will apply. That is true, of course, and assuming that
the Supreme Court really does have Congress's attention,"' a bright-
line test may be useful for that reason, at least in some circumstances.
On the other hand, one need not be jaded or impious to wonder how
often Congress loses much collective sleep during the legislative
process worrying about the Supreme Court's possible reaction to draft
legislation. Even if one were convinced that Congress regularly gave
strong consideration in the legislative process to the Court's possible
evaluation of legislation, one might still reasonably wonder how
much difference such consideration would make. In circumstances
such as those that led to the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, Congress may well have been ignorant as to the rules, but it is
doubtful that Congress could have done anything different if it had
known the rules. Clearly, the inadequacies in the statutory language,
and the ultimate inability of even the legislative history to provide a
convincing cure for those inadequacies, is due to a profound lack of
congressional agreement about the scope and significance of the
statutory enterprise itself.
If that is indeed the case, it may not be clear that a bright-line test
is necessarily preferable to a more openly judgmental and honestly
holistic approach. Certainly, an attempt to fit the issue into the
template through efforts to find clarity (or the lack thereof) in
doubtful cases does not seem preferable to an honest recognition of
the need for judgment. If the process of statutory construction is to
be determined by the application of a default rule with respect to
factors over which Congress has little control, the bright-line test may
441. In INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983), the Court
invalidated the legislative veto on which Congress had relied in attempting to limit
the exercise of executive discretion. The legislative veto had been used into more
than 200 laws in fifty years. Id. at 967, 103 S. Ct. at 2792 (White, J. dissenting).
See also Murray Dry, The Congressional Veto and the Constitutional Separation
of Powers, in The Presidency and the Constitutional Order 195 (Joseph Bessette &
Jeffrey Tulis eds., 1980). From 1983 to 1990, Congress enacted more than 100
such legislative veto provisions. See Jonathan L. Entin, Separation of Powers, the
Political Branches and the Limits of Judicial Review, 51 Ohio St. L.J. 175, 225
n.328 (1990).
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simplify the responsibility of the courts, but it will not necessarily
lead to better results in terms of the search for legislative intent. At
bottom, however, one might wonder about the efficacy of the
Supreme Court's current jurisprudence, which seemingly conditions
application of Chevron or Skidmore on the nature of the medium used
by an agency to express its views. The character of the organic
statute might seem a more relevant factor.
Third, something should be said about the nature of the problem
itself, and the posture in which it appears for judicial resolution,
because those elements also are important factors in this project.
First, Congress's decision to give limited enforcement powers to the
Commission and depend principally on enforcement through private
litigation has continued importance for the proper resolution of this
issue. As we have seen, questions relating to the Commission's
regulation have principally been raised in the context of private
litigation in which the Commission is not typically a party. During
the period prior to the promulgation of the regulation, the litigation
of this issue was not only characterized by the absence (generally
speaking) of the Commission as a party before the court, but it was
also characterized by the absence of a formal and easily accessible
statement of the agency's reasons for adopting this interpretation.
Those circumstances were not congenial to the affording of
consideration, let alone deference, to agency decisions, whatever the
appropriate rule of construction might be.
In addition, the way in which these issues were characterized in
those early cases has had a substantial continuing effect on theirjudicial treatment. Indeed, the same arguments aboutjurisdiction and
the respective roles of the agency and the courts in the enforcement
scheme have tended to characterize the consideration of these issues
from the beginning. One of those arguments, of course, involves the
workload of the federal courts and how the Commission's
interpretation of Section 706(f)(1) will affect that workload. It was
part of the discussion long before Chevron, and it remains part of the
discussion now. Indeed, some courts have taken this concern so
seriously as to suggest that an important purpose of the administrative
scheme set up in Title VII was to protect the federal courts from
additional work. That argument seems far-fetched, at least in that
form, but there is obviously a strong congruency between the
construction afforded by some courts and their institutional self-
interest.442 Moreover, the courts' collective concern is certainly not
442. The avoidance is only temporary, at least in theory, since most of these
cases will not be settled under a regime in which they are never reached for
substantive treatment. On the other hand, it is not clear how many cases will be
abandoned during the 180-day period or what the profile of those claims might be
in terms of merit. If meritorious claims are abandoned during the period, that fact
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misplaced given the large number of Title VII cases that are filed in
the federal courts, the substantial amount ofjudicial time and energy
that these fact-intensive cases typically require, and the relatively
small number of cases in which plaintiffs ultimately prevail on the
merits." 3 The present system seems to require a great investment
from the courts while promising little additional justice in return.
Nonetheless, it is fair to say that the judiciary's institutional self-
interest is at least as strong as that to which some courts have pointed
in suggesting that the Commission's interpretation was motivated by
the desire to "dump" its surplus cases on the courts. The courts that
take this view seem to put great faith in the Commission's ability to
investigate charges without adequate resources, but not in the
Commission's ability to interpret and implement its organic act.
Finally, and most important, the courts' discussion of these issues
reflects their traditional methodologies and concerns, and, to the
extent that the cases reflect judicial concern with the ultimate
meaning of the statute, as opposed to the reasonableness of the
Commission's interpretation, those methodologies and concerns take
on considerable importance. One is hard-pressed to assign a
dominant role to the Chevron test in this particular area; even the
judicial opponents of early right-to-sue letters seem disinclined to
analyze the issue in Chevron terms, giving little attention even to the
question whether the Commission's regulation meets the threshold
requirements for Chevron deference. Whatever the appropriate
standard of review, it seems difficult in practice for the courts to act
in a way that is not rooted, at least implicitly, in an understanding that
their role is to say what the law is, and to do so from a position that
is privileged in comparison to that held by those whose job is merely
to administer and execute the law. Ultimately, the cases we have
considered do involve a "swinging door,"' if not ofjurisdiction, as
would obviously give cause for concern.
443. In recent years, as we have noted, approximately 21,000 to 24,000 private
employment discrimination lawsuits have been filed each year. See supra note
100. The public and private costs of pursuing such litigation are substantial, and
the recoveries tend too be small. See, e.g. Colin P. Johnson, Comment, Has
Arbitration Become a Wolf in Sheep's Clothing?: A Comment Exploring the
Incompatibility Between Pre-Dispute Mandatory Binding Arbitration Agreements
in Employment Contracts and Statutorily Created Rights, 23 Hamline L. Rev. 511,
535-36 (2000) (explaining that the potential damage award in Title VII cases is low
and the cost of litigating a Title VII case is high); John J. Donohue III & Peter
Siegelman, Law and Macroeconomics: Employment Discrimination Litigation
Over the Business Cycle, 66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 709, 711 (1993) (fimding that the
number of employment discrimination lawsuits filed in federal courts jumps
dramatically and the plaintiff win rate falls when the economy goes into a
recession).
444. See Grimes v. Pitney Bowes, 480 F. Supp. 1381, 1385 (N.D. Ga. 1979).
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the court suggested in Grimes, then at least of competence and
responsibility. On one side of the door are Article III courts; on the
other side of the door are bureaucrats. How the door swings, and how
work is apportioned between the rooms, is critically important, and
nowhere more so than when decisions are made about internal agencyprocedures, the assignment of agency priorities, and the allocation of
agency resources.
In other words, the approach taken by these courts consciously
and necessarily reinforces their entitlement to say "what the law is,"
even when the law is profoundly unclear, while the courts also seek
to protect themselves, at least in the short term, from having to decide
factual disputes that they think more appropriate to the status of an
administrative agency. Charles Hough is said to have remarked that
he cared not who laid down the law of the land, so long as he was
able to find the facts." 5 It is ironically appropriate, in an age when
the power of law is exaggerated by friend and foe alike, and theory
reigns supreme, that this realist dictum should be turned on its head.
445. See Wade H. McCree, Jr., Bureaucratic Justice: An Early Warning, 129
U. Pa. L. Rev. 777, 797 (1981).
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